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A B S T R A C T
Inaccurate software cost estimates continue causing project over-
runs and hurting firms’ economy. This thesis addresses the
problem by focusing on top management role in applying estim-
ation methodologies successfully in organisations. The research
questions are 1) How does top management support software
cost estimation, and 2) What are the impacts of top management
support for creating a good cost estimate for a software project?
Three empirical studies, one quantitative and two qualitative,
were conducted to address the research questions. The studies
identified practices, through which top management is involved
in cost estimation, and collected evidence on the impact of prac-
tices on estimation success. The quantitative study is based on
views of 114 Finnish software professionals, and the quantitat-
ive studies are based on in-depth findings from three Finnish
software producing companies and projects.
The results show that top management support for estimation
is mostly indirect. Management focuses on creating a successful
environment for estimation instead of hands-on participation.
The key factors of top management support include adequate re-
sources, demonstrating the importance of estimation and seeking
realism. This indirect role is enough for successful estimation.
On the other hand, the results provide evidence that top man-
agement may negatively impact estimation. For example, unclear
expectations may cause the project team to aim for the wrong
outcome, expressed expectations may bias estimation and in-
terpreting estimates as commitments may decrease estimators’
motivation and cause them to give high estimates.
The practical implication is that top management should avoid
direct participation in software estimation and focus on sustain-
ing a supportive and unbiased environment. By doing this, many
projects should be able to avoid failures hurting firms’ compet-
itiveness. From the research perspective, the results provide
evidence that people-related perspectives are an important factor
in software estimation, implying that a shifting focus from meth-
odologies toward managerial topics is justified.
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T I I V I S T E L M Ä
Epätarkat ohjelmistoprojektien kustannusarviot johtavat suun-
nitelmien ylittymiseen ja rasittavat yritysten taloutta. Tämä väi-
töskirja keskittyy ylimmän johdon rooliin arviointimenetelmien
menestyksekkäässä soveltamisessa organisaatioissa. Väitöskirjan
tutkimuskysymykset ovat 1) kuinka ylin johto tukee ohjelmis-
tojen kustannusarviointia ja 2) mitä vaikutuksia johdon tuella
hyvän kustannusarvion laatimiseksi on ohjelmistoprojektille?
Väitöskirjan tulokset perustuvat yhteen määrälliseen ja kahteen
laadulliseen tutkimukseen. Tutkimukset tunnistivat tapoja, joilla
johto osallistui kustannusarviointiin sekä keräsi näyttöä osallistu-
miskäytänteiden vaikutuksista arvioinnin onnistumiseen. Mää-
rällinen tutkimus pohjautuu 114 suomalaisen ohjelmistoammatti-
laisen näkemyksiin, kun taas laadulliset tutkimukset pohjautuvat
löydöksiin kolmen suomalaisen ohjelmistoyrityksen toteuttamista
kolmesta ohjelmistoprojektista.
Tulokset osoittavat, että ylimmän johdon tuki arvioinnille on
pääasiallisesti epäsuoraa. Johto keskittyy hyvien edellytysten luo-
miseen sen sijaan, että osallistuisi arviointiin henkilökohtaisesti.
Tärkeimpiin tapoihin tukea arviointia kuuluvat mm. riittävien
resurssien varmistaminen ja realististen arvioiden tavoittelu. Yllä
kuvattu epäsuora osallistuminen on riittävää arvioinnin onnistu-
miseksi. Toisaalta johdon toimet voivat myös vaikuttaa arviointiin
negatiivisesti. Esimerkiksi epäselvät tavoitteet saattavat johtaa
väärien asioiden tavoitteluun, johdon esittämät odotukset voivat
vääristää arvioinnin tuloksia ja arvioiden tulkitseminen lupauk-
siksi voi laskea arvioitsijoiden motivaatiota ja johtaa perusteetto-
man korkeiden arvioiden antamiseen.
Esitettyjen tulosten perusteella johdon pitäisi välttää suoraa
osallistumista arviointiin ja keskittyä arviointia tukevan ilmapii-
rin luomiseen. Näillä toimilla useat projektit voisivat todennä-
köisesti välttää yrityksille vahingolliset epäonnistumiset. Tutki-
musnäkökulmasta tulokset osoittavat, että inhimilliset tekijät ovat
merkittävässä roolissa kustannusarvioinnissa, ja lisäpanostukset
johtamisnäkökulmien tutkimiseen ovat perusteltuja.
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S Y N O P S I S

1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The global software industry has emerged as a significant busi-
ness segment in the last few decades [19], with five tech compan-
ies achieving the highest market value in the world (2017): Apple,
Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon and Facebook [34]. At the same
time, the products and services of an increasingly broad spec-
trum of companies are becoming more dependent on software.
As a result of this development, global Research & Develop-
ment spending on software increased by 65% between 2010 and
2015 [116], and there is no slow-down in sight. Technologies
like AI and IoT promising significant efficiency gains and profits
guarantee continued investments in software-related innovations.
Technology has begun to replace not only industrial workers but
also information workers at a growing rate.
As a result of these developments, the success of software more
frequently dictates the success of a company. The timing of a
product launch is an important factor for product and company
success. Delayed product launches have been found to cause, for
instance, lower product margins, increased cost and decreases in
firms’ market value [49]. However, software projects are often
unpredictable. They tend to overrun their schedules and budgets
[30, 53, 44, 136], usually by a significant margin [101], causing
hundreds of billions of euros in losses annually [38, 100, 106].
Considering the importance of understanding the time and
cost required to develop software, practitioners and researchers
have tried to estimate these parameters since the beginning of
software’s history, with the earliest studies dating back to the
1960s. Since then, software cost estimation has developed into
a significant body of knowledge with hundreds of different es-
timation techniques and methodologies [97, 67] and is being
included in all major project management and process improve-
ment frameworks, including CMMI [17], PMBOK [56] and IPMA ICB
[54].
3
4 introduction
1.1 what is a cost estimate?
Simply speaking, a software project cost estimate is a prediction
of how long a project will take to implement and how much it
will cost. A classical view of the estimation process is presented
in Figure 1.1, where a chosen methodology is applied to create
an estimate for effort, duration and cost, or loading, of a soft-
ware based on the requirements and other cost drivers such as
developers’ experience and skill-level, programming language,
size of the project and type of software to be developed. Almost
always, the size of the software is estimated first, which is then
converted into effort, schedule and budget.
Figure 1.1: Classical view of software estimation process. Adapted
from [140].
The reality is more complex. Many times, an estimate is con-
fused with the concepts of target, commitment and plan. Typ-
ically, when business management asks for an estimate, they
are actually interested in getting a commitment or plan to hit
a certain target. These misconceptions need to be rectified to
ensure that an estimate is utilised in a meaningful way and errors
are avoided. The requirements are also seldom clear or consist-
ent when the estimation commences, and there are other inputs
than cost drivers that need attention, such as financial and other
resource constraints, software process and overall company soft-
ware architecture. A more precise SCE process is presented in
Figure 1.2.
Estimates are used to prepare a project plan and control a pro-
ject toward its targets. Project control activities include making
decisions related to estimation outputs, such as adding or re-
moving requirements or staffing or architectural changes. Project
execution involves dealing with a plethora of unforeseen events,
which usually invalidate the inputs, or assumptions, used for pre-
1.1 what is a cost estimate? 5
Figure 1.2: Actual software estimation process. Adapted from [140].
paring the estimate. This typical project control flow is illustrated
in Figure 1.3.
Changes in the estimation assumptions call for re-estimation
to gauge the impact of the changes on the estimate and whether
the project can be controlled to meet its goals. Another reason
for re-estimation is the gathering of new and more precise in-
formation regarding estimation inputs as the project progresses.
Utilising this information enables refined and more accurate es-
timations, which are valuable for maintaining a reliable project
status and controlling the project. This improved understanding
of estimation inputs and their impact on the estimation accuracy
can be illustrated with a cone of uncertainty [13], presented in
Figure 1.4. According to the cone, the initial estimate is inaccur-
ate and subject to an estimation error of 4x magnitude. When
the project progresses under competent project management, the
cone starts narrowing fast, indicating improved accuracy of the
estimates.
As presented above, SCE deals with a lot of uncertainty, and
estimates are inaccurate by nature, especially in the beginning of
a project. This brings us back to the purpose of estimation and
the definition of an estimate. Considering the uncertainties and
changes described above, it would not make sense, or even be
possible, to try to predict the outcome of the project accurately.
Thus, the real value of an estimate is to help executives set good
targets and help project management make good plans and take
appropriate action to control the project toward achieving its
6 introduction
Figure 1.3: Project control flow. Adapted from [97].
Figure 1.4: Cone of uncertainty; variability in the estimate by project
phase. Adapted from [12].
goals. Based on this realisation, Steve McConnell [97] has defined
a good estimate as follows:
A good estimate is an estimate that provides a clear enough view of
the project reality to allow the project leadership to make a good
decision about how to control the project to hit its targets.
— Steve McConnell
1.2 estimation methodologies
The actual estimation methodologies are often divided into two
categories in the literature, model-based and expert judgement-
based [101]. In both categories, most of the steps are explicit,
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i.e., they are clear and can be described in detail. Examples of
these explicit steps include breaking down the work into smaller
pieces and combining these pieces into a whole. The difference
between the categories emerges from steps for quantifying the
size of software. In expert judgement-based methods, an expert,
typically a software developer, assesses the size of a software
artefact, while in model-based methods, the size is estimated
based on input parameters, which convert into lines of code or
function points based on a mechanical formula. Input parameters
used by model-based methods may include several screens or
reports and their complexity. However, it must be noted that
estimating the complexity of a report, for example, is not de-
terministic and includes an element of expert judgement. In
expert judgement-based methods, one or more experts estimate
the size of a software artefact, like a screen or report, based on
their judgement. This part of the estimation process is based
on intuition, or a cognitive process, and cannot be described in
detail. Popular model-based processes include COCOMO [13] and
SEER–SEM [58], while popular expert judgement-based processes
include Planning Poker [43] and Work Breakdown Structure [97,
p. 117].
Neither of the method categories produce good results con-
sistently. On the contrary, systematic overruns persist [30, 53,
44]. However, there are signs that the improvement of model-
based methods is slowing down after decades of work, while
judgement-based methods still seem to have significant potential
for improvement [63, 67]. Research results also show that model-
based processes cannot outperform judgement-based methods
systematically, and judgement-based methods seem to produce
better results in most situations [61]. Jørgensen [68] has proposed
that this advantage of judgement-based methods would originate
from experts’ higher degree of knowledge of the estimation sub-
ject and their flexibility in processing this information. Models
cannot incorporate all contextual parameters in a meaningful way.
Modelling the relationships between the high number of para-
meters is complex and time-consuming, and understanding the
importance of the parameters is critical. While parametric mod-
els cannot process contextual information effectively, judgement-
based models are exposed to human biases, as the estimates
are based on a thinking process. However, as mentioned above,
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despite these weakness in judgement-based processes, they out-
perform parametric models in most situations. Therefore, it is
not surprising that software engineers have adopted the use of
judgement-based processes to a high degree [71, 52, 80].
1.3 estimation biases and distortions
As expert judgement-based processes have gained popularity
within the software industry, the research focus for improving
the methodologies has also expanded. One important focus area
is human biases distorting estimation. This is understandable,
since the quantification of the software size or effort is based
on human thinking processes. Reportedly, biases can emerge
from various sources such as customer expectations [71], lack of
separation between a bid (‘price-to-win’) and realistic effort us-
age [72], variations in wording, future opportunities or irrelevant
information [66]. In addition, the selection of estimators affects
estimation success. Estimators with more relevant experience [70,
64], more realistic track records on previous estimates, higher de-
velopment skills and self-perceptions that are less than averagely
optimistic [65] tend to produce more realistic estimates.
Cognitive biases are not the only factors distorting estimation.
Many practitioners have argued that factors emerging from or-
ganisational contexts are equally important as estimation process-
related factors [67, 94]. Indeed, some recent studies have found
that organisational factors and even intentional distortions are
common. For example, in a study by Magazinius, Börjesson and
Feldt [94], 13 of 15 interviewees reported having experienced
some type of estimate distortion. Published research papers re-
port that organisational phenomena such as negotiations [95],
hidden agendas [73] and selling ideas [94] distort estimation.
Thus, estimation is a complex process combining many factors
such as explicit estimation methodologies, cognitive processes of
human individuals and distortions emerging from organisational
contexts. In this thesis, organisational factors, or organisational
phenomena, refer to factors connected to the organisational en-
vironment, structures and processes, along with the behaviours
of individuals acting in the organisational context.
1.4 motivation and research gap 9
1.4 motivation and research gap
As described in the sections above, organisational factors signi-
ficantly affect software cost estimation. From this perspective,
increased interest toward organisational factors is unsurprising.
Increased focus can also be justified indirectly through the success
of using estimation methodologies. Methodologies are shown to
produce accurate results when used properly [113, 115]. Neverthe-
less, many software projects seem to be unable to use estimation
methods effectively [94, 68, 51]; however, in project management,
the use of methodologies has been found to have a positive im-
pact on project success [149, 141, 24]. Thus, the problems that
result in estimation errors seem to occur partially because estim-
ation methodologies are used more ineffectively by organisations
than reported in previous works.
While software projects may have difficulties in using proper
methodologies [94, 68, 51], the situation is considerably better,
for example, in the area of project management, as only 5% of
projects do not use any PM tools [141]. Because cost estimation is
an inseparable part of all projects and the cause of an overrun in
software projects may reside in software cost estimation, project
management or other areas [21, 98, 104], the difference in the
extent of use of methodologies between SCE and PM is surpris-
ing, especially because commonly used industrial project man-
agement and process improvement frameworks, such as CMMI,
PMBOK and IPMA ICB, promote the importance of estimation and
the use of methodologies. The use of proper methodologies is
proven to have a positive effect on the outcomes of both SCE and
PM [85, 149, 148]; however, only PM professionals utilise these
valuable tools and methods to any great extent. This observation
suggests that organisational factors inhibit successful application
of estimation methodologies in SCE.
As scientific literature or industrial advice do not provide clear
explanations for the gap in the extent of use of methodologies
between SCE and PM, one assumption is that the difference arises
from organisational priorities and does not seem to be related
to the availability of proven cost estimation methodologies. Pro-
ject management is widely linked to the execution of corporate
strategy, but SCE seems to have very little visibility among top
management. Also, while project management research has paid
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close attention to non-technical factors such as top management
support, communication, skills and learning, SCE research has
mostly focused on developing and improving estimation tech-
niques. This is an important observation, indicating that the
explanation for the difference in the extent of use of SCE and PM
methodologies could reside within the research areas omitted
from the study of SCE.
Organisational factors and their impact on project success are
thoroughly studied and well-understood in the field of project
management; top management support and actions especially
have been found as some of the most important factors affecting
project success [90, 35, 149, 107]. The effects of top management
support in project management correlate highly with overall pro-
ject success [147, 35, 122], and some reports propose that TMS
is the most important project success factor [147]. PM literature
also lists various ways for top management to support projects
[148]. Estimation inaccuracies emerging from management ac-
tions have also been reported to some extent in the domain of SCE.
For example, management pressure [94], lack of management
tracking of the estimation performance and removal of padding
from estimates by managers have been found to affect estimation
[95, 86]. However, top management support in SCE has not been
studied systematically, leaving a significant gap in the body of
knowledge.
Our work focuses on filling the gap related to top management
participation in SCE by studying the impact of organisational
factors, and specifically top management support, on successful
use of estimation processes. Improving the understanding of
the real-world dynamics may provide practitioners with valuable
tools for improving SCE in organisations, and the gap between
the advice provided by the industrial project management frame-
works and the low extent of use of methodologies could be
narrowed. The results could also provide further evidence that
organisational issues are equally as important as technical ones
for effective SCE and generate new theories about the reasons for
continuing overruns in estimation.
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1.5 research objective and questions
Based on the described problems and research gaps, the objective
of this research is:
To contribute to practices and theories on SCE by explaining the role of
top management in SCE, specifically addressing how top management
support SCE and determining the positive or negative impacts of this
support.
Derived from the objective, the questions for this research are:
rq1 How does top management support SCE?
While the first question is largely concerned with how and
to what extent top management participates in SCE, the second
question focuses on the actual positive or negative impacts of top
management’s actions, with the next question being:
rq2 What are the impacts of top management support for creat-
ing a good cost estimate for a software project?
Satisfying the research objective and answering the questions
requires a two-fold research focus: 1) the current practice of top
management participation in SCE, i.e., behaviours for participa-
tion and their extent of use, and 2) analysis of the impact of top
management actions.
1.6 overview of original publications
In the following sections, we will describe each of the original
publications in brief. Table 1.1 provides a mapping between
original publications and the research questions they address.
1.6.1 Paper I: Top management support in software cost estimation –
A study of attitudes and practice in Finland
In this paper, we identify a list of 16 practices from the literature
that are likely to represent top management support for software
cost estimation. We use survey research and statistical methods to
verify that the practices measure the same construct, TMS for SCE.
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Table 1.1: Mapping between original publications and the research ques-
tions they address.
Paper I Paper II Paper III Paper IV Paper V
RQ1 X X X
RQ2 x x X X X
Notes: X, major contribution to RQ; x, minor contribution to RQ.
The list is used to capture the frequency of use and experienced
importance of top management support practices in a question-
naire from 116 software professionals. We also study statistical
correlations between frequency of use, experienced importance
and project success to determine which support practices affect
project success positively. The key finding of the paper is that
top management invests a significant amount of attention in
SCE; however, the extent of use and experienced importance of
support practices do not correlate strongly with each other or
project success. In practice, software professionals invite senior
managers to participate in SCE, for which the paper provides a
list of participation practices.
1.6.2 Paper II: Accounting testing in software cost estimation – A
case study of the current practice and impacts
This paper focuses on cost estimation related to software testing
tasks. We present in-depth findings from two case projects with
11 interviewees and report on the current practice for estimating
software testing and the impact of used practices on SCE and pro-
ject success. We emphasise the differences between software and
testing estimation and show how these influence testing success.
Finally, we examine the role of testing planning, attitudes connec-
ted to testing and other phenomena as explaining factors for the
differences between software and testing estimation and discuss
the impact on the estimation process. The results reported in the
paper show that companies easily deviate from their standard
procedures, when estimating testing, which may even lead to
severe estimation errors. The deviations can be explained by
negative attitudes towards testing. Furthermore, the paper shows
1.6 overview of original publications 13
that the extant literature has sparsely addressed estimation of
software testing.
1.6.3 Paper III: The impact of a delayed software project on product
launch coordination – A case study
In this article, we study the impact of a delayed software project
on the related product launch through a case study involving one
delayed software project. We present how management’s delay-
containment actions influence launch-related sales and marketing
activities and their motivational factors. Impacts of sales and mar-
keting actions are observed through changes in the scope, cost
and quality of the planned activities, moderated by motivational
factors. We also explain the role of reliable scope and schedule in-
formation throughout the project and describe how management
actions may influence this. Finally, we provide evidence that pres-
sure and volatility, among other things, connected to a delayed
project hinder reliable and meaningful estimation. The results
show that the delays may increase the cost of a product launch,
as well as decrease the scope and quality of the launch activities.
These impacts are influenced by key personnel’s motivational
factors.
1.6.4 Paper IV: Top management support for software cost estimation
– A case study of the current practice and impacts
In this paper, we paint a complete picture of top management’s
role in SCE based on multiple case studies. We study real-life top
management support practices for SCE and how they appear in
organisations. The identification of practices is based on the list
of 16 support practices developed in Paper I, which we validate
and develop further in this article. We also report on the time and
effort top management invests into participation in SCE. Addi-
tionally, we identify concrete artefacts, persons and items affected
by top management actions and analyse the impact of top man-
agement actions on estimation and project success. The results
show that top management takes no, or very little, direct actions
to participate in SCE. However, projects can conclude successfully
regardless of the low extent of participation. Top management
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actions may also induce bias in estimation, influencing project
success negatively. This implies that senior managers must recog-
nise the importance of seeking realism and avoid influencing the
estimation in any direction.
1.6.5 Paper V: The role of organisational phenomena in software cost
estimation: A case study of supporting and hindering factors
This article focuses on the organisational context of software cost
estimation and describes organisational factors either supporting
or hindering creation of a meaningful cost estimate. We focus
broadly on organisational properties and mechanisms and report
on factors emerging from human behaviour. We explain the im-
pact of top management actions, SCE and SW process maturity,
communication and attitudes in connection to supporting and
hindering factors. To study SCE maturity, we develop a model
for measuring SCE maturity in an organisation. CMM is used to
measure software process maturity. The results suggest that the
role of the top management is important in creating prerequisites
for meaningful estimation, but their day-to-day participation is
not required for successful estimation. Top management may
also induce undesired distortion in estimation. Estimation ma-
turity and estimation success seem to have an interrelationship
with software process maturity, but there seem to be no signific-
ant individual organisational factors, which alone would make
estimation successful. Our results validate several distortions
and biases reported in the previous studies, and show that the
SCE research focus has remained on methodologies and technical
issues.
1.7 overview of research contributions
This thesis investigates top management participation in SCE; the
contributions of the thesis are divided into two parts: particip-
ation practices and impacts of participation. First, we identify
participation practices and validate their relevance by measuring
frequency of use, experienced importance and top management
investment of time and effort into practices. Second, we invest-
igate the impacts of participation practices on SCE and project
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success and report on delay management actions’ impact on
product launch. Figure 1.5 presents an overview of the contribu-
tions and how the research questions are linked to them.
Figure 1.5: Contributions of the thesis.
Through the contributions of the thesis, we establish a concept
top management participation in SCE and describe the current
practice related to top management participation. We also show
how top management actions influence estimation, projects and
product launch success. The contributions are introduced in the
following sections.
1.7.1 Top management participation practices for SCE
The first contribution of the thesis is an explanation of how top
management participates in software cost estimation. Our ap-
proach is to first identify a list of potential participation practices
from literature and then capture the frequency of use and experi-
enced importance of these practices. Based on these metrics, we
use statistical methods to show that the list coherently measures
the same construct, top management participation in SCE. Then,
we validate the results by showing how the practices are applied
in a real-life setting.
The list of potential participation practices, the basis of the
contribution, is adopted from the area of project management,
where top management participation is thoroughly studied [148].
This list is complemented with best practices from the area of SCE
to account for the specific nature of SCE [97]. The resulting list
of potential participation practices contains 17 candidates. The
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frequency of use and experienced importance is captured in a
survey study from 116 software professionals in Finland, and
the consistency of the list is validated using statistical methods.
Except for one practice, the list measures the same construct, top
management participation in SCE, resulting in a list of 16 practices.
The candidate removed from the list was concluded, as a result
of a peer discussion, to have an unclear proposition, thus, not
being valid from the research point of view. The results show that
the average experienced importance is higher than the average
frequency of use, with averages of 2.54 and 3.04 for frequency
of use and experienced importance, respectively. The results did
not show a correlation for individual practices between these two.
This part of the research is presented in Paper I.
The next step in our approach is to investigate how these 16
practices are applied in organisations in a real-life setting. A
multiple-case study in three organisations helped us gain an
in-depth understanding of the question. Paper II, Paper IV and
Paper V report the results from this research. The results de-
viate significantly from the preliminary results reported above.
We found strong evidence for only five of the 16 support prac-
tices. Additionally, we discovered two new practices, which were
present in all studied projects. We also show that top manage-
ment invests very little time in their participation in SCE. However,
although the extent of direct top management participation is
low, we show that many of their actions are indirectly connected
to SCE by creating prerequisites for successful estimation. For ex-
ample, we show that top management provides direction for the
project and ensures adequate resources and good communication
in the organisation.
1.7.2 Impacts of top management participation in SCE
Our second contribution regards the impact of top management
actions on a software project. In our first approach in Paper
I, we investigated the statistical correlation between the 16 top
management support practices and project success. Two prac-
tices were found to be significant with respect to project success.
In our second approach, we conducted a multiple-case study
in three organisations to examine the real-life consequences of
top management actions on SCE and project success. The third
1.8 structure of the thesis 17
approach focused on top management reactions to software pro-
ject delays and the impact of those reactions on launching the
software product in question.
In the second approach, we examined the effects of TMS on
people and project artefacts. These were mapped to impacts
on SCE and project success. The study discovered two direct
TMS practices for SCE, ‘Top management studies and approves
the estimate’ and ‘Top management ensures the involvement
of the project manager during the estimation stage’, and five
indirect practices related to resource provisioning, goal setting
and demonstrated importance. Thus, top management’s role was
found to be mostly related to creating prerequisites for successful
estimation instead of participating in estimation directly. We
also found that top management can cause direct negative effects
on estimation and the related software project. For example,
expectations expressed by top management may become anchors
[5] affecting estimation, and a lack of shared vision may cause the
team to base the estimate and work on incorrect or incomplete
requirements. These results are reported in Papers II, IV and V.
The third approach focused on the impact of top management
actions on a product launch in the case of a delayed software
project. In our single case study-based research, we studied
top management reactions to project escalation, the impacts of
containment measures on sales and marketing tactics and motiv-
ational factors related to the launch team. Impacts on sales and
marketing tactics were observed through the lens of scope, cost
and quality of actions. The results show that top management
may try to align the situation to the business objectives quickly,
although project realism would not allow this. On the other
hand, it may create uncertainty about the schedule and scope of
the project, which may have broad negative impacts on project
launch activities. Our results suggest that establishing a reliable
schedule and scope and therefore reducing uncertainty would be
the most effective action to recover from delays and their negative
impact. Paper III reports these results.
1.8 structure of the thesis
The thesis consists of two parts. Part I provides a research sum-
mary and explains the concepts and background information,
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while Part II presents the peer-reviewed original publications.
Part I is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents background
and related work, Chapter 3 describes the research methodology
and discusses the reliability and validity, Chapter 4 discussed the
results of this thesis and their implications, as well as provides
suggestions for future research, and Chapter 5 concludes the
thesis.
2
B A C K G R O U N D A N D R E L AT E D W O R K
In this chapter, we provide a background for this thesis and
review the related work. First, we establish the importance
of successful software project deliveries to motivate our work
properly. Then, we review the current practice for creating a
good software cost estimate and common reasons why estimation
may fail. We also present critical factors for successful project
management. Finally, the role of top management in software
projects is reviewed.
2.1 role of software
Software is a catalyst for many profound changes in the global
economy. Gartner stated that IT spending will reach $3.7 trillion in
2018 [39]. PwC’s The 2016 Global Innovation 1000 study reports
that global R&D spending on software increased by 65% between
2010 and 2015, and R&D allocation for software is expected
to increase an additional 43% by the end of the decade [116,
117]. The same study reports that companies investing more on
software grow faster than their competitors. Non-tech companies
are joining the software revolution [130]. John Deere says that
they will soon employ more software than mechanical engineers.
Pizza Hut is deploying robotic waiters, and people can order a
pizza with a tweet. Car manufacturers and ride companies are
developing autonomous cars, and Volkswagen’s R&D spending
is the highest in the world [116]. A Siemens’ executive stated that
everything they do—including all products and all services—is
software-driven [131]. Software enables product differentiation
to a higher degree and enhances the customer experience. At
the same time, software is revolutionising the job market and
the management and culture of companies. Therefore, it is clear
that business success is becoming increasingly dependent on
software.
Although software drives innovation and creates opportunit-
ies, benefits of software are not realised automatically. Software
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creates new business models, accelerates the innovation cycle
and makes the marketplace more competitive [135, 33]. Thus,
software needs to be done right, and there are many considera-
tions when launching a software-driven product or service. The
timing of market introduction is critical for a product’s success
[18]. Customers are increasingly asking for high-quality software
products, leaving the companies with less time for development
[47]. However, launching a product involving software depends
on the outcomes from the software project, which are often late
and difficult to predict [30, 53]. A vast number of studies have
been conducted showing the relationships between speed to mar-
ket, quality, costs and profitability (e.g., [127, 135]. Timing and
good management of key aspects of the launch, such as market-
ing plans and overall launch direction, have been pinpointed as
critical success factors for launch success [28], and it is generally
known that marketing and technological execution proficiency
are significant predictors of new product success [46]. Thus,
firms that are able to develop software quickly on a predictable
schedule are likely to gain an advantage over the competition.
2.2 impact of overruns and estimation error
Software projects are difficult endeavours. According to several
studies on software project overruns, most projects (60%–80%,
Table 2.1) are completed overbudget and/or late, with an average
cost overrun of 30%–40% [101]. Approximately 20% of all projects
are cancelled due to various challenges such as lack of senior man-
agement involvement, too many scope and requirement changes
and high project overrun [32]. Expressed in financial terms, the
annual losses from software projects are measured in the billions
of euros [38, 100, 106]. The biggest single failures include the
electronic care record system in the UK, the dental service system
in Sweden and the combat support system in the US, where the
cost was over EUR 1 billion before cancellation [144]. Thus, the
direct cost impact of failure can be significant.
Often, the direct cost of a failure is not the only, or even the
most significant, negative impact of an overrun. The literature
suggests that the consequences of being late to the market include
lower profit margins, higher production costs and decreased
firm market value [49]. Scholars have also argued that speed
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Table 2.1: Estimation accuracy results [101].
Study Jenkins Phan Heemstra Lederer Bergeon Standish
Cost overrun 34% 33% 33% 89%
(median) (mean) (mean) (mean)
Projects completed over budget 61% 70% 63% 84%
Projects completed under budget 10% 14%
Schedule overrun 22%
Projects completed after schedule 65% 80% 84%
Projects completed before schedule 4%
is associated with high-quality products [89]. In addition to
impacts on firms’ financial performance and competitiveness,
overruns may have destructive impacts on operative and project
dynamics such as apologising to key customers, fixing problems
arising from quick and dirty workarounds and preparing interim
releases for trade shows or demos [97]. If the software were ready
on time, these situations could be avoided.
Failures and overruns are seldom related to one specific reason
such as underestimating a project, poor project execution or scope
volatility [93, p.13]. However, good estimation should foresee and
account for challenges related to a project, assuming good project
execution, to produce a reliable estimate. A reliable estimate
is key to the success of a project in terms of financial success,
customer satisfaction and other criteria. Too high or too low
estimates have a biasing effect on the business case, meaning that
projects may be approved or rejected on false premises, possibly
leading to the situations described above. Generally, business
cases justifying starting software projects are based on several im-
portant assumptions such as time-to-market, features, customer
experience, cost and internal coordination of work. Most of these
parameters are related to the schedule. If the schedule is overrun,
the assumptions fail, causing various problems in the project.
Thus, accurate estimation is important for the successful plan-
ning and control of a project, including budgeting, coordination
of all activities and delivering quality and functionality.
Most executives are willing to accept higher costs, longer sched-
ules and reduced functionality if they gain predictability in return
[97, 115]. Businesses need to make commitments to customers, in-
vestors and the marketplace, and these commitments along with
systematic planning and execution are supported by predictabil-
ity. Although keeping promises is highly valued by executives,
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projects should not be overestimated. Additionally, overestima-
tion may lead to rejecting viable projects on false premises and
increased cost [42, 109]. However, executives’ opinions and other
arguments favour overestimation over underestimation.
2.3 reasons for estimation error
Since overruns are a systemic problem for the software industry,
it is natural that sources of estimation error are thoroughly stud-
ied, resulting in an extensive body of knowledge. Regrettably,
this body of knowledge has not been able to remedy the situ-
ation. However, without this knowledge, the situation would
most likely be even worse, considering the explosion of global
software development and growing project sizes. Knowledge
of sources of errors provides valuable pointers for estimation
process improvement.
Reasons for estimation error are many. To aid in reviewing
sources of estimation error, we have divided them into the fol-
lowing categories, based on McConnell [97, pp. 33-34]:
• Inaccurate information about the project being estimated
• Inaccurate information about the capabilities of the organ-
isation that will perform the project
• Inaccuracies arising from the estimation process
• Inaccuracies arising from human bias related to the estima-
tion process
• Intentional biases arising from political issues and manage-
ment
Additionally, chaos and variability in projects are common
reasons for overruns [96]. However, this is primarily a concern
for project control, not for estimation. Even the best estimators
and estimates cannot predict the outcome of an out-of-control
project. Thus, we consider this source of estimation error to be
out of the scope of this review.
Before addressing the actual sources of errors, a reminder of
the cone of uncertainty [13] is appropriate: in the beginning of a
project, estimates are very inaccurate and the ranges are broad.
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When the project progresses, emerging information allows the
estimates to be tightened up. Thus, re-estimation should be
applied throughout the project, as planned. However, the cone of
uncertainty is not a source of estimation error, it just describes
the levels of accuracy warranted in different phases of the project.
The following sections review the sources of estimation error
by category. In addition to this brief review, there are several
other causes for estimation error.
2.3.1 Inaccurate information about the project
Understanding the software and related requirements is neces-
sary for accurate estimation. The cone of uncertainty describes
how accuracy increases as a function of the project phase, i.e.,
the accuracy correlates with the amount of information avail-
able. However, the cone does not narrow by itself. Increased
accuracy and information requires persistent and firm work from
the buyer, users, project management, analysts and software de-
velopers to achieve this greater understanding. There is no room
for sloppy investigation of requirements, missing activities, lack
of user involvement or poor specifications if the intention is to
tighten the range.
Larenjeira [83] said that the accuracy increases through decom-
position of the complexity of the software. In their often-quoted
study, Lederer and Prasad [87] reported that users’ lack of un-
derstanding of their own requirements, frequent requests for
changes by users and poor or imprecise problem definition are
significant sources of estimation error. Van Genuchten [139] re-
ported that causes for estimation error include requirements of
insufficient quality or lateness, specs of delivered software of in-
sufficient quality, underestimated complexity of application and
more problems than expected with performance requirements
or memory constraints. Stutzke [132] indicated that changes to
product requirements and design become more expensive as the
projects proceed. The cost of requirement errors may be 100 times
higher if fixed after the system is in operation instead of fixing
them at the start of the project.
To summarise, an estimate can only be as accurate as the under-
standing of the software warrants. Failure to establish a desired
level of understanding of requirements leads to estimation errors.
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Thus, all of a project’s stakeholders should pay close attention
to establishing and maintaining a shared understanding of what
the software should accomplish. Additionally, all changes should
be dealt with immediately, rather than postponing them.
2.3.2 Inaccurate information about the capabilities of the organisation
The reason for variability in or poor understanding of require-
ments may arise from the capabilities of an organisation. For
example, analysts may be inexperienced or unskilled and are
therefore unable to decompose and refine the requirements as
planned. There are many other kinds of issues arising from organ-
isational capabilities causing estimation error. Lederer and Prasad
[85] concluded that the inability to anticipate the skills of project
team members is a significant source of error. Subramanian and
Breslawski [133] reported that the project manager’s confidence
in the estimation model, managerial experience and programmer
or team member experience affect estimation accuracy, and Van
Genuchten [139] found that too little experience with develop-
ment environments and more inexperienced people on a team
than expected can cause errors.
Generally, a lack of organisational capabilities means that an
organisation is not equipped to accomplish what needs to be
done to deliver the software as planned. The lack of capabilities
can be related to various factors ranging from the experience of
project managers or analysts to their experience with develop-
ment tools, programming languages, testing methods, integration
frameworks, development methods or project management meth-
ods. Even the whole business area may be unfamiliar. Oftentimes,
estimates are based on an assumption that all capabilities will be
available for the project. Equally often, this is not the case, result-
ing in errors. Therefore, it is crucial to understand which people,
processes and technologies are involved in the project and their
levels of experience and to account for this in the estimation.
2.3.3 Inaccuracies arising from the estimation process
Software cost estimation research has been methodology-centric
for decades, thus it is obvious that methods contribute signific-
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antly to estimation accuracy. However, they are also a source for
estimation error. Hihn and Habib-agahi [51] report that 83% of es-
timates are prepared primarily using informal analogy—without
using a planned and defined process. This has been found to
be connected to estimation errors [85]. Heemstra [48] reported
that 35% of organisations do not make proper cost estimates and
recommended using SCE methods and ensuring estimator com-
mitment. Although the studies are old, according to our personal
experience, ad-hoc or off-the-cuff estimates are not uncommon
today. The first step is to pursue an accurate estimate and choose
a proper methodology for creating one.
The number of estimation methods, or processes, is measured
in hundreds, making an exhaustive review of different inac-
curacies impossible. However, we have selected examples for
illustrating problems arising from the estimation process. Lederer
and Prasad [87] reported that errors are caused by lack of an ad-
equate methodology or guidelines for estimating, inability to tell
where past estimates failed, lack of setting and review of standard
durations for use in estimating and insufficient analysis when
developing estimates. Also, overlooked tasks, insufficient user-
analyst communication and understanding and lack of adequate
guidelines for estimating cause inaccuracies [85]. Jørgensen [62]
reported that a variation in and poor communication of what is
meant by the effort estimate may easily contribute to effort and
cost inaccuracies and cause planning and budgeting problems
for software projects. McConnell [97] continued the list with
unexpected events and overlooked tasks (such as data conversion,
mentoring of new team members and installation), projects estim-
ated by a developer as opposed to a PM and projects estimated
by a person not participating in the project.
2.3.4 Inaccuracies arising from human bias
As mentioned in the Introduction, human biases are an important
source of error because practically all estimation methodologies
involve human judgement and thinking processes. Considering
the extent of overruns reported, it is unsurprising that optimism
is an important factor distorting estimates [112]. Moløkken-
Østvold and Jørgensen [102] have continued with this theme and
found that people in technical roles are even more optimistic
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than people in non-technical roles. Several other studies concur
[139]. Optimism is an example of self-induced bias, but a human
mind can also be affected by exposing it to pressure, irrelevant
information, future opportunities, expectations and cognitive
anchors, among others [72, 69, 5, 66].
A significant amount of effort has been put into finding ways
to avoid bias. Means for avoiding bias include selecting persons
less prone to bias and distractions as estimators. As concluded
in the Introduction, estimators with more relevant experience [70,
64], more realistic track records on previous estimates, higher de-
velopment skills and self-perceptions that are less than averagely
optimistic [65] tend to produce more realistic estimates. Lederer
and Prasad [88] also proposed that reviewing the estimation ac-
curacy should be included in performance reviews to shun bad
practices.
Another method of reducing bias is training the organisation
and altering the estimation process so that estimators are less
exposed to pressure, irrelevant information and other distrac-
tions. For example, management should avoid anchoring their
expectations prior to estimation [5] and should pursue realism
[60]. There is excessive pressure in almost all large projects [59],
so it is easy to understand that the temptation to please the man-
agement is high [60]. Furthermore, obvious countermeasures
have been proposed for almost all reported sources of bias: re-
move irrelevant information before handing it over for estimation,
do not show customer expectations of the price for estimators
and so on. As the sources of biases are many, it is ultimately
important to understand the phenomena and critically review
potential influences.
2.3.5 Political issues and management
Cost estimating is a political activity [84]. It may be intentionally
influenced by different stakeholders from upper management to
users to fit the estimates into their personal agendas [84, 112, 94].
For example, if management and estimators want to complete
projects on time, management encourages high estimates, so
estimators pad estimates, and if they want to do more projects,
management encourages low estimates and estimators shrink
estimates. People with the greatest power on a software project,
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including upper management, IT management and software
professionals, are in the best position to play politics. Although
this political colouring of estimation has been recognised for
decades [84, 112], surprisingly few studies have focused on the
phenomenon [67], even though otherwise meticulous estimation
work can easily be voided by distortions.
As with other sources of estimation inaccuracies, the range
of individual causes of error is broad. Lederer and Prasad [87]
reported that pressures from managers, users or others to influ-
ence the estimate, reduction of project scope or quality to stay
within the estimate and removal of padding from the estimate
by management are common. Magazinovic and Pernstål [95]
showed that estimates are affected by budget and management
goals. Additionally, Magazinius et al. 1 found that selling ideas,
personal agendas, negotiations, hiding activities in other activ-
ities to buy extra time, increasing estimates to drop undesired
functionality out of the score and job securing occur in projects
[94]. The distortion is not limited to the planning phase of a
project, as tracking costs can be intentionally incomplete or mis-
leading [95, 2, 41] and it is typical for IS management to fail to
examine estimates carefully [87].
2.3.6 Frequency of occurrence
The occurrences of different estimation inhibitors have been ad-
dressed in several studies over the decades, as summarised in
Table 2.2. All the categories reviewed in the previous sections
are represented, however, certain topics are more common than
others. For example, changes and overlooked tasks repeat in
several studies. Also, topics related to understanding the project,
organisational capabilities and the estimation process itself repeat
in the research findings, while findings related to human bias
and politics are rare.
Although politics and human bias-related inhibitors are rarely
reported, this does not imply that they would not affect the
estimation and may also be significant inhibitors for estimation.
According to our experience, but not reported in this thesis, many
of the previously reported inhibitors are interlinked. For example,
1 Ana Magazinius has published also under the name Ana Magazinovic, thus
Magazinius and Magazinovic refer to the same person.
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we have witnessed situations where unexpected and overlooked
tasks, lack of understanding of the requirements and feedback
problems may have been caused by actions of senior management.
Effects of management actions have not been thoroughly studied
in the area of SCE, and causal relationships and consequential
and indirect effects are not well-understood.
In the area of project management, the impact of politics is
well-recognised. Atkinson [7] concluded that quality is measured
based on attitudes, and project results are measured against sub-
jective perceptions. Thus, the original goals are also set based
on people’s subjective interpretations of the desired outcome
when only the least-solid information is available. Shenhar et
al. [125] suggested that project managers “need to see the big
picture” or “be aware of the results expected”, which describe
how complex and subjective goal setting and measurement are
in project management. Buchanan [16] reported that 90% of prac-
titioners state that utilising politics is necessary to succeed, and
84% say that they would use politics when necessary. Generally,
political behaviour is common in all organisational levels and is
well-documented [16]. Considering the examples drawn from
the extensive body of knowledge of organisation politics, it is
likely that software cost estimation is more of a political activity
than anticipated. Thus, the consequential and indirect effects of
politics are likely broader than is currently reported, which may
manifest through the reported non-politics–related reasons.
2.4 top management support and role
Leaders at all levels establish unity of purpose and direction and
create conditions in which people are engaged in achieving the
organisation’s objectives [55]. Top management, or senior man-
agement, refers to the group of senior executives and decision
makers responsible for the overall strategic direction of the organ-
isation [143]. Thus, organisations resemble their leaders in many
ways; the leaders shape organisations with their behaviours. Typ-
ically, these behaviours are beneficial to endeavours within an
organisation [29]. For the previous reasons, top management’s
role and actions have been thoroughly studied throughout the
decades from different perspectives. For example, in project man-
agement, leadership-related topics have become the most popular
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Table 2.2: Results from studies on perceived cost estimation inhibit-
ors [93].
Study Top perceived cost estimation inhibitors
Phan et al. (1998) Optimism
Frequent changes
Duration
van Genuchen (1991) More time spent on other work than planned
Complexity of application underestimated
Lederer and Prasad (1995a)* Frequent requests for changes by users
Users’ lack of understanding for their own requirements
Overlooked tasks
Subramanian and Breslawski (1995)* Requirement change/addition/definition
Programmer/team member experience
Staff turnover
Jørgensen and Moløkken-Østvold (2004)* No systematic feedback
Interviews Poor project planning and overlooked tasks
Poor requirements specification
Jørgensen and Moløkken-Østvold (2004)* Unexpected and overlooked tasks
Questionnaires (qual analysis) Change requests from clients
Simpler task/more experienced developer than expected
Jørgensen and Moløkken-Østvold (2004)* Project estimated by developer
Questionnaires (stat analysis) Project estimated by a person outside the project
Client focus on time-to-delivery, not cost or quality
Morgenshtern et al. (2007) High level of uncertainty
Magazinovic and Perstål (2008) Feedback problems
Shared resources between projects
Negotiations
Requirement uncertainty and change
Notes: The three highest ranked inhibitors are presented for studies where the number of
inhibitors is too high for all to be included, marked with *.
theme for research, with an increasing popularity from decade
to decade (Table 2.5). In total, top management role-related re-
search papers form a formidable body of knowledge that aids
in studying top management roles in connection to less-studied
areas such as top management roles in software cost estimation.
Top management support is typically divided into two sep-
arate constructs, involvement and participation, although the
terminology for these constructs may vary [57]. Involvement
and participation refers to psychological state and behaviour and
activities performed, respectively [10]. In their terminology, Jar-
venpaa and Ives [57] divided TMS into attitudinal and behavioural
interpretations. Attitudinal interpretations cast TMS as a set of
favourable attitudes, involvement, commitment and ‘opinions
and desires’, whereas the behavioural interpretations present TMS
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as a set of direct managerial behaviours such as offering tech-
nical assistance or engaging in ‘activities or substantive personal
interventions’.
Dong et al. [29] listed 19 IT system-related studies where top
management participation has been investigated. The studied
areas include IT adoption, IS success, EDI success, data warehous-
ing success and use of technological innovation, among others.
With a few exceptions (e.g., [23, 138]), the presented TMS measures
were attitudinal. Measures were of the nature, “...supports in-
formation system”, “...understands the importance”, “...is aware
of the benefits” and “...strongly encourages”. Positive effects
of TMS were widely reported, however, not in all cases. In the
two papers mentioned above, Compeau and Higgins [23] repor-
ted that top management availability for equipment selection,
HW and SW difficulties and specialised instruction did not affect
computer efficacy. Thong et al. [138] reported that the CEO’s
hands-on participation in IS implementation was not related to
user satisfaction. Thus, behavioural TMS and positive impacts
emerging from it are rare. Provisioning of resources is also closely
connected to TMS. While this is probably an attitudinal practice
in most cases, it may also be a behavioural practice. Nevertheless,
resource provisioning is also a widely studied concept in vari-
ous areas and has been found to contribute positively to project
success, IS success and other areas (e.g., [1, 14, 124]).
In the field of project management, TMS is considered one of
the most important, if not the most important [147], success
factors. Fortune and White [142] reported in their study of 236
respondents working in projects in various countries and indus-
tries, 63% of which were managing projects, that support from
senior management was the second most important success factor
for projects. The most important was clear goals and the third
most important was adequate budget/resources, both of which
are tightly coupled to the power and role presented by senior
management in organisations. Madanayake et al. [92] conducted
a qualitative case study with five case projects to identify critical
top management support practices in the software sector. They
presented a list of 16 support practices categorised into three
roles assumed by top management (Table 2.3). Top management
roles have also been studied from the risk perspective. Arnu-
phaptrairong [6] summarised in his review of 12 studies related to
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software risks that lack of management commitment and support
is the second most significant risk for software projects.
Although TMS seems to be mostly attitudinal, the project man-
agement literature has also identified behavioural types of top
management support practices that contribute positively to pro-
ject success [14, 148, 149]. These practices provide assistance to
senior management on how they should use their valuable time.
Success factors have been identified separately for different coun-
tries and industry segments, including the software industry [92,
149]. Zwikael’s list [149], based on quantitative survey research,
consists of 10 top management support practices contributing
positively to project success:
1. appropriate project manager assignment,
2. refreshing project procedures,
3. involvement of the project manager during the initiation
stage,
4. communication between the project manager and the or-
ganisation,
5. existence of a project success measurement,
6. supportive project organisational structure,
7. existence of interactive inter-departmental project groups,
8. organisational project resource planning,
9. PMO involvement and
10. use of standard project management software.
McLeod and MacDonell [99] described the broad role of top
management, which is perceived to play into the scope of soft-
ware system development. Top management is expected to en-
sure adequate financial and human resources and that the project
is aligned with organisational goals and strategies. Top manage-
ment should also influence attitudes, resolve political conflicts
and create a positive context for change, among other things.
This spectrum of power exercised by top management creates
plenty of opportunities for influencing success factors or reasons
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Table 2.3: Analysis of top management actions.
Strategy Facilitate Lead
Workout a sustainable
business model
Supply resources Accept ownership and
gain better understand-
ing of project work
Have clear business ob-
jectives and state them
Make necessary inform-
ation available
Review project plans
Provide challenging
work
Retain key employees provide guidance
Balance project assign-
ments
Liaise with customer Watch status
Build support in the or-
ganizational model
Boost employee morale —
Participate in scope
definitions
— —
for failure. Poon and Wagner [114] suggested that TMS is a meta-
factor encompassing other success factors. This proposition is
also supported by Young and Jordan [147]. The concept of meta
factors is interesting, especially related to TMS, and should be
studied further in connection to SCE. It is also worth noting that
no practice in the previous review addresses cost estimation or
overruns specifically, although these continue disappointing and
frustrating senior management year after year.
2.5 trouble escalation
Many software projects end up in trouble for overrunning their
budgets significantly. When this happens, top management,
project team members and other stakeholders need to decide
what to do with the runaway project. Surprisingly, it appears to
be difficult to terminate a troubled project. Keil [76] explained
that many times, projects seem to take on a life of their own and
are allowed to continue to absorb resources until they are finally
terminated. This phenomenon of not being able to terminate a
troubled project is called escalation of commitment, or simply
escalation.
Escalation occurs for various reasons. Staw and Ross [128]
divided these reasons into project-related, psychological, social or
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organisational reasons. Keil [79] suggested that cultural reasons
also impact escalation, as well as reluctance to report bad news
[126]. Keil et al. [78] also reported that “sunk cost” (“so much
money has been spent already”) and “project completion” (“it
is so close”) effects make de-escalation difficult. Schmidt and
Cavaltone [121] suggested that new product development projects
are especially prone to escalation since they are rarer and people
grow enamoured with them. These projects are also allowed to
continue to launch commercialisation phases, even if performance
reviews are poor and costs increase in these phases.
Therefore, many projects are allowed to continue longer than
necessary before termination or proceed to conclusion even
though the status analysis would advocate termination. The
situation is so serious that Lyytinen and Robey [91] claimed that
organisations fail to learn from their failures, and failure becomes
a new norm. The effects of overrun projects are not limited to
sunk cost only. The literature suggests that the consequences of
being late to the market are significant, causing lower profit mar-
gins, higher development and production costs and decreasing
the firm’s market value [49]. Scholars have also argued that speed
keeps costs in control, is associated with high-quality products
[89] and helps to ensure early entrant advantages and overall
profitability (e.g., [22]). Suboptimal project decisions can also
harm brands and erode the credibility of an organisation in the
eyes of its stakeholders [120].
When the time for blowing the whistle comes, it is usually done
by the senior management or IT management [77]. Early warning
signs for escalation include lack of top management support,
lack of documented requirements and weak project managers
[74]. When the stakeholders, typically senior management, take
action to de-escalate, the typical actions include redefining the
project, improving project management and changing project
leadership if the project is not terminated [77]. To summarise, top
management holds a key role when projects escalate. They make
the conscious or unconscious decisions to let the projects escalate
or take actions to de-escalate. These top management behaviours
significantly influence not only the project success but also the
product and organisation success.
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2.6 sce and pm research focus
The first software cost estimation studies date back to the 1960s
[103, 105], and thousands of research papers have been published
since [15, 68], resulting in a notable body of knowledge. The
most prominent areas of interest have been estimation methods
and size measures, as presented in Table 2.4. The recent study
of SCE research trends shows also that the research focus has re-
mained consistently on estimation methodologies and techniques
between 1996 and 2016, the emerged research areas being ‘size
metrics’, ‘estimation by analogy’, ‘tools for estimation’, ‘soft com-
puting techniques’ and ‘expert judgement’ in five topic solution
[123]. The researchers seem to believe that the answer to the
continuing estimation errors resides in the methodologies; the
secret formula just has not been found yet. At the same time,
organisational issues have been the focus of only 16% of studies
(Table 2.4).
Considering the reported reasons for estimation error (Table 2.2),
the research focus is confusing. The practitioners report that is-
sues like unstable requirements, feedback problems and poor
planning are among the most common reasons for estimation
error. These topics are primarily organisational matters unrelated
to methodologies or size metrics. Many practitioners concur with
this observation [67, 97]. Additionally, Jørgensen and Shepperd
[67] pointed out that only eight out of 304 articles were in-depth
case studies and only three evaluated the background of the
estimation processes. Thus, focus on an in-depth understanding
of real-life phenomena behind estimation has been low, and it is
possible that the dynamics behind the estimation inhibitors may
not be thoroughly understood.
At the same time, while SCE researchers put their effort into
improving methodologies, the situation is vastly different in the
area of project management. Kolltveit, Karlsen and Grønhaug
[82] analysed 562 project management-related articles published
in the International Journal of Project Management between 1983
and 2003 and categorised articles in six perspectives, as presen-
ted in Table 2.5. Task and Transaction perspectives deal mainly
with non-organisational issues, while the other four perspectives
mainly focus on organisations. As Table 2.5 reveals, the research
focus has undergone a major shift from methodology-heavy areas
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Table 2.4: Distribution of published SCE articles among research top-
ics. [68]
1990- 2000-
Perspective -1989 1999 2004 Total
Estimation method 73 % 59 % 58 % 61 %
Size measures 12 % 24 % 16 % 20 %
Organisational issues 22 % 15 % 14 % 16 %
Uncertainty assessment 5 % 6 % 13 % 8 %
Calibration of models 7 % 8 % 4 % 7 %
Production function 20 % 4 % 3 % 6 %
Measures of estimation performance 5 % 5 % 6 % 5 %
Data set properties 0 % 1 % 2 % 1 %
Other 0 % 2 % 1 % 1 %
toward leadership- and business-related topics. In the first obser-
vation period (1983–1987), 68% of the studies reported findings
primarily related to Task and Transaction perspectives, while the
share of these categories decreased to only 18% by 2003–2004.
This shift of focus seems reasonable, since organisational issues
are reported to be even more important factors to project success
than technical ones [90, 35, 148, 107]. Top management support
has even been suggested as the most important factor affecting
project success [147], which corresponds with the largest share of
leadership perspective-related papers.
Thus, project management research seems to converge with the
reported problem areas, while SCE research continues improving
methods and measures, although the reported problems reside
elsewhere. Counterintuitively, the extent of use of methodologies
seems to be much higher in project management. Fortune and
White [142] reported that only 5% of projects do not use any
PM tools, while Hihn and Habib-agahi noted that only 17% of
estimators used proper estimation methodologies [51]. Although
not reported in research papers, it seems reasonable to assume
that the leadership and business focus in project management has
increased the awareness, extent of use and effective application
of methodologies, and, again counterintuitively, a tight methodo-
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Table 2.5: The distribution of published PM articles among different
perspectives. [82]
1983 1988- 1993- 1998- 2003-
Perspective -1987 1992 1997 2002 2004 Total
Task 49% 34% 32% 23% 12% 29%
Leadership 8% 16% 25% 28% 33% 23%
System 23% 25% 18% 19% 15% 20%
Stakeholder 1% 3% 1% 5% 6% 3%
Transaction 19% 9% 6% 10% 6% 10%
Business 0% 13% 17% 15% 29% 15%
logy focus does not increase use or improve effectiveness of the
application of methodologies.
2.7 background relation to research questions
Overruns are still common in software projects regardless of
significant effort invested in improving estimation processes. Al-
though the review of causes for estimation error show that many
are related to human factors, the research focus has remained on
methodologies. When accounting for the reported frequency of
occurrence of estimation inaccuracies, it should be observed that
in most cases, human factors have a significant role. Thus, the
assumption that estimation error would decrease significantly
by inventing a new, better estimation model or methodology
seems challenging, as well as the idea that humans would be able
to follow any methodology precisely and cold-bloodedly. On
the contrary, humans are easily misguided, and they sometimes
distort results deliberately [69, 5, 66, 84, 112, 94]. There is also
strong evidence that even simple and easy-to-use methodologies
produce good results if used effectively [113, 115], supporting
the importance of human factors. Therefore, a fair course of
action is to seek improvement for SCE from other areas than
methodologies.
This thesis focuses on improving estimation practices and ac-
curacy by focusing on top management roles in software cost
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estimation. Senior management roles are broad in organisations,
and their actions have a significant impact on operations. The soft-
ware estimation error causes and top management role-related
literature reviewed in this chapter provide a good reference frame-
work for studying our research topic. Thus, the first research
question is:
rq1 How does top management support SCE?
Project management, top management, risk management and
many other disciplines indicate top management support as one
of the most impactful factors. Leadership has become the most
studied topic in project management. Thus, top management
participation seems to be a good direction when expanding SCE
into non-technical research topics. Since TMS in SCE has received
little attention so far, this thesis broadly explores the impacts
of top management actions in an organisation, reflecting the
phenomena reported in the literature and addressing the second
research question:
rq2 What are the impacts of top management support for creat-
ing a good cost estimate for a software project?
As presented above, this thesis connects the research questions
to the previously established theory from other domains. How-
ever, the extant literature utilised in this thesis, as well as the
scope of study, are by no means exhaustive. The goal has been to
draw from the existing theories, connect them to our efforts and
use them to aid in adding new findings and theories to the body
of knowledge as well as to make suggestions for further research.

3
M E T H O D O L O G Y
Three empirical studies, one quantitative and two qualitative,
were conducted to address the research questions. This section
describes the used research strategy and methodologies of the
studies and discusses the validity of the studies and results.
3.1 research strategy
The research questions of this thesis are exploratory in nature,
discovering what is happening, seeking new ideas and generating
hypotheses and new research areas [118]. They explain the prac-
tices associated with top management participation in SCE, the
extent of use of the practices and the impacts of practices on SCE.
Answers to these questions add to existing knowledge regarding
top management participation in SCE, which is an understudied
topic in the field of software estimation. Furthermore, this thesis
adds knowledge from the in-depth organisational stance, rather
than measuring aspects of top management participation. Thus,
the philosophical perspective of the studies is interpretive [108].
The interpretive perspective aims to understand the dynamics
of humans taking action in social settings and acknowledges that
organisations and social structures do not behave rationally and
objectively. Interpretive perspective is the most appropriate for
this thesis, since top management as a topic is generally politically
loaded [16]. Previous research also reports on politics, personal
agendas, human bias and other behaviours that can be considered
non-objective or non-rational and their influence on SCE. We
have also witnessed many behaviours distorting and influencing
SCE, either intentionally or unintentionally, and therefore believe
that SCE cannot be improved effectively without seeking an in-
depth understanding and interpretations of observed phenomena
including motivational factors, social actions and interactions
between related stakeholders.
The conducted research investigates specifically top manage-
ment participation in SCE, thus a clear definition for top man-
39
40 methodology
agement is necessary both for conducting the research and inter-
preting the results. The literature presents various definitions for
top management. In the Background section, we mention that
top management, or senior management, refers to the group of
senior executives and decision makers responsible for the overall
strategic direction of the organisation [143]. This definition re-
flects the widely used theoretical construct of dominant coalition
[26], which generalizes the term top management. The term
dominant coalition refers to a group of powerful people, who
sets the goals and strategic direction of a company. However, the
empirical definition varies. Carpenter, Geletkanycz and Sanders
[20] present a list of definitions for a top management team from
over 30 research papers. This variance in definitions is acknow-
ledged also by researchers, and e.g. [110] propose that ‘rather
than assuming titles and positions as indicators of involvement,
the first task ... is to identify which players are involved and
why’. We have assumed this approach in our work, and from
our work’s viewpoint, top management refers to the furthest up
level of management, who is involved in the project and related
estimation at hand. Hence, in smaller firms top management may
include the CEO and management team, while in large corpora-
tions top management may refer to business unit or department
heads, and their leadership teams. There are also many terms
referring to top management. In our work, we use senior man-
agement, senior executives and upper management as synonyms for
top management.
Finally, this thesis is based on empirical investigation. The
reported findings are based on empirical evidence, which are
gained through direct and indirect observation and experience.
A survey and two case studies were conducted as part of the
research. The survey initiated the research, acting as a pre-study
for the following case studies to assure that important issues
were not foreseen [145]. The more in-depth studies conducted in
relation to this thesis were case studies.
3.2 research process
This thesis consists of three studies, five publications and two
research questions, as presented in Figure 3.1. Before the actual
research commenced, a literature review was conducted in the
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beginning of 2014 to gain an understanding of the most recent
findings and current practices in the areas of software estimation,
project management and top management participation. All
studies were conducted as part of the N4S research program [27]
between 2014 and 2016. The used research methodologies are
summarised in Table 3.1.
study 1 is a survey of a descriptive and explorative nature
[9] reporting the views of 114 Finnish software professionals
regarding the extent of use and experienced importance of top
management support practices for SCE. In addition to a pre-
defined list of 16 support practices, the respondents were also
able to propose other practices. The statistical correlation between
the extent of use and experienced importance of support prac-
tices and project success was tested. The respondents worked in
various roles in the studied projects including senior managers,
developers and project managers. The studied projects varied
from small to large, and the involved organisations included all
sizes of firms from SMEs to large multinational corporations. The
findings of Study 1 are reported in Paper I and contribute to RQ1
and RQ2.
Figure 3.1: Overview of the conducted research.
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Table 3.1: Summary of research methodologies
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
Strategy Survey Multiple case study Single case study
Approach Quantitative Qualitative Qualitative
Purpose Exploratory Exploratory Exploratory
Data collection method Web-based questionnaire Semi-structured interviews Semi-structured interviews
Documentation review Documentation review
Data analysis method Multivariate statistical Qualitative (NVivo 10) Qualitative (NVivo 10)
Sample size 114 respondents 3 projects 1 project
15 people 7 people
18 documents 115 documents
Reporting Paper I Paper II, IV and V Paper III
study 2 is an explorative follow-up study for Study 1 deepen-
ing the understanding of top management support practices for
SCE and investigating the impact of top management actions on
SCE. The study is a multiple-case study following the replication
logic [146] and involving 15 senior software developers from
three organisations and projects. One of the organisations was
an SME and two were large corporations. The sizes of the studied
projects were 20, 44 and 200 person months, respectively, with
a duration of less than one year. The findings of Study 2 are
reported in Papers II, IV and V and contribute to RQ1 and RQ2.
study 3 is a single case study focused specifically on top man-
agement actions related to a delayed software project. The study
further deepens the results of Study 2 in a setting where top man-
agement involvement is typically high and reports on the impact
of top management actions on SCE and product launch. Study 3
involved seven interviewees, and 121 project related documents
were investigated. The case company and case project were the
same as in Study 2 (SME), but Study 3 was an independent study
with a different research plan and interviewees. The planned
duration of the project was three months, but after seven schedule
extensions, the product was finally released 12 months after the
project start. The findings of Study 3 are reported in Paper III
and contribute to RQ2.
3.3 data collection
This section describes the data collection methods related to the
three studies.
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study 1 was a survey study using a questionnaire of 17 ques-
tions for data collection. The goal of the questionnaire was to
1. collect information about the respondent and the project in
question,
2. identify the extent of use of TMS practices in SCE and
3. identify software professionals’ opinions on the importance
of different TMS practices in SCE.
As typical for surveys, this study also collected information
about attitudes and behaviour [75] in retrospect [111]. The re-
cipients were instructed to answer the questionnaire only if they
had been actively involved in the estimation of a software project
within the past 24 months and to base their responses on their
most recent estimated project, including abandoned projects. Re-
sponses were received for approximately three months, from the
end of May to the end of August 2014.
Before the actual survey, a pilot survey was sent to 30 respond-
ents. Based on the feedback from the 16 pilot survey responses,
20 changes were made to the questionnaire. The main survey
was implemented as an anonymous, internet-based question-
naire, and a link to the questionnaire was sent to 1,109 software
professionals. The recipients of the invitation were selected based
on the mailing lists provided by the Project Management Insti-
tute Finland chapter and Dimecc Oy (Dimecc Oy is a non-profit
Finnish organisation that coordinates national and international
research programmes). Of the recipients, 114 completed the en-
tire questionnaire (10.28% response rate, partial responses were
excluded from data analysis). The questionnaire was anonymous
to maximise the number of responses.
The first two of the 17 questions were screening questions
determining whether the respondent was eligible to participate in
the questionnaire. The next four questions determined the role of
the respondent in SCE. Questions 7–10 measured the experienced
importance and frequency of use of TMS practices in SCE. The
respondents were also asked to add their own suggestions for
practices. The rest of the questions determined the characteristics
of the estimated project.
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study 2 was a multiple-case study using replication logic [146]
in which the data collection was conducted over seven weeks
in June and July 2015. The cases were selected to generate rich
information about the phenomena being studied. We focused on
large and small companies, selecting higher and lower maturity
organisations and exemplary and challenged projects. The case
companies and projects are different in their industrial domains,
sizes and processes. The final decision to include each project
in the study was made based on a discussion with a company
representative confirming that the project was likely to add new
perspectives to the study.
The unit of analysis was a single software cost estimate. The
study was focused on the experiences gained during the prepara-
tion of the cost estimate. The primary data collection methods
were semi-structured interviews [118] and a review of document-
ation. An interview protocol consisting of questions related to
top management participation in SCE was created following the
guidelines of Runeson and Höst [119]. In total, 15 people were
interviewed from three organisations, and 18 documents were
reviewed (Table 3.2). The documents included typical project
documentation such as cost estimates, project plans, meeting
minutes and status reports to gain a better understanding of
the procedures and SCE methods used. The case studies were
completed one at a time to allow for the reflection and refinement
of the research and interview questions [81]. All interviews (but
not key informant interviews) related to a single case study were
conducted on the same day, except for one interview for the last
case study. The one-hour interviews were conducted by two
researchers, and the discussion was recorded. One researcher
acted as the interviewer and the other took notes. The recordings
were transcribed and sent to the interviewees for review. All case
subjects participated in the study voluntarily and anonymously,
and the collected data were treated as confidential. The case
companies chose to remain anonymous.
Each interview day was preceded by a key informant interview
day during which background information about the case was
collected from a person in a central role in the case study area.
The key informant interviews addressed the following topics:
1. Project background, size, status and success
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2. Project team members and their roles
3. Estimation methodology and success
4. Software development methodology
5. Software process maturity, capabilities and track record
The semi-structured interviews were based on a predefined
list of questions. Additionally, we employed the list of 16 top
management support practices for studying top management
participation practices. Any interesting facts and observations
that were mentioned led to additional questions being asked on
that subject. The interview instrument was developed by three
researchers and adapted slightly for the individual case studies.
The interview instrument consisted of the following main areas:
1. Introduction
2. Personal, team and project background
3. Current state of SCE in the organisation
4. Experiences of the organisational phenomena affecting SCE
5. Ending (uncovered topics)
study 3 was a single case study collecting in-depth exper-
iences of one delayed software project. The case project was
selected for three main reasons: First, the project was delayed,
which was a precondition for studying the impacts of a delay on
SCE and a product launch. Second, the new product was highly
expected in the company as it was strategically important. Thus,
Table 3.2: Interviewees of the research.
Study 2: Small Global Study 2: Large Multinational Study 2: Tech Giant
Product Owner (KI) Project Manager (KI) Program Manager (KI)
Senior Business Manager Business Manager Line Manager
Testing Manager Senior Manager
Senior Technology Manager Requirements Engineer Requirements Engineer
Project Manager Software Developer Head of Product Management
Head of Programs
KI = Key informant for the study, interviewed twice
46 methodology
Table 3.3: Interviewees’ roles in the company
Role Department Length (min)
CEO, Product Director CEO, Products 55
Key account manager Sales 35
Product marketing manager Marketing 55
Sales director Sales 35
Sales analyst Sales 25
Product owner (PO) Product management 50
Marketing director Marketing 50
the company made an important investment into the product,
which was followed carefully even by the top management, which
improves the validity of the results. Third, the researchers were
familiar with the company, and the employees were expected to
speak honestly, even about difficult topics.
The study design was very similar to Study 2, following the
guidelines by Runeson and Höst [119]. The primary data gath-
ering method for this study was semi-structured interviews. In
total, we interviewed seven persons and studied 121 meeting
minutes and four plan documents. The interviewees and their
role descriptions, as well as their departments in the company, are
shown in Table 3.3. Prior to the interviews, an interview protocol
with the interview instrument was created. The interviews were
conducted by two researchers; one acted as the main interviewer
and the other took notes. The interviews were recorded and
carried out during one week in the beginning of January 2016.
All interviews were transcribed, and the results were sent to the
interviewees for review. All participated in the study voluntarily,
and the company and interviewees wished to remain anonymous.
The collected data were treated confidentially. As a secondary
data source, we collected different project-related documents
such as meeting minutes and marketing and sales plans.
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3.4 data analysis
study 1 aimed to establish the level of TMS for SCE and the
level of experienced importance of TMS for SCE. Additionally, the
correlation between these two and project success was analysed.
The primary method for data analysis was statistical analysis.
The conducted survey was based on a predefined list of 16 TMS
practices for SCE for measuring the current practice and attitudes.
The list’s validity was evaluated according to three conventional
techniques: Cronbach’s standardised α, Spearman’s rank correla-
tion coefficients and an eigenvalue decomposition. Cronbach’s
standardised α was computed separately for the practices and
attitudes. The internal consistency was studied further by gen-
erating Spearman’s rho matrices for the use of practices and
attitudes. One practice showed negative correlation, which, after
a peer discussion, was excluded from the analysis as an unclear
proposition. Finally, a scree plot was used to assess the number
of latent dimensions in the data [134].
The correlation between the extent of use and experienced im-
portance was measured with Pearson’s r for the overall score and
individual elements. Also, nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-tests
were administered to test the correlation. Project- and respondent-
related variables’ influences on the use of practices and attitudes
were tested with two separate ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion models. The basic model setup was similar in both models:
the sum variables of extent of use and attitudes were used as
dependent variables, while respondent- and project-related back-
ground variables were used as independent variables. The tested
independent variables were the following: ICT sector, firm size,
project size, project duration, project status and estimate mean-
ingfulness evaluation before the project, during the project and
after the project. As a second regression modelling approach, a lo-
gistic regression model was fitted with a recoded project success
variable as the dependent phenomenon. Finally, a nonparametric
Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was used to investigate the effects
of the individual 16 items.
study 2 used transcriptions of the interviews, coding of tran-
scripts and documents and grouping the coded pieces of text to
make conclusions. The overall process of analysis was conducted
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as outlined by [119]. During the coding phase, each interview
transcript and collected document was reviewed statement by
statement, and statements containing information about studied
topics were assigned a code representing the findings category.
Then, readily coded main categories were reviewed statement
by statement to identify subcategories. After a couple of itera-
tions, subcategories emerged from these two approaches. The
performed analysis was of the inductive type, meaning that the
patterns and categories of the analysis come from the data instead
of being pre-defined. The application used for coding (NVivo
10) maintained the evidence trail from the coded pieces of text
back to the documents, transcripts and interviewees automatic-
ally. After coding the data, the coded statements were grouped
together to form initial hypotheses, or candidates, for conclusions.
The process progressed iteratively. During the process of forming
a hypothesis, interviewees were asked clarifying or additional
questions, as necessary, to resolve any confusions and provide
additional confidence for the hypothesis. The role of the collected
documentation was mostly to provide background information
and to support statements made by the interviewees.
study 3 followed the same analysis practice as Study 2. How-
ever, while the role of the documentation was mostly related to
understanding the background of the studied projects in Study 2,
in Study 3, the documentation had an important role in discover-
ing escalation-related practices and patterns and establishing a
chronological order of events.
3.5 reliability and validity
study 1 used Cronbach’s standardised α, Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficients and an eigenvalue decomposition for
measuring the model’s reliability, i.e., how well the list of 16
propositions measure top management participation in SCE. The
obtained Cronbach’s standardised α values were 0.92 and 0.88 for
the extent of use and perceived importance, respectively. This is
higher than required by the statistical literature [40]. Spearman’s
rank correlation coefficients show a clear correlation between the
scores for the list items. Finally, the result of the scree plot test
was that a single latent construct is present.
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The correlation between the two latent constructs, extent of
use and experienced importance, is moderate (Pearson’s r = 0.48).
The same also holds for the individual elements. When tested
with nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-tests, the null hypothesis
of equal distributions holds only for the three practices.
The analysis did not find statistically significant correlations
between project- and respondent-related background variables
and the sum variables extent of use and experienced importance.
Furthermore, the analysis did not discover correlations between
the sum variables extent of use and experienced importance
and project success. Finally, the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis
rank sum test, which was used to investigate the effects of the
individual 16 items on project success, found that only two items
had statistically significant effects (p<0.05).
study 2 and study 3 were qualitative studies in which the
validity could be evaluated through four aspects of validity: reli-
ability, construct validity, internal validity and external validity
[145]. Reliability is concerned with the extent to which the data
and analysis are dependent on the specific researchers. We took
several measures to improve reliability. First, we prepared re-
search protocols to plan and document the steps of the performed
research. Second, the analysis was conducted using a software
that acts as a data storage for all documents, keeps records of cod-
ings and related text inserts and preserves a full trail of evidence.
Finally, all research materials are archived to provide a possibility
to assess the reliability of the findings. Although several meas-
ures were taken to improve reliability, open-ended questions and
related discussions are problematic from the reliability point of
view, since the discussions were facilitated by specific researchers
whose thinking processes are unique and not replicable.
Construct validity refers to the extent to which operational
measures actually represent what the researcher has in mind
and what is investigated according to the research questions
[145]. Prior to Study 2 and Study 3, a quantitative study (Study
1) was conducted in which the construct validity of the themes
addressed in the interview instruments was confirmed. The
interview instruments were prepared based on these validated
topics and further reviewed by the supervising professor. The
interviews were also conducted by two researchers, ensuring that
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questions were addressed in an in-depth manner and provided
insight to draw conclusions on the desired topics. The inter-
viewees were also able to review our transcripts and conclusions
to confirm mutual understanding of the topics.
Internal validity is of concern when causal relations are ex-
amined [145]. When the researcher investigates whether one
factor affects an investigated factor, there is a risk that the invest-
igated factor is also affected by a third factor. If the researcher is
not aware of the third factor and/or does not know to what extent
it affects the investigated factor, there is a threat to internal valid-
ity. Our primary measure to mitigate threats to internal validity
is in-depth collection of data. All topics were discussed with the
interviewees until we felt that the topic was thoroughly covered
and an understanding of the topic was reached. Furthermore, we
asked follow-up questions during the analysis phase as necessary.
The paper manuscripts were also presented to the interviewees to
resolve any possible problems related to the drawn conclusions.
External validity is concerned with the extent to which it is
possible to generalise the findings and the extent to which the
findings are of interest to other people outside the investigated
case [145]. Considering that Study 2 is based on three projects and
Study 3 is based on one project, they are exploratory in nature,
and because the study topics have not been widely explored prior
to these studies, the generalisability of the results is low. However,
our studies provide in-depth information and detailed findings
of the studied topics, so we believe that the transferability of the
results to similar contexts should be fair.
Finally, we took several countermeasures against reactivity,
researcher bias and respondent bias-related threats to validity
[118]. Reactivity means that the presence of the researcher may
influence the study and the behaviour of the study objects. Re-
searcher bias refers to the preconceptions of the researcher that
may influence how questions are asked and answers are inter-
preted. Finally, respondent bias originates from the respondents’
attitudes toward the research, which may lead, for example,
to withholding information or giving answers the respondents
think the researcher is looking for. The countermeasures included
prolonged involvement, data source triangulation, observer trian-
gulation, methodological triangulation, theory triangulation peer
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debriefing, member checking, negative case analysis and audit
trail [118] .

4
D I S C U S S I O N O F R E S U LT S
The following section discusses and summarises the key results of
this thesis for both research questions. This chapter also presents
the academic and practical implications, addresses limitations of
the conducted studies and makes suggestions for future research.
4.1 how does top management support sce (rq1)?
The first goal of this thesis was to understand the top manage-
ment support practices for SCE (i.e., how does top management
participate in SCE?). Study 1 and Study 2 addressed this ques-
tion; the results of Study 1 were reported in Paper I, and the
results of Study 2 were reported in Papers IV and V. Study 1
approached the question quantitatively by conducting a survey
among Finnish software professionals serving different roles in
software projects. The study used a list of 16 predefined practices
for measuring TMS in SCE (Table 4.1, practices 1–16). Since TMS
in SCE is a sparsely studied area, we identified relevant top man-
agement support practices for project management [149, 97] and
adapted the identified practices for SCE. The list contained two
kinds of practices, tangible actions and expressing understanding
and support for SCE. According to employed validity measures,
the list properly measured the desired constructs, the extent of
use and experiences importance to TMS in SCE.
The results from Study 1 show that 10 out of 16 practices are
more often present in estimating projects than absent. Using a
scale from 1 to 4, the means for extent of use and experienced
importance were 2.54 and 3.04, respectively. Six practices had
a mean value lower than 2.5 (the scale midpoint) for extent of
use, and all but two practices had a mean above 2.5 for perceived
importance. Thus, the results clearly indicate that TMS for SCE
would be high and that senior management would contribute to
SCE in various ways. However, in Study 2, which was a case study,
we used the same list of 16 practices for gaining an in-depth un-
derstanding of TMS for SCE. The results were vastly different from
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the results reported in Paper I. According to the results based on
three projects and interviews of 16 software professionals, only
five of the 16 practices were found to be exercised in connection
to estimation Table 4.1. However, the study identified two ad-
ditional practices: Top management studies and approves the
estimate and Top management ensures adequate resources for es-
timation. Thus, seven practices in total were associated with TMS
for SCE. Study 2 also confirmed that the time and effort invested
by top management in SCE was low, and the respondents clearly
stated that top management did not participate in estimation
directly.
Considering the dissonance in the results between Study 1 and
Study 2, a brief discussion is appropriate. In Study 1, our as-
sumption was that the survey would have measured the extent of
use of TMS practices as objective facts and the experienced import-
ance as a subjective state [36] and that the results would describe
the real-life situation in a generalisable manner. However, the
results from Study 2 indicate that the validity of the extent of use-
related results from Study 1 may be low for individual practices.
Reasons for low validity may be that respondents did not have a
good recollection of exercised support practices and have based
their answers on ‘gut feelings’, or they tended to prefer seeing
senior management participating in SCE and adjusted their an-
swers accordingly. The possibilities are extensive. Although the
validity for individual practices seems low, the overall presence
of top management in SCE correlates with the results from Study
2. However, the validity of the results from Study 2 is likely to be
higher than the validity of the results from Study 1, as is typical
between surveys and case studies [45]. Retrospectively, the order
of Study 1 and Study 2 should have been switched: surveys are
not optimal for discoveries but are strong for testing hypotheses
[8]. Thus, the theories should have been first generated with case
study research and followed by verifying surveys [37].
As detailed above, top management participation in SCE is
mostly indirect through creating a good environment for suc-
cessful estimation and demonstrating the importance and un-
derstanding of estimation. The findings correlate with previous
studies from other fields. Akkermans et al. [3] reported that the
presence and attitudes of top management were identified as a
root cause for driving performance in ERP implementation. Bingi
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Table 4.1: 16 TM support practices for SCE used in Study 1.
Practice Confirmed Category
1. TM ensures existence of estimation procedures –
2. TM ensures that the estimator has adequate skills –
3. TM ensures improving estimation procedures –
4. TM ensures the involvement of the project manager
during the estimation stage
+ Direct parti-
cipation
5. TM ensures good communication between the es-
timator and the organisation
–
6. TM ensures that there are criteria for evaluating the
meaningfulness of the estimate
–
7. TM ensures ongoing estimation skills training pro-
grammes
–
8. TM requires re-estimating during the project to get
more accurate estimates
–
9. TM ensures that the estimate relies on documented
facts rather than guessing and intuition
–
10. The IT executive studies and approves the estimate –
11. TM recognizes that estimates are critical to this or-
ganization’s success
+
12. TM is knowledgeable of estimation procedures –
13. TM understands the consequences of an erroneous
estimate to the project success
–
14. TM can distinguish between estimates, targets and
commitments
–
15. TM recognizes that the estimates are inaccurate in
the beginning of the project
–
16. TM takes the output of an estimate as given without
debate
+
17. NEW: TM studies and approves the estimate +
18. NEW: TM ensures adequate resources for estimation +
(+) indicates that the practice was also supported by Study 2; (–) indicates that no
evidence was found in Study 2; NEW indicates that the practice was discovered in
Study 2. Supported practices are categorised as outlined in Paper V.
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et al. [11] noted that leadership from upper management and
support and caring acts of project leaders would boost the morale
of the team members and that the top contributor for a successful
ERP implementation is strong commitment from upper manage-
ment. Herington and Peterson [50] said that top management
should set the stage in CRM initiatives for leadership, strategic
direction and alignment of vision and business goals.
In software process improvement, management is encouraged
to take responsibility, discuss SPI often and consider SPI as a
method of increasing competitiveness [31]. Top management
plays an important role in innovation in providing a support-
ive organisational climate [4]. In project management, Riaz and
Mohamad [1] recognised that provisions of resources, communic-
ation, expertise, power and structural arrangements are import-
ant dimensions of top management support, having a significant
positive relationship with project success. Bingi et al. [11] emphas-
ised top management in situations where the outlay of capital
investments is significant, and Stelzer and Mellis [129] reported
that support from top management indicates their interest in SPI
and the extent to which organisational resources are granted by
top management for SPI implementation. All in all, top manage-
ment employs very few hands-on measures and participation
happens on a more strategic level.
To summarise, our studies show that top management particip-
ation in SCE is mostly related to resource provisioning, demon-
strated importance and goal setting. This corresponds to top
management roles in other areas such as project management,
ERP or CRM implementation, innovation and SPI. Additionally, we
found two direct participation practices that also demonstrate
power by nature. Thus, top management support for SCE is gen-
eric and strategic by nature and has been found to be typical for
managers in earlier studies [25, 137].
4.2 what are the impacts of tms for sce (rq2)?
The second goal of the thesis was to investigate the impacts
of top management participation on SCE for a software project.
Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3 address this question. The results
of Study 1 are reported in Paper I, the results of Study 2 are
reported in Papers II, IV and V and the results of Study 3 are
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reported in Paper III. Study 1 used a quantitative approach for
investigating the impact of 16 top management support practices
in project success for extent of use and perceived importance of
practices. The impact was studied for individual practices and for
all practices. According to the results from Study 1, two practices
were found to be significant with respect to project success:
1. “Top management ensures that the estimate relies on doc-
umented facts rather than guessing and intuition for the
extent of use”, and
2. “Top management recognises that estimates are critical to
this organisation’s success” for the experienced importance.
Study 2 approached the research question though a qualitative
case study-based research design. The study discovered that top
management’s actions had very little direct impact on a software
project. The exercised practice ‘TM studies and approves the
estimate’ led to re-estimation and improved the estimates. Oth-
erwise, top management actions did not have direct supportive
impacts on people- or project-related artefacts. The study also
found that top management actions may have direct negative
impacts on estimation and software projects. For example, if
the project-related expectations (‘vision’) are not clearly commu-
nicated, the project team may aim toward a wrong target and
base the estimate on incorrect premises. Furthermore, expressing
expectations, e.g., regarding the schedule or effort of a project,
may create anchors [5] that can influence estimation. Also, inter-
preting estimates as commitments resulted in estimators giving
upper bound estimates.
Many interviewees also disclosed their negative feelings to-
ward estimation, originating from fear of failure, management
interpreting estimates as commitments and requests for ‘quick es-
timates’. Specifically, in the case of a delayed project investigated
in Study 3, extending the schedule in small, unrealistic intervals
as a result of experienced management pressure had harmful
effects in an organisation. Consecutive extensions resulted in
lost trust in the estimates and made work coordination difficult.
This had widespread negative impacts not only on the project
itself but also on market introduction of the project results and
on planned benefits to be earned. Thus, it seems easier for top
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management to hinder successful estimation than to give direct
support.
According to our findings, the nature of TMS for SCE is mostly
indirect or attitudinal [57] in nature. ‘Recognising’, ‘understand-
ing’, ‘being able to distinguish’ and ‘taking without debate’ are
examples of attitudinal interpretations of TMS. In the scope of
our findings, ‘provisioning resources’ is also attitudinal. Hence,
top management’s role in supporting SCE is a ‘back-seat driver’
instead of an ‘active participant’ [57]. Generally, top management
provides an appropriate environment [4] and does not often par-
ticipate in day-to-day SCE operations. This description of the top
management role in SCE corresponds with previous research (e.g.,
[29, 92]).
While the direct TMS for SCE is low, the positive impact of indir-
ect practices seems to be enough for a successful project outcome.
The evidence suggests that these factors support estimation and
are even crucial to it, as found in various studies from other areas
(e.g., [29]). The importance of the practices was also confirmed
by the interviewees and respondents. No results suggested that
direct top management actions related to SCE would be necessary
for successful estimation or projects. These attitudinal practices
can be seen as oppositional to the harmful behaviours mentioned
earlier, increasing the chances of successful estimation and im-
proving motivation.
Top management participation may also have significant negat-
ive impacts on project and estimation success. The top manage-
ment actions with negative impacts discovered in our studies are
behavioural in nature without systematic or planned long-term
patterns. Anchoring, interpreting estimates as commitments
and demanding quick estimates were situational events with
which top management caused negative impacts. Intuitively,
people with power can easily make either good or bad by their
actions. Unfortunately, doing harm appears to be easier than
doing good, and opportunities for causing harm are practically
endless. Buchanan [16] lists consequences of organisational polit-
ics to include frustration, anxiety and job dissatisfaction on an
individual level and misuse of resources, creating communica-
tion barriers and wasting time on an organisational level. Some
harmful behaviours are likely to be unintentional, others are
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intentional [94]. Our research suggests that top management
hands-on participation is more likely to do harm than good.
Therefore, the role that top management has assumed in rela-
tion to SCE seems appropriate.
4.3 implications for practice
The objective of this thesis was to explain the role of top manage-
ment in SCE and to provide suggestions for improving estimation
practices through a greater understanding of top management-
related reasons for estimation error. The results presented in this
thesis are based on three empirical studies: one survey and two
in-depth case studies. The studies focused on collecting evid-
ence of top management participation in SCE, specifically tangible
top management participation practices and the effects of top
management participation on a software project.
The results of Study 2, reported in Papers IV and V, indicate
that top management creates prerequisites for successful estima-
tion from the back-seat driver’s role without the need for direct
participation in estimation itself. I believe that this is an accurate
and useful depiction of the reality, indicating that top manage-
ment makes the best contribution to estimation and project suc-
cess by understanding the importance and nature of estimations
and by providing adequate resources for a reality-seeking and
thorough estimation process. We also conclude, based on the
evidence, that top management should avoid direct participa-
tion in estimation. Due to the power top management holds in
organisations, their words and signals are easily interpreted as
intentions. When organisations try to align with and comply
to these assumed directions, the objectivity and realism of es-
timation is compromised. Thus, emphasising a supportive and
realism-seeking environment with minimal potential bias is a
good starting point for SCE improvement work when considering
the role of top management.
Retrospectively, and especially in light of previous research,
the results presented in this thesis seem unsurprising to me, my
fellow researchers and fellow practitioners. However, considering
the power of top management in organisations, it may not be easy
to discuss their role in relation to SCE or other areas, as conflicts
with top management may have consequences for one’s career. I
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hope that this thesis is an eye-opener and facilitates constructive
discussion of top management roles in SCE. Optimally, manage-
ment would understand their place in SCE better and provide
support and encouragement. I believe that many organisations
would be able to benefit from these insights and improve their
estimation accuracy.
4.4 future research
The findings of this thesis draw an unsurprising picture of top
management as a grey eminence creating an environment for
successful estimation and staying behind the scenes. However, be-
cause of the power top management holds, its role is complex and
multi-layered. I believe that top management may have a role in
relation to some estimation inhibitors presented in Table 2.2. Top
management roles and actions in software projects may be a meta-
factor behind estimation inhibitors such as “frequent changes”,
“focus on time-to-delivery rather than cost or quality” or “poor
requirement specification”. Considering the significant negative
effects of top management actions on estimation witnessed in
our studies, this seems probable, and understanding top manage-
ment’s role in connection to individual inhibitors could enable
improvements in estimation accuracy.
This thesis also shows that the results of surveys and in-depth
case study research of the same topic may differ. The survey
produced results that could not be validated in case study re-
search. The reason for this discrepancy may be that it is difficult
to judge whether a certain proposition in a questionnaire is truly
significant in a real-life setting or if it is just a proud thought. I
believe that top management-related research cannot be properly
conducted without in-depth studies in real-life settings due to the
complex nature of TMS. Thus, top management-related research
should be primarily conducted via in-depth studies generating in-
depth insight and with quantitative methods to validate already
proven phenomena.
5
C O N C L U S I O N S
Software project overruns continue to be a systemic problem in
the industry, even after decades of persistent improvement. Thus
far, SCE research has focused on seeking reasons for overruns
and estimation error from methodologies without much luck.
Therefore, it seems likely that the reasons for estimation error
originate from other sources. While SCE research focuses on
methodologies, many other disciplines have given more attention
to managerial issues, especially top management support. As
a significant success factor in many areas, TMS has not been
studied thoroughly in SCE. Based on empirical evidence, this
thesis investigates the role of top management in SCE.
The evidence from our studies shows that top management
support for SCE is mostly indirect, as in many other disciplines.
Senior management focuses on creating a successful environment
for software development and SCE instead of participating in
the software process personally. For SCE, the key factors of top
management support include adequate resources, demonstrat-
ing the importance of SCE and seeking realism. This indirect
role is enough for successful estimation. On the other hand, top
management may negatively impact estimation with its actions.
For example, unclear expectations may cause the project team to
aim for the wrong outcome, expressed expectations may become
anchors biasing estimation and interpreting estimates as com-
mitments may decrease estimators’ motivation and cause them
to give high estimates. Because of the power top management
holds in organisations, their opinions and wishes easily cloud
objective work toward realistic estimates. Some estimation errors
inevitably originate from top management actions.
The results show that top management can both support and
hinder estimation accuracy. The support is mostly conveyed
through attitudinal behaviours such as seeking realism and
demonstrating support for SCE, while the hindering factors typ-
ically originate from direct actions. The practical implication
is that top management should avoid direct participation in, or
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even contact with, SCE and focus on sustaining a supportive and
unbiased environment. By doing this, many projects should be
able to avoid failures hurting firms’ competitiveness. From the
research perspective, the results provide evidence that people-
related perspectives are an important factor in SCE, implying that
a shifting focus from methodologies toward managerial topics is
justified.
This thesis contributes to the practice and theories on SCE by ex-
plaining the role of top management in SCE. The primary insight
is that top management can focus on creating prerequisites for
successful estimation and avoid direct participation. The results
also show that the impacts of top management actions typically
originate from indirect and/or informal actions. This insight
provides a direction for further research. Top management beha-
viour may act as a meta-factor related to sources of estimation
error and should be investigated in more detail. Finally, we
noted that survey research may give vastly different, and in our
experience unreliable, results compared to in-depth case study
research. Top management support seems to be too complex
to be adequately understood through structured questionnaires.
Thus, I recommend an in-depth approach for future studies.
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Abstract
Purpose –A cost estimate is considered to have a high impact on software project success. Because of
this, different methodologies for creating an accurate estimate have been studied over decades.
Many methodologies produce accurate results, when used properly. However, software projects still
suffer from inaccurate estimates. The disparity may result from organisational hindrances. This paper
focuses on top management support (TMS) for software cost estimation (SCE). The purpose of this
paper is to identify current practices and attitudes of top management involvement in SCE, and to
analyse the relationship between these two and project success.
Design/methodology/approach – A list of 16 TMS practices for SCE has been developed. A survey
was conducted to capture the frequency of use and the experienced importance of support practices.
Data has been collected from 114 software professionals in Finland. Correlations between the
frequency of use, attitudes and project success were analysed.
Findings – Top management invests a significant amount of attention in SCE. The extent of use and
experienced importance do not correlate strongly with each other or project success.
Research limitations/implications – The results may lack generalisability. Researchers are
encouraged to validate the results with further studies.
Practical implications – Software professionals invite senior managers to participate in SCE. A list
of practices for participating is provided.
Originality/value – This paper suggests a list of 16 TMS practices for SCE. The paper also reports on
the extent of use and experienced importance of practices, and the correlations between these two
and project success.
Keywords Senior management, Software cost estimation, Support practices
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Projects exceeding their budgets and schedules are a widely recognised problem in the
software industry (Standish Group, 1994; Moløkken and Jørgensen, 2003; Lederer and
Prasad, 1992). A project delivering the desired results within the planned budget
and schedule is an exception, not the rule. The consequences of this phenomenon are
dramatic, resulting in hundreds of billions of euros in losses annually (Ewusi-Mensah,
2003; Charette, 2005). Considering the severity of the problem and its consequences,
it is not surprising that the problem has been extensively studied from several
angles, including project management (PM) and software cost estimation (SCE)
(Van Genuchten, 1991; Lederer and Prasad, 1995).
Software projects are difficult endeavours. So, a project should be well organised in
order to have the premises to succeed. The PM literature has identified a wide spectrum
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of critical support factors (CSF), which contribute positively to project success (Fortune
and White, 2006; Cooke-Davies, 2002). One of the most important CSFs is top
management support (TMS) (Fortune and White, 2006; Young and Jordan, 2008;
Schmidt et al., 2001). The PM literature has also identified own specific CSFs for TMS,
guiding how senior management should use its valuable time to support project
success (Zwikael, 2008a, b; Boonstra, 2013).
The purpose of SCE is to provide meaningful information to support decision
making (McConnell, 2006). Too high or too low estimates have a biasing effect on the
business case, meaning that projects may be approved or rejected on false premises.
Also, during the project phase, working towards incorrect goals can have negative
effects on the project (Jørgensen and Sjøberg, 2001). Therefore the scientists and
practitioners have developed an almost endless plethora of different methods for
creating cost estimates (McConnell, 2006; Jørgensen and Shepperd, 2007). It has also
been proven that when used properly, these methods will constantly produce
adequately good results (Putnam and Myers, 2003; Pitterman, 2000).
The necessary information for delivering a successful software project seems to
exist, yet most projects fail to meet the set expectations. The possible reasons are many,
including leadership related problems. As a matter of fact, even 60 per cent of senior
executives perceive that organisational issues are more important than the technical
ones in information system development (Doherty and King, 2001). A logical conclusion
would be that top management would promote and enforce the use of best practices
both in PM and SCE. The literature clearly shows that TMS has been studied in the
scope of PM, but surprisingly not in the scope of SCE.
The first objective of this paper is to develop a list of TMS practices for SCE, which
is then used for studying TMS in SCE further. The developed list is based on PM CSFs
(Zwikael, 2008a, b), which are adopted in the SCE scope, and selected best practices
presented in the SCE literature (McConnell, 2006), which can reasonably be assumed to
have a positive result in the SCE outcome. The other objectives of this paper are: to
investigate to what extent and how top management is involved in SCE, to study what
is the perceived importance of presented support practices and to analyse the
relationships between the extent of use, perceived importance and project success.
Understanding better the extent of top management involvement and perceived
importance of different support practices can help senior managers, project managers
and researchers to justify paying more attention on organisational issues related to
SCE, and specifically on TMS.
1.1 SCE maturity
Software projects are often late or do not finish at all (Standish Group, 1994). There is
not one reason for being late, but it is a result of many reasons, including PM related
issues and non-meaningful estimates (Van Genuchten, 1991; Lederer and Prasad, 1995).
When considering estimation related problems, it is not likely that failing cost
estimates would be a result of lack of suitable estimation methods. For example,
Jørgensen lists 12 different estimation approach categories (Jørgensen and Shepperd,
2007), and the number of actual estimation techniques is measured probably in
hundreds. Regardless of the modest track record of SCE, projects also do succeed and
deliver the wanted results on time, within budget and scope (Putnam and Myers, 2003;
Pitterman, 2000). There is also evidence that some organisations succeed constantly,
proving that when used appropriately, estimation and PM can produce accurate and
desired results (Putnam and Myers, 2003; Pitterman, 2000). On the other hand, even as
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many as 83 per cent of estimators seem not to use any estimation methodologies, or
they rely on ad-hoc or memory-based methodologies (Hihn and Habib-agahi, 1991).
This is proven to be connected to budget and schedule overruns (Lederer and Prasad,
1992). When considering PM, White and Fortune reported that only 5 per cent of all
organisations do not use any PM methodologies (White and Fortune, 2002), and it has
been found that the maturity of an organisation is highly correlated with project
success (Harter et al., 2000).
Although the number of estimation methods is more than sufficient, the overall
organisational maturity of making SCE seems not to be on the same level as the
maturity of executing projects. This is surprising, because both the estimate and
the project execution influence the project success (Van Genuchten, 1991; Lederer and
Prasad, 1995). TMS has been studied a lot in PM. It has been found that, e.g. paying
attention to choosing the right project manager and ensuring that the appropriate
PM tools and methodologies are in place contribute positively on project success
(Zwikael, 2008a, b). However, the literature does not provide any advice to how
senior management should support SCE. Actually, it has been found that no practice
discourages the use of guessing as an estimating method (Lederer and Prasad, 2000).
This disparity may indicate that the difference between organisations’ estimation
maturity and PM maturity is a result of differences in the management focus.
1.2 Top management involvement in PM
The primary duty and responsibility of a project manager is to make sure that the
project delivers on time, cost and scope (PMI, 2013). However, the senior management is
accountable for appointing project managers, making sure that the work is performed
as a project in the first place, and ensuring that the PM maturity and methodology are
on an adequate level. When a project has been established, the project manager and
the project itself need support from top management. Senior management, e.g. provides
direction for the project and helps in resolving any issues or conflicts. Senior
management also influences PM capabilities and the performance of an organisation
through TMS processes (Zwikael, 2008a, b).
The effect of TMS in project success has been found to correlate highly with the
overall project success. As a matter of fact, TMS has been found to be one of the most
significant factors contributing to project success (Fortune andWhite, 2006; Young and
Jordan, 2008). PM literature lists various ways for top management to support projects.
For example, Zwikael has identified a list of 17 relevant support practices of how top
management could support IT projects (Zwikael, 2008a). Zwikael’s list of 17 support
practices is presented below:
(1) project-based organisation;
(2) existence of project procedures;
(3) appropriate project manager assignment;
(4) refreshing project procedures;
(5) involvement of the project manager during initiation stage;
(6) communication between the project manager and the organisation;
(7) existence of project success measurement;
(8) supportive project organisational structure;
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(9) existence of interactive inter-departmental project groups;
(10) organisational projects resource planning;
(11) organisational projects risk management;
(12) organisational projects quality management;
(13) on-going PM training programmes;
(14) PM office involvement;
(15) extent of use of standard PM software;
(16) use of organisational projects data warehouse; and
(17) use of new project tools and techniques.
This paper utilises the fact that both SCE and PM affect project success. TMS has been
successfully studied in scope of PM, but not in scope of SCE. Considering the universal
nature of TMS, it is likely that the same or similar top management CSFs, which
contribute positively to project success during a project, contribute positively on SCE
success as well.
Based on the previous, a list of 16 support practices is developed and used for
studying top management involvement in SCE. The selected support practices
are adopted from Zwikael’s list of support practices in IT PM, and from other best
practices presented in SCE literature. This list of 16 support practices is used in
a questionnaire to study the current practice and perceived importance of top
management involvement in SCE. The purpose of the questionnaire is to understand
TMS in SCE better.
2. Research configuration
A list of predefined support practices was developed to capture the current practice and
opinions about top management involvement in SCE. An internet-based questionnaire
was used for data collection. A fourfold Likert scale was used for evaluating both
dimensions, the maximum values indicating that SCE is always used (1¼ “never used”
to 4¼ “always used”) or considered to be of high importance (1¼ “no importance”… to
4¼ “high importance”). Statistical methods were used for analysing the relationships
between the current practice, attitudes and project success.
2.1 Methodology
In order to capture the current practice of TMS in SCE, and the opinions of
software professionals regarding the importance of TMS practices, a list of 16 TMS
practices in SCE has been developed. The list is adapted from Zwikael’s PM
related top management CSFs (Zwikael, 2008a) and other relevant TMS practices
presented by McConnell (2006). The practices presented on the developed list can
reasonably be assumed to be relevant also in the SCE scope. The practices represent
conceptually two different kinds of practices: tangible doing (practices 1-10) and
basic awareness of SCE (practices 11-16). The list of 16 support practices is
presented below:
(1) top management ensures existence of estimation procedures;
(2) top management ensures that the estimator has adequate skills;
(3) top management ensures improving estimation procedures;
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(4) top management ensures the involvement of the project manager during the
estimation stage;
(5) top management ensures good communication between the estimator and the
organisation;
(6) top management ensures that there are criteria for evaluating the
meaningfulness of the estimate;
(7) top management ensures on-going estimation skills training programmes;
(8) top management requires re-estimating during the project to get more accurate
estimates;
(9) top management ensures that the estimate relies on documented facts rather
than guessing and intuition;
(10) the IT executive studies and approves the estimate;
(11) top management recognises that estimates are critical to this organisation’s
success;
(12) top management is knowledgeable of estimation procedures;
(13) top management understands the consequences of an erroneous estimate to the
project success;
(14) top management can distinguish between estimates, targets and commitments;
(15) top management recognises that the estimates are inaccurate in the beginning
of the project; and
(16) top management takes the output of an estimate as given without debate.
2.2 Data collection and questionnaire design
A questionnaire of 17 questions was designed for data collection. The questionnaire
was to:
(1) collect information about the respondent and the project in question;
(2) identify the extent of use of TMS practices in SCE; and
(3) identify software professionals’ opinions on the importance of different TMS
practices in SCE.
A pilot survey was conducted prior to the main survey. In the pilot survey, an invitation to
answer the questionnaire was sent to 30 software professionals, of which 16 responded.
Based on the feedback from the pilot survey, 20 changes were made to the questionnaire.
The main survey was implemented as an anonymous internet-based questionnaire, and a
link to the questionnaire was sent to 1,109 software professionals. The recipients of the
invitation were selected based on the mailing lists provided by Project Management
Institute Finland chapter and Digile Oy (Digile Oy is a non-profit Finnish organisation,
which coordinates national and international research programmes). The recipients were
instructed to answer the questionnaire only if they had been actively involved in the
estimation of a software project within the past 24 months, and to base their responses on
their most recent estimated project, including abandoned projects. The reason for
anonymity was to maximise the number of responses.
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Of the all recipients, 114 completed the whole questionnaire (10.28 per cent response
rate). In total, 291 recipients started answering the questionnaire, but only 184 of them
had participated SCE during the past 24 months; 70 of those 184 respondents failed
to answer all questions, and their incomplete answers were not included as part of the
survey.
The first two of the 17 questions were screening questions determining whether the
respondent is eligible for taking part in the questionnaire. The next four questions
determined the role of the respondent in SCE. Questions 7-10 measured the experienced
importance and frequency of use of TMS practices in SCE. The respondents were also
asked to add their own suggestions for practices. The rest of the questions determined
the characteristics of the estimated project. The list of the questions is presented below:
(1) Have you already answered this survey? If you answer Yes, you will be
forwarded to the end of the questionnaire.
(2) Have you participated SCE during the past 24 months? If you answer No, you
will be forwarded to the end of the questionnaire.
(3) Which of the following best describes your role in SCE?
(4) Which of the following best describes your role in making the go/No Go decision
about the estimated project?
(5) Which of the following best describes your role in the estimated project?
(6) Which of the following best describes your job role?
(7) Indicate the Frequency of the ways of top management involvement in SCE in
your organisation.
(8) Specify other ways of top management involvement in SCE, which were not
presented in the previous question, and indicate the Frequency.
(9) According to your subjective opinion, indicate the Importance of the ways of
top management involvement in SCE from the estimation success point of view.
(10) Specify other ways of top management involvement in SCE, which were not
presented in the previous question, and indicate the Importance from the
estimation success point of view according to your subjective opinion.
(11) In your opinion, indicate when the estimate meaningfulness was evaluated.
(12) Indicate the industry sector of the latest estimated project. Indicate either your
own organisation’s sector, or client organisation’s sector, if the project was
developed for a client.
(13) How many people are currently employed in your organisation?
(14) How many people were involved in the latest estimated project?
(15) What was the length of the last estimated project in months?
(16) What is the completion status of the last estimated software project?
(17) How successful was the last estimated project?
2.3 Respondent and project demographics
This section introduces respondent related demographics, including the projects at
hand. All questions were answered by 114 respondents (n¼ 114).
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2.3.1 Industry sector. The respondents were asked to indicate the industry sector of
the estimated project. ICT accounted for 33 per cent (38) of responses. The complete
breakdown is shown in Figure 1.
2.3.2 Number of employees. The number of employees was classified into five
categories, as shown in Figure 2. Most of the respondents, 33 per cent (38), worked in
organisations with 50 or less employees. The breakdown is presented in Figure 2.
2.3.3 Numbers involved. The number of people involved in the estimated project
was classified into five ranges. When asked, most of the respondents, 38 per cent (43),
indicated that the number of persons involved was between six and ten. The
breakdown is shown in Figure 3.
2.3.4 Project duration. Most of the projects lasted 12 months or less. In total,
34 per cent (39) of the projects lasted between one and six months and 34 per cent (39) of
the projects lasted between seven and 12 months. The categorised breakdown can be
seen in Figure 4.
2.3.5 Role of respondent. The invitation to answer was sent to software
professionals, of which 22 per cent (25) identified themselves as project managers, 16
per cent (20) as software developers, team leaders or architects, 30 per cent (34) as
senior managers, 7 per cent (8) as directors and 16 per cent (18) as managers. The full
breakdown is presented in Figure 5(a).
2.3.6 Role in project. Respondents were also asked to indicate their role in the
estimated project. Totally, 24 per cent (28) answered they were project managers,
11 per cent (13) software developers and 4 per cent (4) non-technical project team
members. In total, 25 per cent (29) were steering group members and 27 per cent (31)
were project owners; 8 per cent (9) answered that they had some other role, like coach,
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quality manager or security officer. None of the respondents answered that they were
not part of the project itself. The roles are presented in Figure 5(b).
2.3.7 Role in SCE. When requested to indicate their role in SCE, 33 per cent (38) of
the respondents stated that they had the overall responsibility of preparing the
estimate, 19 per cent (22) were involved in estimating certain functionalities, 40 per cent
(46) reviewed the estimate and 7 per cent (8) had some other role in the estimation, like
process improvement coach or they needed the estimate for the business case
preparation. The roles are also shown in Table I.
2.3.8 Role in decision making. In all, 26 per cent (30) of the respondents indicated
that they made the final decision about approving or rejecting the project, while 25 per
cent (28) indicated they had some decision-making power, but someone else made the
final decision; 34 per cent (39) recommended the project to the decision makers and
11 per cent (13) had their opinion considered, but they did not have formal decision
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making power. Only 4 per cent (4) indicated that they did not participate in decision
making. The roles can be seen in Table II.
2.3.9 Completion status. Exactly half, or 50 per cent (57), of the respondents
answered that the estimated project was still in progress. In total, 36 per cent (41)
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of the projects were delivered, and the rest of the projects did not get approved,
were terminated or had not been started yet. The full breakdown is available in
Figure 6(a).
2.3.10 Project success. The respondents were offered four alternatives to estimate
project success: “complete success”, “quite successful”, “poor success” and “terminated/
complete failure”. In total, 73 per cent (83) of the respondents were able to indicate the
success of the project, while 27 per cent (31) indicated that the information is not
available; 14 per cent (12) of those who indicated the success of the project reported that
the project was “complete success”, while 73 per cent (61) reported “quite successful”,
10 per cent (8) “poor success” and 2 per cent (2) “terminated/complete failure”. This
result corresponds somewhat with the other reported cost and budget overrun rates
(Moløkken and Jørgensen, 2003). However, it must be noted that only 36 per cent (41) of
the estimated projects had yet been concluded, so many of the respondents may have
indicated the success of the project prematurely. The complete breakdown is shown in
Figure 6(b).
2.3.11 Evaluation of estimate meaningfulness. The survey defined a meaningful
estimate as follows, adapted from McConnell, (2006):
A meaningful estimate is an estimate that provides a clear enough view of the project reality
to allow the project leadership to make good decisions about how to control the project to hit
its targets.
The respondents were asked to indicate in which phases of the project the
meaningfulness of the estimate was evaluated in their opinion. The question was asked
for three different phases: before the project, during the project and after the project.
The respondents were offered five alternatives: disagree, tend to disagree, tend to
agree, agree and too early to answer. For all phases the alternative agree was the most
popular answer. The percentages for “agree” before, during and after the project were
57 per cent (62), 48 per cent (50) and 38 per cent (36) of those who already could answer
the question, respectively. The full breakdown is presented in Table III.
Role in software cost estimation Frequency %
I had the overall responsibility for preparing the estimate 38 33
I estimated the effort for certain functionalities 22 19
I reviewed the estimate 46 40
Other 8 7
Table I.
Role in software
cost estimation
Role in decision making Frequency %
I made the final decision 30 26
I had decision making power, but someone else made the final decision 28 25
I made the recommendation for the decision makers, but I did not have formal
decision making power
39 34
My opinion was considered, but I did not have formal decision making power 13 11
I did not participate in decision making 4 4
Table II.
Role in decision
making
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3. Results and discussion
This section discusses the main survey findings about TMS in SCE. First, the validity
of the list of 16 support practices for measuring the current practice and perceived
importance is discussed. After that the correlation between these two dimensions of
TMS is analysed. Third, the results from the causal analysis between the variables are
presented, and finally, the extent of use and attitudes are compared, and the scores for
the individual support practices are discussed.
3.1 Validity of support practices
The primary focus of this paper is to establish what is the level of TMS for SCE, and what is
the level of experienced importance of TMS for SCE. A list of 16 TMS practices for SCEwas
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(a) Project
completion status;
(b) project success
Meaningfulness evaluation point Disagree
Tend to
disagree
Tend to
agree Agree
Too early
to answer Total
Before the project 4 22 21 62 5 114
During the project 5 14 36 50 9 114
After the project 14 22 24 36 18 114
Table III.
Evaluation
frequency of cost
estimate
meaningfulness at
different project
phases
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developed and used for measuring the current practice and attitudes. The list’s validity
was evaluated according to three conventional techniques: Cronbach’s standardised α,
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients and an eigenvalue decomposition.
Cronbach’s standardised α was computed separately for the practices and attitudes.
The obtained values are 0.92 and 0.88, respectively. According to the literature, values
over 0.9 indicate “excellent” internal consistency and values over 0.8 “good” internal
consistency of the test items (George and Mallery, 2003), meaning that the items on the
list are very likely to measure the same single theoretical construct. These values are
also higher than required in the statistical literature (George and Mallery, 2003).
The internal consistency was studied further by generating Spearman’s rho
matrices for both the use of practices and attitudes (Figures 7 and 8).
Also these matrices show a clear correlation between the scores for the list items.
However, the matrices show a negative correlation for one practice: “Top management
takes the output of an estimate as given without debate”. A peer discussion of the
possible reasons for the deviating behaviour was conducted. The conclusion was that
the proposition is not clear, and it can be interpreted either so that a higher score would
imply a positive aspect of SCE, or so that a higher score would imply a negative aspect
of SCE. For this reason, the proposition cannot be considered as valid from research
point of view.
Finally, a scree plot was used for assessing the number of latent dimensions in the
data (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). When the above two correlation matrices were used
to extract the corresponding eigenvalues, it is clear that a single latent construct is
present (Figure 9), as represented by the dominant eigenvalue.
Considering the results of the previous tests, in statistical terms the presented
16 support practices seem to measure the same phenomenon, TMS for SCE, both in
terms of extent of use and experienced importance. In other words, the list is valid for
measuring TMS for SCE.
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3.2 Correlation between current practice and attitudes
The correlation between the two latent constructs, extent of use and experienced
importance, is moderate (Pearson’s r¼ 0.48). The same also holds for the individual
elements. When tested with nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-tests (Table IV), the null
hypothesis of equal distributions holds only for the following three practices:
(1) top management recognises that estimates are critical to this organisation’s success;
(2) top management ensures involvement of the project manager during the
estimation stage; and
(3) top management is knowledgeable of estimation procedures.
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
−0.12 −0.09 0.14 −0.09 0.15 −0.02 0.13 0 0 0.14 0.01 0.15 −0.05 −0.09 0.11 1
0.24 0.13 0.29 0.11 0.29 0.29 0.23 0.35 0.31 0.08 0.32 0.26 0.46 0.55 1 0.11
0.44 0.38 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.29 0.3 0.33 0.34 0.11 0.4 0.21 0.41 1 0.55 −0.09
0.4 0.34 0.54 0.39 0.35 0.52 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.12 0.64 0.35 1 0.41 0.46 −0.05
0.33 0.22 0.4 0.33 0.28 0.38 0.33 0.3 0.32 0.34 0.3 1 0.35 0.21 0.26 0.15
0.52 0.51 0.64 0.38 0.29 0.55 0.48 0.34 0.54 0.26 1 0.3 0.64 0.4 0.32 0.01
0.37 0.09 0.29 0.28 0.16 0.4 0.41 0.24 0.34 1 0.26 0.34 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.14
0.48 0.43 0.41 0.32 0.3 0.52 0.45 0.4 1 0.34 0.54 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.31 0
0.28 0.26 0.35 0.19 0.27 0.31 0.33 1 0.4 0.24 0.34 0.3 0.36 0.33 0.35 0
0.41 0.31 0.6 0.37 0.42 0.62 1 0.33 0.45 0.41 0.48 0.33 0.33 0.3 0.23 0.13
0.49 0.45 0.67 0.41 0.46 1 0.62 0.31 0.52 0.4 0.55 0.38 0.52 0.29 0.29 −0.02
0.26 0.3 0.47 0.31 1 0.46 0.42 0.27 0.3 0.16 0.29 0.28 0.35 0.23 0.29 0.15
0.4 0.21 0.39 1 0.31 0.41 0.37 0.19 0.32 0.28 0.38 0.33 0.39 0.27 0.11 −0.09
0.53 0.45 1 0.39 0.47 0.67 0.6 0.35 0.41 0.29 0.64 0.4 0.54 0.28 0.29 0.14
0.4 1 0.45 0.21 0.3 0.45 0.31 0.26 0.43 0.09 0.51 0.22 0.34 0.38 0.13 −0.09
1 0.4 0.53 0.4 0.26 0.49 0.41 0.28 0.48 0.37 0.52 0.33 0.4 0.44 0.24 −0.12
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It is notable that all of these three practices were ranked high, both in terms of use of
practices and attitudes. In other words, not only the attitudes towards them are
positive, but they have also received top management attention in practice.
When considering the first item, it seems understandable that the first step in supporting
SCE is to be aware and recognise the importance of SCE for the organisation. In the scope of
PM, awareness, recognition, commitment and other related concepts are listed among the
most important success factors (White and Fortune, 2002; Young and Jordan, 2008). It is
also intuitively understandable that to work effectively with something, awareness and
recognition of the concept are important. Reports of failures and high overrun rates
(Ewusi-Mensah, 2003; Charette, 2005; Jiang, 2005; Standish Group, 1994) have also made top
managers painfully aware of the organisational consequences of failed estimates.
Project manager’s role in a project is central, with an overall responsibility of the
project success (PMI, 2013). Considering that, it is not surprising that involving the
Top management support practice
Frequency
(mean)
Importance
(mean) Difference
U
(ρo0.05)
Top management understands the consequences of
an erroneous estimate to the project success 2.97 3.47H 0.50 4,361
Top management recognises that estimates are
critical to this organisation’s success 2.96 3.32H 0.37 5,012C
Top management ensures involvement of the project
manager during the estimation stage 2.94 3.25 0.31 5,242C
Top management can distinguish between estimates,
targets and commitments 2.84 3.41H 0.57 4,170
Top management recognises that the estimates are
inaccurate in the beginning of the project 2.68 3.30 0.62 3,967
Top management ensures existence of estimation
procedures 2.67 3.18 0.52 4,500
Top management ensures that the estimator has
adequate skills 2.66 3.32H 0.66 4,153
Top management is knowledgeable of estimation
procedures 2.57 2.86L 0.29 5,399C
Top management ensures good communication
between the estimator and the organisation 2.56 3.20 0.64 4,005
The IT executive studies and approves the estimate 2.51 2.71L 0.20 –
Top management ensures that the estimate relies on
documented facts rather than guessing and intuition 2.44 3.05 0.61 4,269
Top management requires re-estimating during the
project to get more accurate estimates 2.38 3.10 0.72 3,758
Top management ensures that there are criteria for
evaluating the meaningfulness of the estimate 2.36 3.04 0.68 3,930
Top management ensures improving estimation
procedures 2.26 2.98 0.72 3,821
Top management takes the output of an estimate as
given without debate 2.15 2.04 −0.11
Top management ensures on going estimation skills
training programmes 1.74 2.47L 0.74 3,664
Mean 2.54 3.04 0.50
SD 0.33 0.37
Notes: H, one of the four practices with the highest perceived importance; L, one of the three practices
with the lowest perceived importance; C, frequence and importance correlate
Table IV.
Use of practices,
attitudes and
correlation
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project manager is both seen as important, as well as practiced often. Also the literature
mentions early involvement of the project manager as a critical TMS process (Zwikael,
2008a).
While the first two items may seem obvious, the third item does not seem to
correlate well with the other studies. For example Hihn and Habib-agahi (1991) report
that even as many as 83 per cent of estimators seem not to use any estimation
methodologies, or they rely on ad-hoc or memory-based methodologies. Also Lederer
and Prasad (2000) report that there are no practices discouraging the use of guessing as
an estimation methodology. One possible reason for the difference is that an estimation
methodology and estimation procedure are different concepts. The estimation
methodology generally refers to a task for producing an effort estimate for a certain
piece of software, while the estimation procedure refers to a broader concept,
considering things like qualification of the estimator, presentation of the estimate and
re-estimation. However, this conceptual difference is not likely to explain the difference,
since an estimation procedure should provide protection against off-the-cuff estimation
and guessing (McConnell, 2006). Another alternative is that the estimation procedure is
interpreted as a synonym for some other concept, like business case preparation, which
could explain the high rate of application, and the correlation with the attitudes.
The rest 13 pairs, which did not correlate with each other, are all operative by nature,
related to PM or cost estimation as a technical performance. Generally these kind of tasks
are of little interest to senior managers (Thomas et al., 2002; Crawford, 2005). The first
correlating item relates to organisational success, and the second is strategic for the
project, so it seems natural that these two items draw senior management’s attention.
This phenomenon may explain the decreased correlation between the extent of use and
attitudes for the rest of the practices. From the research point of view, studying support
practices with strategic elements further could be justifiable.
3.3 Causal analysis
In the first test, project and respondent related variables’ influence on the use of
practices and attitudes was tested with two separate ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression models. The basic model setup was similar in both models: the sum
variables of extent of use and attitudes were used as dependent variables, while
respondent and project related background variables were used as independent
variables. The tested independent variables were the following: ICT sector, firm size,
project size, project duration, project status and estimate meaningfulness evaluation,
before the project, during the project and after the project.
According to the results, none of the tested independent variables were statistically
significant under the conventional 5 per cent significance level (po0.05). The adjusted
R2-values were both below 0.13, meaning that the models could explain a little over
10 per cent of the variance seen in the sum variables. Considering this, other factors
seem to determine most of the extent of use or attitudes towards SCE.
As a second regression modelling approach, a logistic regression model was fitted
with a recoded project success variable as the dependent phenomenon. That is, in
Figure 6 the two categories, “quite successful” and “complete success” were merged
into one. In addition to the independent variables in the OLS models, the sum variables,
extent of use and attitudes, were added as independent variables. The computed
pseudo-R2 measure (McFadden, 1974) of the model was 0.10. None of the included
independent variables were found to be statistically significant, indicating no influence
on project success. This result deviates at least from Jones (1998), which reports that
527
TMS in
software cost
estimation
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 T
urk
u A
t 0
3:2
3 2
8 J
an
ua
ry 
20
17
 (P
T)
project size affects the probability of project success. However, the sample size in this
study was relatively small, and over 80 per cent of the studied projects were shorter
than 18 calendar months. This may explain the deviating result.
Finally, a nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was used to investigate the
effects of the individual 16 items. Only the following two were found to be significant
(po0.05) with respect to project success:
(1) “Top management ensures that the estimate relies on documented facts rather
than guessing and intuition” for the extent of use; and
(2) “Top management recognizes that estimates are critical to this organization’s
success” for the experienced importance.
Regardless of the statistical significance, it could be premature to draw conclusions of
these practices’ impact on the project success. Further studies are needed to confirm
whether these findings are really significant or just outliers. However, guessing and
intuition have proven to be connected to schedule overruns (Lederer and Prasad, 1992),
so relying on documented facts in SCE could, in the light of the previous research, be
expected to have a positive impact on project success. Also, recognition of the
importance of estimates should intuitively help in supporting SCE, and contribute
positively to project success, as well.
3.4 General observations
As typical for survey setups like the one used in this study, the attitudes are more
positive than the actual extent of use (Table IV). In this case, the average difference is
0.50 in favour of attitudes. Table IV also shows a moderate correlation between the
extent of use and attitudes, correlating with the results of the statistical analysis. Four
attitudes with the highest scores are marked with “H”, and three with the lowest scores
with “L”. As can be seen, the attitudes with the highest scores are among the most
practiced ones, and the attitudes with the lowest scores among the least practiced.
When considering the lower ends of the lists, “skills training programmes”,
“improving estimation procedures” and “re-estimation” are related to learning and
improvement. Also Zwikael (2008a) reports similarly low scores for learning related
practices in software development organisations. A low score for “having a criteria for
evaluating the meaningfulness of the estimate” may suggest that the software
companies are not that interested in the quality of the estimate. In terms of attitudes,
“the IT executive studies and approves the estimate” received a low score. This may
indicate low confidence towards the IT management. The respondents also reported
that in the majority of the estimated projects, “ensuring that the estimate is based on
documented facts rather than guessing” was practiced “never” or “occasionally”. This
corresponds well with the findings in Lederer and Prasad (2000).
“Top management understands the consequences of an erroneous estimate to the
project success” got the highest score in both dimensions of TMS. As discussed earlier,
a high score seems understandable, because project failures and overruns are reported
widely. The two most used practices confirm that the software professionals are very
well aware of the importance of an estimate, and possible consequences of an erroneous
estimate. Furthermore, “top management can distinguish between estimates, targets
and commitments” is related to realism and clear goals, which are considered to be of
very high importance also in White and Fortune (2002).
The respondents also suggested 51 different other means for TMS in SCE, of which
eight could be categorised under “Top management ensures that all stakeholders have
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been consulted”. This is close to “Top management ensures good communication
between the estimator and the organisation”, but it addresses more directly the need to
present the estimate to all stakeholders when the estimate is ready, instead of ensuring
good communication during the estimation work. This suggestion seems reasonable,
and should be studied further in the future. Otherwise the comments were related more
to PM and business case preparation than to SCE.
3.5 Implications for practice and research
The analysis conducted in this study did not reveal significant relationships between
TMS in SCE and project success, and therefore this paper cannot give any strong
recommendations. However, the study clearly shows that top management invests a
significant amount of its valuable time in supporting SCE. The list of practices and
results presented in this paper may still help senior managers to better prioritise their
doings related to SCE. While not statistically proven, it can be reasonably assumed that
the practices with the high extent of use and perceived importance are more important
from the project success point of view than the practices with low scores. The results
may also promote the importance of SCE among top managers and help them to start
actions towards more meaningful and accurate estimates.
From the research and theory point of view, this paper has concentrated specifically
on the construct “TMS in SCE”. Prior work has extensively studied different estimation
methods and TMS’s role in PM. This study continues the work by addressing the tight
coupling of an estimate, project and TMS. The results show that top management
significantly gives their attention to SCE through different support practices, which all
are related to the same construct, TMS in SCE.
3.6 Further research
The analysis conducted in this paper was not able to identify a clear list of support
practices, the use of which would increase the probability of project success. The
identification of this list is probably the most interesting research question, because top
management’s time is a scarce resource, and it should be invested effectively. A new
study with a larger sample of concluded projects should be conducted to get more
reliable results. One natural next step would also be to repeat this survey in other
countries than Finland. The presented list of support practices is also likely to be
incomplete, and it contains mostly operative practices perhaps of a low interest among
the senior managers. Further research could make a more indepth case and interview
based study to validate the results of this study, and to identify other possible support
practices, preferably more strategic of nature. A more qualitative study is also likely to
reveal other interesting aspects of top management involvement in SCE, which were
not revealed by this survey. Specifically top management’s viewpoint to software
estimation and supporting it should be studied. This kind of a study would be likely to
give valuable information about different organisational behaviours or other issues,
which are supporting or inhibiting top management to demonstrate its support to SCE.
Project manager and software professional viewpoints to TMS in SCE as separate
items may also help to understand the matter as a whole better.
3.7 Limitations
This paper used a questionnaire to capture the extent of use and perceived importance
of different TMS practices for SCE. However, this study is the first of its kind, and as all
surveys, it is prone to bias. For example, the items on the list of preselected support
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practices may have been interpreted differently by the respondents, and a different
kind of questionnaire setup could have changed the results. Also, all the respondents
were working in Finland, and support practices and their demonstration may vary
from country to country. Furthermore, the sample size of concluded projects was small,
decreasing the reliability of statistical tests between the practices and project success.
Further studies are needed to validate the results presented in this paper.
4. Conclusions
TMS has been studied extensively in the scope of PM, and found to have a positive
impact on project success. This paper extends the scope of TMS research to also
cover SCE. This paper clearly shows that top management is investing a lot of its
attention in SCE. This paper also shows that the attitudes towards top management
participation are very positive, top management participation is seen to be of a high
importance. Considering this, understanding better the impact of different practices
could help senior managers to invest their time more effectively and increase the
probability of project success.
This paper has built a list of 16 TMS practices, adopted from Zwikael (2008a) and
McConnell (2006). The list has been used in a questionnaire to measure the extent of use
and experienced importance of an important PM support factor, TMS (Fortune and
White, 2006; Young and Jordan, 2008; Schmidt et al., 2001), in SCE. The paper reports
the extent of use and the experienced importance of the support practices, and focuses
on analysing the relationship between these two and project success.
The list of 16 support practices presented in this paper has been found to measure
the construct “Top management participation in SCE” well. Table IV shows the extent
of use and attitudes for each individual practice. As can be seen, top management
demonstrates their support through these processes often, the average frequency being
2.54 on a scale from 1 to 4. The attitudes were also positive, the indicated average
importance was 3.04. Table IV also shows that only for three of the 16 practices the
extent of use and experienced importance correlate with each other. For some reason,
most of the presented support practices do not get the top management’s attention to
the same extent as the practices are experienced important. This study also tested the
impact of the extent of use and the experienced importance of the practices on project
success, trying to identify the most important support factors. The following two were
found to have a positive influence on project success:
(1) “Top management ensures that the estimate relies on documented facts rather
than guessing and intuition” for the extent of use; and
(2) “Top management recognizes that estimates are critical to this organization’s
success” for the experienced importance.
However, these findings may also be outliers, and further research should be conducted
to gain more reliable understanding of the impact of different support practices on
project success.
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Accounting Testing in Software Cost Estimation:  
A Case Study of the Current Practice and Impacts 
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Abstract. Testing has become an integral part of most software projects. It ac-
counts for even as high a share as 40% of the overall work effort. At the same 
time software projects are systematically exceeding their effort and schedule 
forecasts. Regardless of the overruns and big share of testing, there is very little 
advice for estimating testing activities. This case study research assesses the 
current practice of estimating testing activities, and the impact of these practices 
on estimation and project success. Based on the interviews with 11 stakeholders 
involved in two case projects and examination of project documentation, this 
study shows that companies easily deviate from their standard procedures, when 
estimating testing. This may even lead to severe estimation errors. The devia-
tions can be explained by negative attitudes towards testing. Furthermore, this 
study shows that the extant literature has sparsely addressed estimation of soft-
ware testing. 
Keywords: Software Cost Estimation, Software testing, Project Management 
1 Introduction 
Software cost estimation (SCE), or effort estimation, is an art which is not well han-
dled by the software industry (see e.g. Rahikkala et al., 2014). The famous Chaos 
Reports by Standish Group International have for decades claimed that nearly two 
thirds of software products either failed to meet their budget and timetable goals or 
they were never delivered (The CHAOS Manifesto, 2013). While these numbers have 
been heavily criticized (see Laurenz Eveleens and Verhoef, 2010), high failure per-
centages have been shown also by other research and consultancy institutes (c.f. 
Moløkken and Jørgensen, 2003; Mieritz, 2012). Nevertheless, these numbers clearly 
show the dilemma of software cost and effort estimations: they often fail.  
In this study, our topic is an increasingly important aspect of SCE: estimating the 
effort of software testing activities. The software testing activities have been found to 
take from 20%–25% (Haberl et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013; Buenen and Teje, 2014) to 
even 40% or more (Ng et al., 2004) of the total cost of the project. However, there is 
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still a lack of knowledge of SCE methods as well as proper tools and practices for 
software testing estimation. For example, from the studies included into Jørgensen 
and Shepperd’s (2007) systematic literature review on software cost estimation, only 
a handful seems to discuss estimation of software testing activities. 
Thus, there is a gap in extant literature on the effect of software testing effort esti-
mation. The objective of this paper is to 1) gain in-depth knowledge of the current 
practice for accounting testing in SCE, and 2) understand the impact of the used prac-
tices on SCE and project success. 
To answer the research questions, a qualitative research approach is used. We 
study software cost estimation practices in two projects in two case companies. Based 
on the study of 11 interviews and 17 project related documents, this paper contributes 
to the scientific literature by reporting on the current practice of estimating testing 
effort, and the impact of use of these practices on estimation and project success. 
Understanding the role of testing effort estimation in software projects better may 
help project managers, other software professionals and researchers to pay more at-
tention on testing and related estimation. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the back-
ground of software cost estimation studies. It is followed by a description of research 
design and the case study subjects. The fourth section presents the results and Section 
5 discusses the practical and scientific implications, and addresses the limitations of 
the study as well as the future research directions. The final section concludes the 
study. 
2 Background 
Software cost and effort estimation has a long tradition in the field of computing dis-
ciplines. For example, Farr and Nanus (1964) and Nelson (1966) addressed the cost 
estimation of programming five decades ago. Since then a multitude of software cost 
estimation methods and models have been presented (c.f. Boehm et al., 2000; Briand 
and Wieczorek, 2002; Jørgensen and Shepperd, 2007). However, as discussed in the 
introduction, the software industry has an infamous history with the success of soft-
ware cost and effort estimations. Despite the decades of research, projects often run 
over their budgets and timetables (Moløkken and Jørgensen, 2003). 
Software testing is showed to be hard to estimate and predict. In the survey of Aus-
tralian companies by Ng et al. (2004), only 11 companies out of the 65 studied were 
able to meet their testing budget estimates. Most of the companies spent more than 
1.5 times the resources they had estimated. Furthermore, three of the studied compa-
nies estimated the cost of testing twice as high as was the actual cost. At the same 
time, most of the companies reported using approximately 10-30% of their initial 
budget to the testing activities.  
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The extant literature has classified presented estimation methods in several ways. 
For example, Boehm, Abts, and Chulani (2000) divided the existing methods into six 
different categories: Model-based, Expertise-based, Learning-oriented, Dynamics -
based, Regression-based and Composite techniques. However, for the sake of simplic-
ity, we consider only two major types of software cost estimation methods: Model-
based and Non-model-based (Briand and Wieczorek, 2002). The first category, in 
general, consists of methods that have a model, a modelling method, and an applica-
tion method. A classical example of these kinds of software cost estimation methods 
is COCOMO by Boehm (1981). The methods of the second category consist of one or 
more estimation techniques. These methods do not involve any models, only estima-
tions. For example, bottom-up expert estimations belong to this category.  
Some methods for software test effort estimation have been presented. For exam-
ple, Calzolari, Tonella and Antoniol (1998) presented a dynamic model for forecast-
ing the effort of testing and maintenance. The model is based on a view that testing is 
a similar activity to predating a prey (i.e. software bug) in nature. Engel and Last 
(2007) have also presented a model for estimating testing effort based on fuzzy logic. 
In contrast to modelling-focused techniques, Benton (2009) recently presented the 
IARM-estimation method for software cost and effort. The model is remarkably sim-
pler than presented formal models and it emphasizes expert evaluation by team mem-
bers; however, there is a lack of validation and verification of the proposed model.  
To summarize, software testing activities seem to be rather hard to estimate. While 
there is a lack of studies on software testing estimations, Ng et al. (2004) showed that 
most of surveyed Australian companies do not hit their estimates. Furthermore, there 
is a rather wide understanding on the size of software testing of the whole software 
development project. While some studies suggest the use of only one-fourth of the 
budget (e.g., Haberl et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013; Buenen and Teje, 2014), there have 
been claims of even half of the budget (see e.g. Ammann and Offutt, 2001). Neverthe-
less, in our literature review, we sparsely found any studies focusing on developing or 
validating software cost estimation techniques for testing. This is a noteworthy dispar-
ity between the cost caused by testing activities and the academic interest towards the 
topic.  
3 Research methodology 
In the following, we will first present the research approach and design of this study. 
It is followed by a description of case study subjects.   
3.1 Research design 
This study is based on a qualitative research approach (Cresswell, 2003). We use a 
case study research strategy and interviews as the main tools of inquiry. The qualita-
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tive research approach was selected to allow us to get an in-depth understanding about 
the phenomenon under the study lens. The case study research strategy was used as 
the researchers have no control over the study subject (Yin, 2003). As Patton (2001) 
states, the case studies are able to shed light on phenomena occurring in a real-life 
context. This study is exploratory of type, finding out what is happening, seeking new 
ideas and generating hypotheses and ideas for new research (Robson, 2002). The 
research uses a multiple case study design following a replication logic (Yin, 2003). 
The case study organisations were selected based on the impression of the SCE ma-
turity of the organisation gained during the initial discussions with the organisation 
representatives. The unit of analysis is a single software cost estimate. The study is 
focused on the experiences gained during the preparation of the cost estimate. 
This study about estimation of software testing consists of two case companies that 
we call as Small Global and Large Multinational. The companies wished to remain 
anonymous in this study. From both companies, we selected one software implemen-
tation project that has either ended or is near its ending. The first project was devel-
oped for a customer, thus the estimate was used for pricing the project, in addition to 
other planning purposes. The other is a software tool development project, which is 
aimed for a mass market. In this project, the estimates were especially used for esti-
mating the release date of the product. 
For the selected case study projects, we interviewed different stakeholders in-
volved in the projects. The interviewees’ roles varied from developers and testers to 
project managers and senior executives. In addition to the interviews, we collected 
various documents related to the project. For example, we reviewed project plans, 
design documents and minutes of weekly meetings related to the projects.  
We created an interview protocol consisting of several questions related to soft-
ware cost estimation and testing. The protocol was created following the guidelines 
by Runeson et al. (2012). The interviews were conducted as semi-structured (Robson, 
2002). In the interviews, while following the protocol, new ideas were allowed to be 
brought up and discussed with the interviewee. The interviews were conducted by two 
researchers where one acted as the main interviewer. An interview session was ap-
proximately one hour in length and the discussion was recorded. The recordings were 
transcripted and sent to the interviewees for review. All case subjects participated in 
the study voluntarily and anonymously, and the collected data was treated as confi-
dential. 
For the analysis of data, we used nVivo 10. All transcripted interviews, notes done 
during the interviews, in addition to the auxiliary materials, were imported into the 
software. The analysis was conducted in a series of steps (Robson, 2002). First the 
texts were coded by the researchers, whereafter iteration followed, until the conclu-
sions were reached. 
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3.2 Case subjects 
The Small Global is a software producing firm of about 100 persons, headquartered in 
Finland. The company’s line of business consists of selling consultancy and support 
services in addition to software products to businesses. The company is global; it has 
customers and offices in several countries. The selected project, referred to as Devel-
oper Tool, is a typical software product development project in the company. In the 
project, the aim was to produce a visual design tool for developing applications. The 
project followed a Waterfall-style software engineering method: it was strictly 
planned up-front but the actual development work was divided into sprints. The inter-
views conducted in the company are shown in Table 1.  
The Developer Tool project started with a prototype where technical challenges 
and possible development stacks were studied. After the prototype project, a project 
aiming at the release of version 1.0 was planned. The management named a project 
manager and a product owner for the product. The product owner crafted a design 
document for the product, and based on that document, the project management creat-
ed a project plan with time estimates. Initially, the project was estimated to take three 
months with a team of four people.  
The project missed its first deadline, a beta version release, approximately after the 
half-point of the estimated duration of the project. First, the project team narrowed the 
content plan of the product in order to hit the planned release date. Later, the initial 
content was returned to the plan and deadlines were postponed in the future. When the 
problems were noted, some developers were changed and new ones were introduced. 
Currently, the project is expected to finish after approximately nine months of devel-
opment with the team of approximately four persons. 
 
Table 1. Interviews done in this research 
Interview code The role of interviewee 
Small Global 
Interview V1 Key informant interview (Product owner) 
Interview V2 Senior manager of Developer Tool 
Interview V3 Product owner of Developer Tool 
Interview V4 Senior manager of Developer Tool 
Interview V5 Project manager of Developer Tool 
Large Multinational 
Interview T1 Key informant interview (Project manager) 
Interview T2 Project manager of Operational Control System 
Interview T3 Senior manager of Operational Control System 
Interview T4 Software test manager of Operational Control System 
Interview T5 Requirements expert of Operational Control System 
Interview T6 Senior developer of Operational Control System 
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The other case study subject comes from The Large Multinational, which is a large 
multinational company also headquartered in Finland. The Large Multinational pro-
duces software and consultancy for a wide area of business sectors. The selected pro-
ject, referred to as Operational Control System, is a typical software development 
project for the company. The resulted software is a business intelligence reporting 
system for following certain control activities. The software was ordered by a long-
term customer of the company. The interviews conducted in the company are shown 
in Table 1.  
Also this project followed a Waterfall-like software development process: the re-
quirements were elicited before the features of the product were agreed upon with the 
customer. The product was estimated only after the specification documentation was 
ready and accepted by the customer. The estimation was done by the developers and 
testers themselves. The Large Multinational uses a structured sheet for estimations 
that the workers filled individually by themselves. The project manager prepared the 
final estimates by using the expert estimates as the base.  
The Operational Control System project was planned according to certain precon-
ditions: the customer had a fixed budget and limited time for development. Only after 
both the customer and the software vendor had agreed upon the content with a limited 
set of unknown features, the development started. The development work continued 
rather straightforwardly from design and implementation to testing and delivery. The 
project lasted 10 months; the size of the project was approximately 30 man-months, 
of which 25% was used for testing and quality assurance. While there were major 
changes asked by the customer in the midway of the project, it hit the targets by keep-
ing the budget and the timetable. In certain areas, there were estimation mismatches: 
in one software testing area, there was a significant overrun (+76% of initial esti-
mate); however, in the implementation of a certain feature, an expert level developer 
was able to underbid the estimate (-77%) that was created with the presumption of a 
general level developer.  
4 Results 
This section presents the findings identified during the analysis of data, as described 
in the research methodology chapter. The findings are grouped into the following five 
categories: 
1. General 
2. Estimation practices 
3. Testing plan 
4. Attitudes 
5. Estimation challenges 
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4.1 General 
In both projects testing was strongly related to effort and schedule overruns. In the 
Operational Control System project the overrun of the data import testing was nearly 
80%, although the overall project managed to keep the original budgets. In the Devel-
oper Tool project, omitted testing tasks resulted in significant effort and schedule 
overruns, being roughly 100% in July 2015. Regardless of the significant testing re-
lated overruns, the management in both projects report that the actual amount of work 
would probably not have been affected by more accurate estimates. In other words, 
the actual testing work was necessary, although bigger than anticipated. 
The overrun of the testing effort in the Operational Control System lead to discus-
sions with the customer, and likely to decreased customer satisfaction. In the Devel-
oper Tool, the project has received a late project status because of the overruns. This 
has lead to some negative late project symptoms, like decreased development team 
motivation, increased number of status meetings, frequent re-estimation and more 
discussions about the project scope (McConnell, 2006). 
Both organisations have a long experience of software projects and related testing. 
The unit responsible for the Operational Control System has dedicated testing engi-
neers and teams, while in the Developer Tool project the testing was conducted par-
tially by dedicated testing engineers, partially by the development team. In both cases 
customer representatives or pilot users participated in user testing. Following the 
Testing Maturity Model (TMM) presented by Burstein et al. (1998), the testing ma-
turity was on level 3 and level 2 in Operational Control System and Developer Tool, 
respectively, in the scale from 1 (low maturity) to 5 (high maturity). 
4.2 Estimation practices 
There were standard procedures for the estimation of the testing effort in both of the 
companies. The procedures required that the project plan, functional specification and 
testing plan must be ready before the effort estimation. Expert estimation was used for 
estimating testing tasks in both projects, i.e. experts estimated the effort of the testing 
tasks based on their professional competence. In the Operational Control System pro-
ject a spreadsheet based work breakdown structure was used for preparing the final 
estimate, and the effort was also compared with the historical project data. There was 
also a guideline based on the historical data that the testing effort varies between 50% 
and 200% of implementation effort, depending on the application area to be tested. 
The expert estimation of testing tasks was conducted by the actual testing engineer in 
the Operational Control System project and by the product owner in the Developer 
Tool, while feature implementation tasks were estimated by the actual software engi-
neers in both projects. In the Operational Control System, the actual testing engineers 
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were known by the time of estimation, which was not the case in the Developer Tool 
project. Finally the estimates were reviewed in the project steering groups. 
The fact that the actual testing engineer estimated the testing tasks was seen to 
have a positive impact on the estimation results in the Operational Control System 
project, as well as the experience of the estimator. The Operational Control System 
team members report also that knowing the actual persons who will be doing the test-
ing helps in preparing estimates. That is, the amount of work hours needed depends 
on the persons doing the work. 
4.3 Testing Plan 
Regardless of the requirement by the standard estimation procedures, neither of the 
projects had a testing plan ready, when the implementation phase of the project was 
started. In other words, the exact scope of the testing was not defined in detail before 
testing was estimated. In the Operational Control System project the testing effort was 
accounted in the project plan, and the testing manager reports that there was a shared 
vision of the testing based on the previous projects. In the Developer Tool project 
only automated regression testing was accounted in the project plan, but user testing 
and manual testing were omitted. In both projects the testing plan was created in a 
later phase of the project. The reason for not finalizing the testing plan before starting 
the implementation was a hurry to proceed with the implementation, not to save mon-
ey. 
Interviewees in the Developer Tool report that there was a significant difference in 
the expectations of the project results between the development team and the man-
agement. The management expected a finalized, user tested product, while the devel-
opment team’s expectation was more like a regression tested proof-of-concept, where 
the user testing would have been postponed until the next version of the product. The 
overruns in the Developer Tool project are specifically related to this difference in 
expectations. Although the testing activities are seen as necessary, a senior manager 
in the Developer Tool states that a testing plan would have helped to discover testing 
related problems earlier and to plan testing activities better. A proof-of-concept pro-
ject was done prior to the actual Developer Tool project to test all key technological 
assumptions, but that did not cover testing. Retrospectively a senior manager specu-
lates that testing should have been part of the proof-of-concept to avoid testing related 
surprises. 
In the Operational Control System the project manager reported that the first esti-
mate for testing did not fit in the project schedule, and it was discovered that the esti-
mate was prepared in five minutes. The project manager had also challenged the high 
effort for testing activities, being not able to understand the basis for the estimate. 
Furthermore, the project and testing managers report that the difficulties in testing 
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were related to e.g. unavailability of test data and higher complexity of the data im-
port logic than expected. 
4.4 Attitudes 
In the Operational Control System, the testing manager describes that testing is gener-
ally considered as of low importance, and that the competence and historical data is 
not valued as it is valued in the implementation. This feeling contradicts with the 
general comments where professional competence and use of historical data are 
strongly connected to estimation success. The Operational Control System project 
owner emphasizes that the testing effort must be on a reasonable level considering the 
application area and that it must add value to the project. The project owner continues 
that Large Multinational has invested significant amount of time and money for im-
proving testing capabilities within the past two years. This communicates about the 
experienced importance of testing. However, according the product owner, changing 
established practices will take time. Based on the interviews, changing attitudes seem 
to take time, like changing any other capabilities. In both projects the technical staff 
considered especially automated regression testing to have a high importance. In the 
Developer Tool project, a senior manager describes that developers’ attitudes towards 
manual testing and user experience testing are negative. 
Other findings in this research support the feeling that testing is not considered 
equally important as implementation. For example, the testing plans were not ready 
when the project was estimated or testing started, and in one project the actual testers 
did not estimate the testing work or the actual testers were not known at the time of 
estimation. The Developer Tool projects’s product owner reports that testing related 
tasks are first omitted if the schedule is tight and something needs to be dropped out 
from the scope. This lower level of importance may prevent testing as a function from 
evolving, including estimation of testing. The testing manager in the Operational Con-
trol System pointed out that the attitudes towards testing are not encouraging even in 
universities: “There was only one course of software testing out of two hundred of-
fered”. Additionally, the testing manager commented that testing is seen as a task for 
those who are not good enough for ordinary programming.  
4.5 Estimation challenges 
In the Operational Control System project, the testing manager considered estimation 
of testing as more difficult than estimating implementation. The primary reason for 
this is the high number of dependencies: problems with data or specifications, or high 
number of bugs will reflect to testing. For example, if the test data is delayed by one 
week, the testing team is still there, but not doing what they were planned to do. The 
number of found bugs was relatively high in the Operational Control System, which 
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cumulated extra work because of manual testing practices. Also the Developer Tool 
project manager emphasised the role of external parties in estimation. For example, 
the unavailability of external testing engineers or users for user testing may delay the 
project. Other interviewees could not make a difference in difficulty, but a senior 
manager in the Developer Tool pointed out that there is generally less experience of 
estimating testing. 
Automated testing was widely seen to make regression testing more predictable, 
because then the regression would not cause additional testing work. The project 
manager in the Developer Tool emphasises the importance of the right degree and 
phase of testing, otherwise the maintenance of tests can generate extra work. A senior 
executive of the project continues that indecisiveness in processing user feedback may 
cause overruns, and underlines the importance of decisiveness and time boxing in user 
testing. 
5 Discussion 
This section discusses the main case study findings, and presents the related practical 
and theoretical implications. This section also addresses the limitations of this study, 
and gives pointers for further research. 
This study has captured in-depth experiences from two typical project organisa-
tions, who have established software development practices for one project, based on 
their internal guidelines. As is typical for these kinds of organisations, the maturity 
and optimisations of the practices are not on an exemplary level, because the projects 
exist for only a certain period of time, and the contents of the projects vary. The pri-
mary need of these organisations is to get the basic things right in every project, not to 
optimise the last details. 
5.1 Implications for practice 
This study clearly shows that the basic principles for estimating testing related tasks 
are the same as for estimating implementation tasks, but there is a strong tendency to 
take shortcuts and postpone tasks beyond their planned deadlines. The most signifi-
cant finding is that the testing plan was not delivered in either project by the time of 
estimation. This can be compared to estimation of implementation with incomplete or 
no specifications, which is connected to overruns (Standish group, 1994; Lederer and 
Prasad, 1995). Especially in the Developer Tool project this was the reason for over-
runs, and the evidence suggests also that some surprises could have been avoided also 
in the Operational Control System project with a finalised testing plan. 
Also, the practical estimation tasks were subject to taking short-cuts in the Devel-
oper Tool. While the implementation tasks were estimated by a developer and the 
initial project team was known, the testing was estimated by the product owner for an 
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unknown team. This is problematic from the estimation point of view, because the 
productivity of developers is known to vary significantly (Kemayel, Mili and Oueder-
ni, 1991). 
The attitudes towards testing and its estimation seem to be contradictory: on one 
hand testing cannot be omitted, but on the other hand it seems not to be a full-fledged 
part of the software project. This research has found that the testing personnel per-
ceives that testing is considered as unimportant, and the management emphasises that 
the cost needs to be reasonable. The tendency to take shortcuts supports this perceived 
unimportance. The extant literature clearly shows that the attitudes of the senior man-
agement influences strongly the change or improvement of a certain area (Stelzer and 
Mellis, 1998; Wiegers, 1998), which means that the negative attitudes are likely to 
influence also the estimation of testing tasks negatively. 
The technical staff in both projects has very positive attitudes towards automated 
testing. This is claimed to reduce manual work and improve predictability. This is a 
fair assumption, and confirmed, for example, by Ramler and Wolfmeier (2006) and 
Hoffman (1999), but only if implemented properly. They emphasise that the project 
characteristics need to be accounted when planning testing, in order to implement 
effective and reasonably priced testing. This was supported by the comments from a 
senior manager in the Operational Control System (“the extent of testing must consid-
er the project at hand”) and (“testing must add value to the project”), the project 
manager from the Developer Tool (“degree and phase of testing must be carefully 
planned”) and a senior manager in the Developer Tool (“decisiveness and time box-
ing is important in user testing”). 
Changing attitudes, as well as other capabilities, seem to take time. The Large Mul-
tinational has invested resources in building capabilities significantly within the past 
two years, but the know-how or attitudes are still not on the same level as in imple-
mentation. This corresponds to results from other change situations (Piderit, 2000). 
As a summary, similar projects as the Developer Tool and Operational Control 
System are recommended to follow the same estimation practices for testing related 
tasks as for implementation. Neither of the projects reported that the reason for post-
poning or omitting tasks was cutting cost. In this sense, it seems counter intuitive and 
productive not to follow the same rigour in testing as with implementation, especially 
when the short-cuts seem to cause even severe estimation errors. 
Finally, it was noted in the interviews that the personnel was rarely properly edu-
cated to use the estimation tools. While the other of our case study companies offered 
support and education in the estimation to the project management, the development 
teams were not aware of these services. Furthermore, only a few mentioned university 
education as a source of cost estimation knowledge, even though cost estimation 
based on an expert’s opinion is nowadays a part of the standard workflow in many 
companies. While effort estimation is a part of the curriculum guidelines suggested by 
SPLST'15
71
ACM1, there might be a need for education organisations to re-evaluate the content of 
teaching.  
5.2 Implications for theory 
The current SCE literature provides only a few case studies providing in-depth 
knowledge of real-life situations (Jørgensen and Shepperd, 2007), and, to our best 
knowledge, this is among the first studies to report on experiences related to estimat-
ing software testing. This paper contributes to the body of knowledge by showing that 
organisations seem to deviate from their standard practices when estimating testing 
related tasks, causing estimation errors. The reason for deviations resides in negative 
attitudes towards testing. Cost savings are rejected as a reason for deviations, as well 
as poorly performed testing as a reason for overruns in testing. 
Furthermore, our literature review shows that there is a lack of empirical and theo-
retical studies on addressing software testing effort estimation. While further work 
such as a systematic literature review is needed to confirm this observation, this hints 
that one of the reasons for software cost estimation related problems is the lack of 
proper focus on testing and its effort estimation. However, new estimation tools or 
methods for software testing are not silver bullets. A holistic view is needed for im-
proving the accuracy of software estimates.  
5.3  Limitations and further research 
This study has certain limitations. First, the findings of this study are subject to con-
straints of the research methodology. This research studied two very similar software 
projects, which limits the validity of the findings to similar contexts. It is recommend-
ed that further research would be conducted in a different context to see if e.g. larger 
projects or continuous product development projects suffer from similar testing esti-
mation related problems as reported in this paper. Second, a qualitative study is al-
ways, to some degree, subjective and might be influenced by the expectations and 
opinions of the researchers and interviewees. However, we did our best to treat the 
data objectively and tool countermeasures to reduce bias. For example, all transcripts 
and quotes, as well as the manuscript, were checked and approved by the interviewees 
before the publication.  
Considering the big share of testing work in the overall software project and the 
problems reported in this study, further research of the topic is justified. First, our 
unstructured literature review did not reveal many studies in this topic. Thus, a more 
thorough literature review should focus to shed more light on possible research gaps 
1  Software Engineering 2014. Curriculum Guidelines for Undergraduate Degree in Software 
Engineering. https://www.acm.org/education/SE2014-20150223_draft.pdf 
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in software testing estimation. Second, there is a lack of studies addressing the meth-
ods and tools used in the industry to estimate software testing. Further work should be 
devoted to reveal the best practices already used in the industry.  
6 Conclusions 
This research provides evidence that software testing related tasks in software projects 
are estimated by using similar practices as for implementation related tasks, but devia-
tions from the standard practice occur often. These deviations, such as estimating 
without a testing plan, estimating work that will be carried out by others or estimating 
without knowing the actual testers, have been a source for even severe overruns. The 
research rejects poorly performed testing as a source for overruns. Overruns them-
selves are a source of decreased team motivation and customer satisfaction, and addi-
tional work, among other things. 
The results of this research suggest that the reason for process deviations resides in 
the negative attitudes towards testing. Widespread deviations from established prac-
tices among both project management and technical staff, together with the direct 
comments from the interviews, indicate that testing is not considered as important as 
implementation, and therefore deviations are allowed. The results reject cost savings 
as the reason for deviations. 
The main implications from the results for software managers, experts, project 
managers and academia are the following: 
• A deviating estimation process for software testing may lead to severe estimation 
errors. 
• Software projects should use the same rigor in estimating testing as for estimating 
implementation. Deviations should not be allowed. 
• Managers responsible for software and project processes must recognise the im-
portance of testing and promote the importance of it to change the attitudes to-
wards testing. This is necessary in order to establish the use of good practices in 
organisations. 
Finally, the aforementioned serve also as a good starting point for further research. 
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Abstract—An increasing number of today’s products include
software as their key component. This means that more and more
product launches are depending on software projects, which are
infamous for delays. While the impacts of delays are well studied
in the scope of a software project and the company itself, the
impacts on the management of launch activities are not very
well understood. This study addresses the gap by an in-depth
case study of one delayed software project. The results show
that the delays may increase the cost of a product launch, as
well as decrease the scope and quality of the launch activities.
These impacts are influenced by key personnel’s motivational
factors, which in turn cause lost working time and postponing
the work until it is too late to act as planned.
Index Terms—software product management, product launch,
project delay, change management
I. INTRODUCTION
The global software industry has emerged to a significant
business segment in a couple of decades [1], and there are
no signs of slowing down in sight [2]. Software is applied in
an increasingly wide spectrum of business, and it has been
claimed that now every company is a software company1.
Thus, most companies must deal with software projects and
product launches, depending on them. This new situation is
also a challenge for companies: while the timing of the market
introduction is critical for the product’s success [3], software
projects tend to overrun their schedules [4].
This study focuses on the coordination between the software
project and related product launch activities. A product launch
refers to activities needed for bringing a new product into
the market; a product launch strategy should define what to
launch, where to launch, when to launch and why to launch
[5]. Timing and good management of key aspects of the
launch, such as marketing plans and overall launch direction,
have been found as critical success factors for the launch
success [6]. However, because of the nature of coordination,
launching a product involving software is depending on the
outcomes from the software project [7]. While the frequency
and impacts of software project delays have been widely
reported [4], [8] and the success factors of a product launch are
known [6], there seems to be a gap in the pool of knowledge
in how to successfully manage launch activities in case of
1Kirkpatrick, D. Now Every Company Is A Software Company.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/techonomy/2011/11/30/now-every-company-is-
a-software-company/#1505e9a21100.
a delay. Regardless of the frequency of delays, high product
failure rates [9], [10] and reports about focusing on product
development on the cost of market launch management [10],
[11], we were, surprisingly, not able to locate a single study
addressing the situation.
The research objective of this study is to address the
following unanswered question:
RQ What is the impact of software project delays on manag-
ing the related market introduction in terms of cost, scope
and quality of the launch activities?
This paper reports in-depth findings from one delayed soft-
ware project and contributes to the field of product innovation
management and software product management. The results
demonstrate the impacts of delays on cost, scope and quality
of product launch activities. Additionally, the significant role
of motivation as a moderator of the impacts is considered.
Improved understanding of the dependency between a software
project and product launch activities may help top managers,
product managers and researchers.
The remaining of the study is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the background and related work of market
entry studies. Section III describes the case study subject and
research design. It is followed by presentation of findings.
Section V discusses the results and concludes the study.
II. BACKGROUND
PIMS studies (e.g. [12]) were the first ones among the
studies trying to identify profit impacts of marketing strate-
gies. These studies developed an understanding of the causes
and consequences of e.g. entry timing in order to explain
successfulness at the market. A vast number of studies has
been conducted in order to analyze the relationships between
speed to market, quality, costs, and profitability (e.g. [13],
[14]). Literature suggests that the consequences of being late
to the market are significant, causing, for instance, lower profit
margins, higher development and production costs, and less-
ening of the firm’s market value [8]. Scholars have also argued
speed keeps costs in control, is associated with high-quality
products [15], and helps to ensure early entrant advantages,
and overall profitability (e.g. [16]).
While much of the research has revolved around strategic
issues, the importance of the execution of the strategies has
also been recognized [6]. It is known that marketing and tech-
nological execution proficiency are significant predictors of
new product success [17], and, on the other hand, controllable
reasons for new product development (NPD) failure include
poor execution of marketing and technical activities [18],
[19]. Also cross-functional integration between the R&D and
marketing has been found as an important success factor in
NPD [20].
However, systematic planning and execution is not easy,
when software projects are involved: software projects tend to
be late [4]. Previous studies have found that the reasons for
estimation errors are many [21] including intentional distortion
of the estimates [22]. Estimation errors have been shown to
cause decreased customer satisfaction, team motivation and
additional work, among other things [23], [24]. The impor-
tance of estimates is well understood in the management [25],
yet the overruns continue.
To summarize, market introductions and especially their
timing are essential for product success. In addition to strategic
considerations, also launch tactics are understood to influence
NPD success significantly. Furthermore, software projects with
unreliable schedules are a challenge for the successful ex-
ecution and coordination of launch activities. Regardless of
software being involved in a constantly increasing number of
products, there seems to be a gap in the extant literature of
what are the impacts of a software project delay on the launch
activities.
The classic project management triangle of scope, costs,
and schedule is commonly used for studying the goals of a
project [26], and Dvir and Lechler have distinguished between
two types of changes: plan changes and goal changes [27].
Plan changes refer to the environment and prevent the project
from following the original plan. Goal changes refer to the
project scope: changes in requirements or inability to meet
them within the available budget and time [28]. For the
purposes of this study, we employ these commonly used
attributes, and focus on the changes in scope, quality, and
costs to see what kinds of consequences project delays may
have in a firm’s internal launch activities.
III. RESEARCH PROCESS
A. Case company and project
The case company is a Finland-based medium-sized soft-
ware producing company. It has offices in several countries and
its main line of business includes selling software products and
services. The case project aimed at launching an application
tool for software developers. The product was completely new
for the company and it was seen strategically important and
generating new sales for the company.
The software project related to the launch started in mid
2014 with a prototype project. The first schedule for the
commercial version of the product was set in the end of 2014.
Initially, the project was estimated to be ready in three months.
After two months, the schedule was extended for the first
time, and the project received a late status. After 6 additional
schedule extensions, the product was finally launched in
October 2015. The launch project planning was started at the
same time as the software project, but the implementation was
put on hold before its full scale start, when the delay became
evident.
The launch activities relied on videos. The marketing man-
ager describes that video clips and YouTube were employed
for the first time in large scale in a product launch. Other
launch activities consisted of online advertising, product web
pages, webinars, tutorials and documentation, among other
things. In addition to the marketing activities, a direct sales
campaign was conducted. According to the interviewees, there
was plenty of manpower and money at disposal for the
launch. They also describe that the company’s capabilities
for making a successful product launch are good. However,
when launching new products for the new user groups, there
is still room for improvement. Generally speaking, the product
launch under the study followed the same process which
the company had used several times, when launching other
products. The interviewees characterized some of the previous
product launches as highly successful.
B. Research approach
The selection of the case study company is based on
good access to the company and the richness of the delayed
project. Thus, we employ an exploratory qualitative research
approach [29], more specifically a case study research strat-
egy [30].
The case study subject, a project, aimed to create a new tool
for software developers. The project was selected due to three
main reasons: First, the project was delayed but delivered by
the time of writing this report, which was a precondition for
studying the impacts of a delay on a product launch. Second,
the new product was highly expected in the company as it was
strategically important. Thus, the company made an important
investment into the product and it was followed carefully even
by the top management, which improves the validity of the
results. Third, the researchers were familiar with the company
and the employees were expected to speak honestly, even about
difficult topics.
The primary data gathering method for this study is semi-
structured interviews [29]. Prior to the interviews, an interview
instrument was created. The interviews were conducted by two
researchers while one of them acted as the main interviewer.
The interviews were recorded and carried out during one
week in the beginning of January 2016. All interviews were
transcripted and the results were sent to the interviewees for
review. All participated in the study voluntarily. The company
and the interviewees wished to remain anonymous in this
study. The collected data was treated confidentially.
As a secondary data source, we collected different project
related documents such as meeting minutes, and marketing
and sales plans. In total, we interviewed seven persons, and
studied 121 meeting minutes and four plan documents. The
interviewees and their role descriptions, as well as their
departments in the company, are shown in Table I. The
TABLE I
INTERVIEWEES’ ROLES IN THE COMPANY
Role Department Length (min)
CEO, Product Director CEO, Products 55
Key account manager Sales 35
Product marketing manager Marketing 55
Sales director Sales 35
Sales analyst Sales 25
Product owner (PO) Product management 50
Marketing director Marketing 50
analysis was conducted in a series of steps following the
guidelines given by Robson [29].
IV. FINDINGS AND RESULTS
The findings are grouped into categories, as presented in
Fig. 1. When a delay occurs, it creates a need for delay man-
agement activities, which, according to the findings, influence
marketing and sales tactics especially through motivational
factors. The impact on sales and marketing tactics is observed
through three findings categories, scope, quality and cost.
A. Delay management
1) Forums and other communication channels: Based on
the interviews and studying the meeting minutes from different
meetings of the case company, the delays were managed
primarily in four different weekly meetings:
PRODUCTS WEEKLY: Chaired by the CEO for most of the
duration of the project. Other participants were product
owners, including the product owner (PO). The schedule
was reviewed in every meeting.
MANAGEMENT WEEKLY: Chaired by the CEO, other par-
ticipants being management team members, including
marketing and sales director. The schedule for the beta
release was reviewed regularly.
MARKETING WEEKLY: Chaired by the marketing director,
other participants were the whole marketing team, in-
cluding the product marketing manager responsible for
the launch. The schedule was reviewed occasionally.
SALES WEEKLY: Chaired by the sales director, other partic-
ipants being the whole sales team. The schedule was
reviewed in every meeting.
The primary forum for the delay and schedule management
was the products weekly meeting, which was chaired by the
company CEO. The CEO tells that the information on the
updated schedule was available for the whole company in
the meeting minutes, and passed forward to other meetings
through informal discussions by him and the PO. The doc-
ument review confirmed that the meeting minutes from all
of the previously mentioned meetings were publicly available
for the whole company. The marketing director and product
marketing manager describe having got information on weekly
basis from the PO. The sales director got information in the
Fig. 1. The findings overview.
management team meetings and from the CEO, and passed
the information forward to the sales team members.
The interviewed marketing manager, product marketing
manager and sales analyst tell that they would have needed
updated information about the product features for their launch
related work, but this was not available. According to the
minutes of the meetings, the features of the product were not
discussed in any of the above mentioned meetings either. The
product marketing manager describes the trustworthiness of
any schedule and scope information having been low after a
couple of updated and missed deadlines and scope changes.
The PO concurs that when time passed, a lot of changes
regarding the scope and schedule were made, and the status
awareness probably suffered from that. As a result of the lack
of trustworthy information, the PO describes that he received
a lot of direct enquiries regarding the schedule, directly from
the involved parties.
2) Schedule and features information availability: The
schedule for the final release was updated seven times in the
products weekly meeting during the project, as shown in Fig.
2. The beginning of the lines represents the date when the
schedule was updated, while the right hand side end represents
the planned release date for the final product. The thick gray
lines indicate that the release date has been expressed as a
range, and no exact date has been given for the release.
The schedule was updated once in January (R1), February
(R2) and March (R3), the latest launch date being “in the first
half of the year”. Thereafter the schedule was updated next in
early August (R4), followed by three consecutive updates (R5–
R7). The interviewed sales director and key account manager
describe that no schedule information was available during the
sales campaign, which started in the beginning of August, even
if asked from the PO. This confirms the gap in updating the
schedule during the summer months. The product was finally
released in the end of October.
The CEO and PO say that the scope was pretty stable
during the whole project. However, the PO describes that there
Fig. 2. Schedule updates for the final product release.
were attempts to reduce the scope because of the schedule
pressure, but finally the original scope was restored. The
product marketing manager also names a couple of items that
were dropped from the scope early in the project. The PO and
product marketing manager conclude that all this together had
probably caused a perception of a changing scope. This was
confirmed by the interviewees from the marketing and sales
departments, who perceived that the scope of the product was
changing.
3) Decision making: According to the CEO and other
interviewees, the PO was accountable for the overall release
of the product. The PO describes that he first re-estimated
the schedule with the development team, and the updated
schedules were accepted by the CEO as such. However, the PO
adds that the targeted release dates were always known by the
team at the time of re-estimation, and that the knowledge of the
release dates had most likely affected the estimation work. The
PO concludes that “If you know that the targeted release date
is after one month, you are not likely to present an extension of
half a year in the schedule.” The CEO describes the product
under the study having an important role in the company’s
strategy. He continues that the investors of the company were
also following the project closely, and that there was a high
pressure to release the product successfully, and realise the
projected sales. The PO and the product marketing manager
describe that because of the deep involvement of the CEO in
the project, the whole team was well aware of the schedule
and product related targets.
4) Summary of delay management practices: A covering
meeting structure has been in place. The schedule has been
reviewed regularly in the products weekly meeting, and the
schedule has been available in the meeting minutes. However,
the interviewees in sales and marketing describe the available
information not being trustworthy, and that there was a lack of
updated information. There were no schedule updates between
April and September, even though the schedule was slipping
simultaneously. These items seem to have created significant
uncertainty and confusion, and triggered ad-hoc enquiries to
the PO. As a response to the enquiries, the PO provided
information, which differed from the targeted schedule. The
scheduling decisions have been made by the PO, based on
the estimates affected by business targets. The scope of the
product was perceived to be changing, and although the feature
information was requested and would have been needed, it was
not provided.
B. Motivation factors
Both the marketing director and the sales director describe
that their teams have experienced low motivation during the
product launch and the sales campaign. The marketing director
attributes the decreased motivation to the overly optimistic
official schedules, not to the delay itself. Many marketing ac-
tivities, like video recordings and messages of the key benefits,
were depending on the product and its features. Without the
final product, no recordings could be done, because the product
was changing constantly. Also, the feature set of the product
was perceived to be changing, making it impossible to know,
which features and related benefits the final product would
have. Thus, aiming at a moving target caused the production
of the marketing artefacts to be postponed, since reproduction
would be considered demotivating and unreasonable.
The sales director describes that they had no monetary
targets for the sales campaign, because the product was
not ready to be sold. Instead, they were demonstrating the
product to potential customers. The sales director describes
the motivation having been low, because the product quality
was low and there was very little support for the sales from the
products and marketing. The sales was conducting a campaign,
from which they did not expect sales, but there was a risk
of losing a credibility in front of the existing customers
due to a low quality product. The interviewed key account
manager describes the focus of the demonstrations having
been in avoiding known bugs, and the sales analyst estimates
the campaign having caused lost of sales in other product
categories.
The PO and the product marketing manager had a monetary
performance bonus bound to the release schedule. These bonus
targets were not updated with the delays, and it became
obvious in an early phase that the targets will not be reached.
The PO tells having pretended that the bonus target does
not exist, and that he could not let it affect the needed
decision making: releasing something that is not ready does
not contribute to the company’s goals. He continues that many
other important aspects, such as quality, were missing from the
bonus scorecard. The product marketing manager comments
that missing a target, which was perceived as unrealistic, in an
early phase, was demotivating. The interviewed key account
manager comments that even though the sales targets were not
depending on the product, the time spent on the sales campaign
not generating sales worked against achieving his goals.
C. Marketing tactics
1) Scope: According to the CEO, the scope of the launch
was decreased significantly because of the delays. There were
a lot of planned videos, tutorials, blog posts, webinars, doc-
umentation and other material, of which a significant amount
was not ready by the product launch. This proposition gets
support from the product marketing manager, who describes
having postponed everything as much as possible to avoid
doing everything again later. According to him, the last video
edits were made in a hotel room the night before the launch
event. The marketing manager continues that the videos were
affected the most, more videos were planned.
2) Quality: The product marketing manager considered
the impact of the delay having influenced the quality of the
marketing activities the most. According to him, there were
a lot of uncertainties related to the product’s features and
related benefits, which made creating marketing messages
difficult. Long waiting times, uncertainty and noise in the
communication caused the focus to be lost and the creativity
was not at its best. Furthermore, the schedule was tight after
timeboxing the development and deciding upon the release
date in the trade show. Suddenly there was a hurry to do all
the postponed work. Considering the previous and the reported
reductions in the scope of the marketing activities, it seems
likely that the level of finalization of the marketing artefacts
was not as good as planned.
3) Cost: The marketing director describes that they lost
roughly three persons’ work effort for three months during the
summer. The team was just waiting for the technical product
release getting closer, so that they could start working with the
related marketing artefacts. The marketing director speculates
that it could have been possible to get something out of the
waiting period, but it would have been difficult to motivate
the team to do work, of which 80% would have needed to be
reproduced later. The CEO describes that the prolonged launch
required additional coordination work with e.g. an external
video production company, as well as internally. The product
marketing manager adds that the video material had required
additional editing, causing a minor cost increase.
D. Sales tactics
1) Scope: The original target of the sales campaign was to
sell licenses to the new product. Because of the delay, the
target was updated to include the introduction the product
to potential customers, collect feedback and get reference
customers. According to the interviewed key account manager,
the sales did not want to demonstrate the product to existing
customers because of the low quality, and therefore the risk
of losing credibility. This caused that not all customers were
contacted as planned. The sales director adds that reaching
customers in August was difficult because of vacations, and
they did not get reference customers. The CEO describes that
the collected feedback validated the value proposition, but
the PO assesses that the feedback started to repeat the same
problem reports quickly, and it was not very relevant. The
sales director tells that the campaign was ended prematurely
after one and a half months because of the aforementioned
problems, instead of continuing for the planned three months.
2) Quality: According to the interviewees from the sales
team, they did not have sales material, necessary training and
sales support available during the campaign, which prevented
them from giving product demonstrations to the potential
customers by themselves. The PO confirms this. He was on
vacation when the campaign started and after returning from
the vacation, prioritized other things. As a result the sales
team did not give product demonstrations, but invited potential
buyers into demonstration events, where the PO demonstrated
the product. According to the key account manager, the
discussions were also more about informing the customers of
the product instead of selling, because there had not been a
marketing campaign prior to the sales campaign, making the
potential customers aware of the product.
3) Cost: The CEO states that the sales campaign was a
waste of time, because the product was not ready to be sold.
The total lost working time in the sales was estimated to be 10
person months. The interviewed sales analyst comments that
probably also some sales of other products were lost because
of focusing on an immature product instead.
V. DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has captured in-depth experiences from a launch
of a delayed software development tool product for the global
market. As is typical for delay situations, many things did
not go as planned, and the effects of the delays escalated in
the product launch related activities. When a delay is a fact,
preventing the difficulties from escalating and mitigating their
impact on related activities becomes a priority.
A. Key findings and analysis
This study clearly shows that delays in a software project
have a remarkable impact on the cost, scope and quality
of a product launch. The most significant finding of this
study is that the uncertainty of the software project schedule
and product features makes planning and scheduling launch
activities difficult, which may decrease the motivation of the
involved personnel. The decreased motivation in turn leads to
postponing the implementation of the launch activities, until
there is not enough time for implementing them in the planned
scope and quality. The decrease of motivation is mainly driven
by the fear of needing to reproduce significant amounts of
work because of the changes in product features and related
customer benefits.
The schedule was updated by repeatedly extending the
schedule by a short period of time. The schedule extensions
seemed to be driven by the pressure to get the product out,
rather than assessing the situation purely from the project
realism’s point of view. The estimation seemed to be affected
by the business goals. Furthermore, there was a connection
between the scope and schedule [26], also making the scope
live with the schedule, although the eventual scope changes
were minor. The launch team was facing a situation where
there was no trustworthy schedule and scope available. This
created uncertainty and mistrust, and decreased the motivation
because any changes would mean significant reproduction of
the launch related marketing artefacts.
Practice for updating the schedule correlates well with the
previous findings. Excessive pressure occurs in 75% to 100%
of large projects [31], which is often caused by the response of
managers, when the schedule does not align with the business
targets [23]. The technical staff is also known for being poor
at defending their estimates [32]. Furthermore, the project
seems to have experienced the anchoring phenomena [33],
where the estimate is affected by an expressed starting point,
i.e. the targeted release date. Sometimes managers may also
want to launch products despite the fact that the products are
compromised in terms of functionality and reliability [20].
Appreciation of work and interesting work have been found
to be among the five most important employee motivation fac-
tors [34], and therefore it seems not surprising that the fear of
losing the results of the work and needing to repeat the work is
described as decreasing the motivation. The evidence suggests
that the decreased motivation and related consequential effects
might have been avoided by a more realistic rescheduling of
the launch, and publishing a clear master schedule and scope to
the software project, which would have been effectively rolled
out in the organisation, making all involved parties aware of
them. This would likely to have enabled a more effective
coordination between the software and launch projects. The
best project results are suggested to come from the most
accurate estimates [35].
Personal scorecards were seen to have decreased the motiva-
tion instead of driving towards the goals. The scorecards were
bound to the schedule of the product launch, while the involved
personnel saw other topics, such as the quality of the work and
the scope of the work, more important. Also, the performance
indicators were not updated, although the project received a
late project status eight months before the launch. This was
perceived as unreasonable. Monitoring too many conflicting
goals, like cost, budget and schedule, have been reported to
be connected to demoralized staff, and staff ignoring all of
the measures or shifting emphasis from one to another [36].
A reward becomes a demoralizing punishment, if it is missed
out.
Postponing the work lead to a lack of time to implement
the planned launch activities with the planned quality. The
activities were planned early with the assumption that there is
plenty of time to be used, but when the actual launch date was
set, there was significantly less time to be used, although most
of the work remained. This was reported to have lead to cutting
out parts of the planned actions, as well as implementing
them with a reduced scope or weaker quality. The additional
spending originated mostly from lost working time resulting
from waiting, reproducing changed items and additional co-
ordination. All of these impacts are consequential, caused by
changes in the launch schedule and scope. Coordination is
managing dependencies between activities [7]. There was a
clear producer / consumer dependency between the software
project and the launch, as further described by Malone and
Crowston [7]. The products from the software project were
pre-requisites for the launch activities. In the light of the
previous it seems clear that problems in the software project
caused consequential effect in the related product launch.
Finally, the delays caused various other impacts on the prod-
uct launch because of the previously described dynamics. For
example, under pressure a sales campaign was started before
the product was ready, and while the PO and customers were
on summer vacation. Uncertainties also caused an extensive
number of status enquiries for the PO, which prevented him
from attending more important tasks, like training the sales
and creating sales support material.
B. Managerial implications
We recommend that when a delay in a software project
is unavoidable, the escalation of negative effects to product
launch activities should be prevented or mitigated by im-
plementing effective delay management actions. Especially
important is to reduce the uncertainty by using the best effort
to prepare a new, reliable master schedule and scope for the
project, and making the involved parties effectively aware of
them. This makes it possible to also update the respective
launch plans. If done early enough, the marketing and sales
activities may be able to continue their ordinary course of
actions, until the product has reached the planned maturity
to work as a basis for the launch activities. A clear master
schedule is also likely to improve the work motivation.
Furthermore, we recommend carefully considering different
scenarios before setting personal incentives bound to a launch
date, especially in the marketing and sales activities, where
the persons have limited influence over the schedule. Consid-
ering the track record of software projects overrunning their
schedules, the scorecards bound to schedules are more likely
to do harm than good.
C. Implications for theories
This paper contributes to the body of knowledge by showing
that the delay impacts escalate easily from the software project
to the launch activities. The impacts include increased cost,
and decreased scope and quality of the launch. The reason
for the negative impacts results from a missing reliable master
schedule and scope, which decreases the motivation and makes
a meaningful planning of launch activities difficult. The reason
for the decreased motivation is an immature product and
fear towards needing to reproduce work items because of the
changes in the product. The decreased motivation itself causes
persons involved in the launch to postpone all work as long
as possible, which leaves not enough time to implement all of
the planned launch activities, and not with the planned quality.
Furthermore, the impacts of a delayed software project are
studied thoroughly in the scope of the project itself, and in the
scope of the company. However, the impacts on the company’s
internal activities have not been in the focus. This paper clearly
shows that the impacts can be significant also on the internal
coordination, and cannot be ignored. A broader and holistic
view is needed when assessing and managing the impacts of
a runaway software project inside a company. Therefore, we
would suggest the field of software product management to
pay more attention on software project delay management, as
well.
D. Validity discussion and further research
This study has certain limitations. First, the findings of this
study are subject to constraints of the research methodology.
This research studied only one software project, which limits
the generalization of the findings to similar contexts. To im-
prove transferability, we have given rich information about the
case, thus allowing researchers to compare their cases against
the one described in this study. Second, obviously mistakes
were made when managing the delay in the case company, but
nonetheless the results draw attention to the importance of the
existence of a master schedule and scope. It is recommended
that further research be conducted in different contexts to study
the delay management especially in cases, where the delay has
been managed successfully, and no decreased motivation or
impacts on the launch activities are reported.
Third, to reduce inherent subjectivity of a case study,
potential biases were attempted to reduce, e.g., by checking
and approving all transacripts and the manuscript by the inter-
viewees. The results of this study were also supported by an
exemplary trail of meeting minutes. Finally, the confirmability
of the results is partly supported by our literature review on
non-software projects. However, further studies are needed to
verify the results.
Considering the number of products containing software
today, the high share of software projects overrunning their
schedules and the importance of the product launch for the
financial success of the product, further research of the topic
is justified. Our unstructured literature review did not reveal
many studies on the impact of a software project delay on a
product launch, or on any other company internal activities for
that matter. Thus, a more thorough literature review should
focus to shed more light on possible research gaps in the
impact of a delay on company’s internal coordination.
E. Conclusions
This research provides evidence that the delays in a software
project increase costs and decrease scope and quality of
product launch activities. These impacts are mainly the results
of an uncertain schedule and scope, which causes lost working
time and reproduction of work within the launch project, and
postponing the launch activities until there is too little time
to implement all of the planned activities with the planned
scope and quality. The research suggests that postponing the
launch activities is caused by decreased motivation, driven
by the fear of needing to repeat work phases because of
changes in the immature product. The decreased motivation
was amplified by personal reward systems, which were bound
to the launch schedule. This goal was seen to conflict with
other goals, which in turn caused ignorance of the schedule.
Furthermore, the early discovered loss of reward was perceived
as a punishment instead of an incentive.
The main implications are the following: 1) A delay in a
software project may cause increased cost and decreased scope
and quality of product launch activities. 2) A new, realistic
master schedule and scope should be established immediately,
when the delay becomes evident, and all involved parties
should be effectively made aware of them. This may help
to limit the escalation of negative impacts into the product
launch. 3) A personal reward system bound to the launch
schedule may lead to conflicting goals, decreased motiva-
tion and ignorance of the goals. 4) Top managers, software
managers and sales and marketing managers must recognize
the widespread impacts of a software project delay, and
manage the situation holistically from the whole company’s
perspective, instead of individual departments’ perspectives.
Finally, the study showed the importance of the delay
management in software industry as well as noted lack of
studies in this area regarding product launch processes. Further
studies are with more companies and industries are needed to
validate the results. Furthermore, the interaction of feature and
requirement changes should be addressed in future studies.
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Abstract. Context: Despite decades of research in software cost estimation (SCE),
the task remains difficult and software project overruns are common. Many
researchers and practitioners agree that organisational issues and methodologies
are equally important for successful SCE. Regardless of this recent development,
SCE research is revolving heavily around methodologies. At the same time project
management research has undergone a major shift towards managerial issues, and
it found that top management support can be the most important success factor for
projects.
Goal: This study sheds light on top management’s role in SCE by identifying
real-life practices for top management participation in SCE, as well as related
organisational effects. Also, the impact of top management actions on project
success is examined.
Method: The study takes a qualitative and explorative case study based approach.
In total, 18 semi-structured interviews facilitated examination of three projects in
three organisations.
Results: The results show that top management takes no, or very little, direct actions
to participate in SCE. However, projects can conclude successfully regardless of
the low extent of participation.
Conclusions: Top management actions may also induce bias in estimation, influenc-
ing project success negatively. This implies that senior managers must recognise
the importance of seeking realism and avoid influencing the estimation.
Keywords: Senior management, Software cost estimation, Project management
1 Introduction
The global software spending is growing rapidly [12]. Especially R&D spending on
software has increased by 65% between 2010 and 2015 [43], driven by innovations
depending more and more on electronics and software [13]. While software has become
increasingly important for companies, estimating the cost of software is difficult. The
annual losses from software projects are measured in billions of euros [11, 36], and
software project overruns are common [9, 16, 14].
Software cost estimation (SCE) and project management (PM) are both inseparable
parts of a software project, and project management should always consider estima-
tion [17]. Therefore the reasons for overruns may also reside in SCE, PM, or other project
areas [6, 35, 38]. Considering the gravity of the problem and the known positive effect of
using methodologies on project success [52], both SCE and PM professionals have devel-
oped a plethora of methodologies to aid in guiding the project to a planned conclusion.
In the area of SCE, hundreds of estimation methodologies have been developed [34, 22],
some of which have been proven to produce accurate results, when used properly [40,
42]. Yet, overruns are common [9, 16, 14].
Recent studies show that there are severe deficiencies in applying SCE methodolo-
gies in organisations [20, 30, 33, 45, 3], although the problems have been known for
decades [15, 27]. The situation is significantly better in the area of PM, where 95% of
the projects report using PM methodologies [50]. This difference in the extent of use of
methodologies is surprising, because SCE research is methodology heavy, having 84% of
the studies focusing on methodologies [22]. At the same time PM research has undergone
a major shift towards topics like management and business, having only 16% of the
recent articles focusing on methodologies [25]. Especially Top Management Support
(TMS) has been an important topic for PM research, and it has been found to be even the
most important success factor for projects [50]. The body of knowledge regarding top
management support in PM is extensive, and contains clear advice for top management
for how to support projects, including refreshing project procedures and appropriate
project management assignment [53].
Considering the previous, the estimation related problems are not connected only
to methodologies, but also to how these methodologies are applied in organisations.
Although SCE research is still mainly focusing on methodologies, recently topics like
estimation bias [20, 19, 18], organisational inhibitors and distortions [30, 33], and top
management participation [45], have become focus of the research. This paper continues
on this highly relevant path of examining other than technical factors in SCE.
The research objective of this paper is to address the role of top management in SCE,
and to answer the following unanswered questions:
RQ1 What are the real life top management support practices for SCE and how do they
appear in an organisation?
RQ2 How much effort top management invests in participating in SCE?
RQ3 Which persons or items are affected by top management actions?
RQ4 What is the impact of TMS for SCE on project success?
In the scope of our study, when a reference to top management is made, we refer to
the highest up manager, who is aware of the estimate on the basis on their responsibilities
related to the studied projects. This paper provides in-depth findings from three projects
in three case companies. Based on the study of 18 interviews4, the paper contributes to the
scientific literature by reporting on the current practice of top management participation in
software cost estimation, and the effects of this participation in organisations. Additionally,
the impact of top management participation in SCE on project success is addressed.
Understanding the role of top management in SCE may better justify project managers,
4 Due to the non-disclosure agreements, the raw data cannot be disclosed.
other software professionals and researchers to pay more attention to top management’s
role in software cost estimation.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the background
and related work of software cost estimation and top management support for project
management. Section 3 describes the case study subject and research design. It is followed
by the presentation of findings in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6
concludes the study.
2 Background
The purpose of software cost estimation, or effort estimation, is to provide themanagement
and project leadership a clear enough view of the project to make good decisions about
how to control the project to hit its targets [34]. SCE has already been studied for over
half of a century, c.f. [37], and hundreds of different estimation methods have been
developed [5, 22]. Still, despite of the long and extensive work on the area of SCE, many
software projects fail to meet estimates.
Software cost estimation research has heavily focused on estimation methodologies;
leaving organisational issues with relatively little attention. According to Jørgensen’s and
Shepperd’s [22] systematic literature review, organisational issues have been discussed
only in 16% of the reviewed articles (Table 1). Furthermore, the interest towards
organisational issues is decreasing. The recent study of SCE research trends shows
also that the research focus has remained consistently on estimation methodologies and
techniques between 1996 and 2016 [48].
The previous may be problematic, because the SCE challenge seems to reside
elsewhere than in estimation methodologies. Researchers and practitioners largely agree
on this point [30, 34, 22, 27], getting support from recent studies [30, 45, 44]. Also,
major industrial software development frameworks, such as CMMI [1], ITIL v3 [2] and
PRINCE25, continue along the same lines, emphasising the importance of estimation,
without giving specific advice, which estimation techniques to use. Thus, while the
estimation problems seem to reside on the application of the methodologies in an
organisation, the research is still focusing on the methodologies themselves, leaving a
gap between the actual problem and the means to fix it.
Much of the work performed in organisations is organised as projects which is
understandable because the results of projects are critical for organisations [49, 7].
Considering the importance of PM, also PM has been intensively studied for over decades
which has resulted into an extensive body of knowledge. However, whereas the SCE
research is still focusing on methodologies as its primary line of research, the PM
research has undergone a significant shift from methodologies towards other topics, such
as leadership and business. According to Kolltveit et al. [25] (Table 2), PM research
related to Task and Transaction perspectives, representing technical methodologies, has
decreased from 68% to 18% over the time, measured in the number of published articles.
This shift of focus seems natural, since organisational issues are reported to be even
more important factors in project success than technical ones [29, 10, 52]. Also, top
5 https://www.axelos.com/qualifications/prince2-qualifications
Table 1. Distribution of published SCE articles among research topics. [22]
1990- 2000-
Perspective -1989 1999 2004 Total
Estimation method 73 % 59 % 58 % 61 %
Size measures 12 % 24 % 16 % 20 %
Organisational issues 22 % 15 % 14 % 16 %
Uncertainty assessment 5 % 6 % 13 % 8 %
Calibration of models 7 % 8 % 4 % 7 %
Production function 20 % 4 % 3 % 6 %
Measures of estimation performance 5 % 5 % 6 % 5 %
Data set properties 0 % 1 % 2 % 1 %
Other 0 % 2 % 1 % 1 %
Table 2. The distribution of published PM articles among different perspectives. [25]
1983 1988- 1993- 1998- 2003-
Perspective -1987 1992 1997 2002 2004 Total
Task 49% 34% 32% 23% 12% 29%
Leadership 8% 16% 25% 28% 33% 23%
System 23% 25% 18% 19% 15% 20%
Stakeholder 1% 3% 1% 5% 6% 3%
Transaction 19% 9% 6% 10% 6% 10%
Business 0% 13% 17% 15% 29% 15%
management’s interest in PM is increasing along with the number of PM related articles
published in top management and business journals [26].
Regardless of the methodology heavy mainstream of the SCE research, some
of the recent research has also been attending to non-technical problems, such as
human bias, organisational inhibitors and distortions, as well as top management
participation. Jørgensen et al. have conducted a broad and widely cited work on
human bias, originating from different sources. Their studies have covered e.g. the
impact of the first impression [19], customer expectations [23], irrelevant or misleading
information [18], and wording [21] on the estimate. Magazinius et al. have published
their results regarding intentional distortions [30, 32, 31] and organisation inhibitors [33]
in SCE. Additionally, among the studies of organisational factors, Rahikkala et al. [45,
44] have studies top management participation in SCE, and Ahonen et al. [3] have found
problems in the reporting effort in projects.
To summarise, although both SCE and PM are inseparable parts of a software
project [17], only PM research takes a holistic view, and examines the organisational con-
text of the respective area to any great extent. SCE continues to focus on methodological
problems. This is a noteworthy observation, because the problems for software project
overruns reside both in SCE and PM [6, 35, 38]. Understanding the organisational context
of SCE may better help to overcome many organisational problems related to SCE, and
to eliminate related sources of estimation error. This paper continues examining the
organisational context of SCE, and addresses specifically the top management’s role,
which has been found to be of critical importance in PM.
3 Research Process
3.1 Research approach
The study is based on three anonymous case companies and projects. For each company,
we interviewed stakeholders involved in the projects (Table 3) and analysed 18 documents
related to the project, including project plans, design documents, and minutes of meetings.
This study is based on a qualitative research approach [8]. We use a case study
research strategy and interviews as the main tools of inquiry. The qualitative research
approach was selected to allow us to get an in-depth understanding about the phenomenon
under the study lens. The case study research strategy was used as the researchers have
no control over the study subject [51]. As Patton [39] states, case studies are well capable
of shedding light on phenomena occurring in the context of real-life. This study is of
exploratory type, finding out what is happening, seeking new ideas, and generating
hypotheses and ideas for new research [46]. The research uses a multiple case study
design following a replication logic [51]. The unit of analysis is a single software cost
estimate. The study is focused on the experiences gained during the preparation of
the cost estimate. The conceptual framework of the study assisting in answering the
research questions is presented in Fig. 1. Additionally, we have employed the list of 16
top management support practices suggested by Rahikkala et al. [45] for studying top
management participation practices.
An interview protocol consisting of questions related to top management participation
in SCE was created, following the guidelines by Runeson and Höst [47]. The one hour
interviews were conducted as semi-structured [46] by two researchers, and the discussion
was recorded. The recordings were transcripted and sent to the interviewees for review.
All case subjects participated in the study voluntarily and anonymously, and the collected
data was treated as confidential.
For the analysis of data, we used nVivo 10. All transcripted interviews, notes done
during the interviews, in addition to the auxiliary materials, were imported into the
software. The analysis was conducted in a series of steps [46]. First the texts were coded
by the researchers, whereafter iteration followed, until conclusions were reached.
Table 3. Interviewees of the research.
Small Global Large Multinational Tech Giant
Product Owner (KI) Project Manager (KI) Program Manager (KI)
Senior Business Manager Business Manager Line Manager
Testing Manager Senior Manager
Senior Technology Manager Requirements Engineer Requirements Engineer
Project Manager Software Developer Head of Product Management
Head of Programs
KI = Key informant for the study, interviewed twice
Fig. 1. The conceptual model of this research.
3.2 Case companies and projects
‘Small Global’ is a software producing firm of about 100 persons. The company’s line
of business consists of selling consultancy and support services in addition to software
products to businesses. The company is global; it has customers and offices in several
countries. The selected project, referred to as Developer Tool (DT), was about producing
a visual design tool for developing applications. The end-result is a commercial product.
The project followed a waterfall-style software engineering method, but the actual
development work was divided into sprints. The estimation was done by using work
breakdown structure (WBS) and expert estimation.
The DT project started with a prototype where technical challenges were studied.
After the prototype project, a project aiming at the release of version 1.0 was planned. The
product owner crafted a design document for the product, and based on that document,
the project manager created a project plan with time and effort estimates. Initially, the
project was estimated to take three months with a team of four people. The project
completed nine months after the deadline with a team of approximately six persons.
‘Large Multinational’ produces software and consultancy for a wide area of business
sectors. The company has tens of thousands of employees around the world. The selected
project, referred to as Operational Control System (OCS), is a business intelligence
reporting system for following certain control activities. The software was ordered by a
long-term customer of the company.
Also this project followed a waterfall-like software development process. The
estimation was done by the developers using expert estimation, whereafter the values
were filled into a structured sheet. The project manager prepared the final estimates based
on the results from expert estimation. The OCS project was planned according to certain
preconditions: the customer had a fixed budget and schedule for development. The project
lasted 10 months, and the size of the project was approximately 30 man-months. The
project concluded successfully on time and budget.
‘Tech Giant’ is selling products with software to global business-to-business markets.
The company has tens of thousands of employees around the world. We studied the
Network Management Product (NSP) project of Tech Giant. The project produced a new
release of a tool for managing the network. The project produced a new release of the
system. The NSP has been in use for several years.
The project was part of a continuous development cycle involving just under 100
people. A new release of the system is developed every three months. The development
methodology it used was based on Scrum with two week sprints. The development teams
were distributed over several locations. The cost estimation was conducted in two phases:
firstly, rough planning for the whole three month release in the product management
function. Secondly, the backlog items were estimated in the scrum teams, the main
responsible being the program manager. The backlog items were estimated using expert
estimation. The project concluded successfully and delivered over 85% of the planned
scope, which is the goal for all releases.
4 Findings and results
This section presents the findings identified during the analysis of the data as described
in the research methodology section. The findings are grouped into the following five
categories according to the conceptual framework (c.f. Fig. 1): 1) Project boundaries,
2) Participation practices, 3) Participation effort, 4) Practical impacts, and 5) Impact on
project success. The Project boundaries were separated clearly from the participation
practices because, from this study’s point of view, they are related to creating prerequisites
for the estimation and the project rather than directly to the estimation itself.
4.1 Project boundaries: scope, cost and schedule
Software cost estimation is fundamentally about estimating the size of the software for a
given scope. The size is then converted into a schedule and budget, based on different
factors, like the composition of the development team. However, there are usually
boundaries for an acceptable scope, cost or schedule, originating from the business
environment. Based on these boundaries, the decision makers, project management
and estimators try to find an optimal balance between the previously mentioned three
dimensions. This section summarises boundaries for the studied projects and estimation.
At Tech Giant, who operates in a three month release cycle, the schedule was fixed.
Also the cost (resources) was fixed to a great extent, although there were some additional
resources available for situations, where overruns seemed probable. Large Multinational
reported that their customer also operated under a predefined system update cycle and
budget framework, also fixing the schedule and cost. At Small Global, the Senior Business
Manager and other team members reported that the schedule was fixed. The Senior
Business Manager also reported that the planned scope was a minimum viable and
nothing could not have been dropped out, making also the scope of the project fixed.
Thus, for Tech Giant and Large Multinational, the only variable element was the scope,
and for Small Global the resources. Additionally, the senior managers monitored the
progress of the projects against the estimate regularly, and made adjusting decisions
based on the situation, where deemed necessary.
4.2 Participation practices
First of all, top management did not exercise seven of the sixteen studied support practices
at all, as shown in Table 4. Practices 1–16 are adapted from [45]. Additionally, the
presence of three practices, ‘TM ensures the involvement of the project manager during
the estimation stage’, ‘TM ensures ongoing estimation skills training programmes’ and
‘TM recognizes that the estimates are inaccurate in the beginning of the project’, was
indirect, meaning that the presence of the practices could not be tracked back to any
specific TM actions related to the studied projects. ‘TM recognizes that the estimates are
inaccurate in the beginning of the project’ was not relevant for Tech Giant, as they are in
a continuous three month release cycle, and the delivered scope must be constantly at
least 85% of the planned scope. Large Multinational and Small Global had improved the
accuracy with a specification phase, but this was a standard practice in both companies,
like the involvement of the project manager during the estimation phase was for all three
companies. Large Multinational and Tech Giant had arranged training for SCE earlier,
but there were no ongoing training programs during the studied projects.
In all projects the senior managers reported that they had studied and approved the
estimates. At Small Global, the Senior Business Manager studied the estimate in detail, as
part of the project plan, while at Large Multinational and Tech Giant, the senior managers
studied the estimates only on a summary level. Certain items in the estimates were also
challenged by the senior managers in the OCS and NSP projects, which resulted in better
estimates for the items in question. Considering the list of predefined 16 practices at hand,
studying the estimates is close to ‘TM ensures that the estimate relies on documented
facts rather than guessing and intuition’ and ‘IT executive studies and approves the
estimate’. However, as studying and approving the estimates does not fit precisely under
either of the previous, we decided to report it as a new TM support practice for SCE, ‘TM
studies and approves the estimate’. ‘TM is knowledgeable of estimation procedures’ was
present in the OCS project, where the Business Manager reported having been well aware
of the estimation practices. This was, according to the Business Manager, coincidental
rather than a result of planned actions. The presence of the four remaining support
practices was strong in all case projects. The interviewees reported that the management
considered the estimates having a high importance. However, none of the interviewees
specified concrete examples of how the importance was demonstrated during the case
projects, which means that the importance has most likely been established before these
particular projects. At Large Multinational, the estimate was used for preparing an offer
for a customer, who made the order decision based on it. At Tech Giant, a business
plan, product roadmap and customer commitments were made based on the estimates.
At Small Global, a GO/NOGO decision of the project was made based on the estimate.
However, the Senior Business Manager at Small Global reported that the decision of
making the product was practically made, and the estimate was used for reassuring that
the scope was small or minimum viable, and that the delivery was possible in the targeted
Table 4. Exercised Top Management support practices.
Practice Tech Giant Large Multinational Small Global
1. TM ensures existence of estimation procedures
2. TM ensures that the estimator has adequate skills
3. TM ensures improving estimation procedures
4. TM ensures the involvement of the project manager during the
estimation stage
+++ +++ +++
5. TM ensures good communication between the estimator and the
organisation
6. TM ensures that there are criteria for evaluating the meaningfulness
of the estimate
7. TM ensures ongoing estimation skills training programmes + +
8. TM requires re-estimating during the project to get more accurate
estimates
9. TM ensures that the estimate relies on documented facts rather than
guessing and intuition
10. The IT executive studies and approves the estimate
11. TM recognizes that estimates are critical to this organization’s
success
+++ +++ ++
12. TM is knowledgeable of estimation procedures +++
13. TM understands the consequences of an erroneous estimate to the
project success
+++ +++ +/-
14. TM can distinguish between estimates, targets and commitments +++ +++ -
15. TM recognizes that the estimates are inaccurate in the beginning of
the project
N/A + +
16. TM takes the output of an estimate as given without debate +++ +++ +++
17. NEW: TM studies and approves the estimate +++ +++ +++
18. NEW: TM ensures adequate resources for estimation +++ +++ +++
(+) signs and (-) signs indicate evidence of assumed positive and negative presence, respectively. N/A signs for not available.
schedule. Thus, the estimate was connected to significant financial interests at Tech Giant
and Large Multinational, and for making important planning decisions at Small Global.
When asked, all interviewees reported that realism and accuracy were always sought
during the estimation. Furthermore, each interviewee also concluded that there was no
push from the management to make the estimates smaller, and the management did not try
to negotiate the estimate smaller. The Line Manager from Tech Giant says that estimates
are accepted as facts, and the scope is reduced, if necessary. The Business Manager
from Large Multinational says that the price can be negotiated with the customer, but
not the estimate itself. However, although all interviewees at Small Global report that
there was no push from the management, they also say that there was still a pressure to
make the estimate smaller, conveyed by the Senior Business Manager in form of a strict
deadline. The Project Manager, who was responsible for making the estimate, says that
he experienced a high pressure and started to doubt his own estimates and eventually
made them smaller.
As described earlier in this section, all of the projects had clear targets, or business
goals, consisting of the scope, budget, and schedule. In the OCS and NSP projects the
estimates were also accepted as facts which steered the planning. However, in the DT
project, the Project Manager described that he made the estimate smaller because of
the perceived pressure. The Senior Business Manager also told that the purpose of the
estimate was to verify that the fixed scope was possible to be delivered within the target
schedule, with higher resources, if necessary. The decision of executing the project
was practically done. The previous signals that, in addition to creating estimates, the
management seem to have expected the estimation to result into a plan, how to hit the
targets, even though this seems not to have been consciously understood and intended.
In the NSP project, there was a continuous commitment to deliver at least 85% of the
target scope, and at Large Multinational the normal practice was to use the estimate also
as a commitment. At Small Global, the Project Manager says having been committed
to the estimate in the beginning, but during the re-estimations in the later phases of the
project he describes as having been afraid of giving estimates, because the estimates were
taken literally by the management. Thus, estimates seem to have been implicitly taken as
commitments by the management, although there was no explicit agreement on this.
In addition to the findings related to the 17 support practices reviewed earlier, resource
provisioning for SCE emerged from the discussions. According to the interviewees’
subjective perception, all projects had enough time and resources for preparing the
estimates. At Small Global and Large Multinational, there was a separate specification
phase prior to the actual implementation phase. The requirements engineer at Tech Giant
reports that pre-studies are conducted, when necessary, to gain adequate understanding
of the features. However, also this support practice was indirect of nature, and could not
be attributed to any top management actions specific for the studied projects.
4.3 Participation effort
According to the evidence discovered during the interviews and review of the documents,
top management’s effort for participating in SCE was low in all case projects. In terms of
time and effort, the most significant contribution was the follow-up of the progress against
the estimate. This, however, is primarily connected to project management, and not to
SCE. Additionally, the senior managers studied the estimate in all projects. However,
as an investment of time and effort, this was relatively small. The effort related to all
other participation practices could not be attributed to the studied project in particular.
The practices had emerged in a longer period of time and become established routines,
which do not need attention for each new project. The interviewees in all projects also
confirmed that the top management did not participate directly in the estimation.
4.4 Affected items
As concluded earlier, top management sets boundaries for the project and estimation in
form of budget, schedule and scope. This, however, is not influencing the estimation
itself. Furthermore, the indirect support practices ‘TM ensures the involvement of the
project manager during the estimation stage’, ‘TM recognizes that the estimates are
inaccurate in the beginning of the project’, ‘TM ensures ongoing estimation skills training
programmes’, ‘TM ensures adequate resources for estimation’ and ‘TM is knowledgeable
of estimation procedures’ did not have any direct effects on estimation, which could have
been attributed to the studied projects.
The awareness related practices, ‘TM recognizes that estimates are critical to this
organization’s success’, ‘TM understands the consequences of an erroneous estimate to
the project success’, ‘TM can distinguish between estimates, targets and commitments’
and ‘TM takes the output of an estimate as given without debate’ did not have any
tangible effects either in their positive occurrences. However, in the DT project the Project
Manager reported that he had made the estimates smaller, because of the awareness of the
target schedule. Furthermore, he reported that his willingness to give re-estimates during
the project had decreased and he had started to give upper bound estimates, because the
estimates were taken literally and interpreted as commitments. So, the awareness related
support practices seem to have tangible effects on people or SCE related artefacts only,
when the effects are harmful.
‘TM studies and approves the estimate‘ was the only support practice that had direct
positive impacts on estimation as a result of top management actions. After studying
the estimates, managers challenged some parts of the estimate in the OCS and NSP
projects. This lead to re-estimation, and improved the effort estimates for those particular
functionalities.
4.5 Impact on project success
Cost estimation is an inseparable part of any software project [41], thus the cause of
an overrun may reside in SCE, PM or other areas [6, 35, 38]. Not even the best project
management can control a project if it has to meet unrealistic goals, while chaotic project
control will usually overshoot set limits, making cost estimation meaningless. In this
study our aim was to find evidence from the real-life experiences of how management’s
actions impact SCE, which further influences project success. Of the studied projects,
two, OCS and NSP, delivered on time, scope and budget, and one project, DT, suffered
from significant cost and schedule overruns.
In the two successful projects, top management’s participation in SCE has been
minimal, and we found very little evidence of their actions’ impact on persons or artefacts
during the estimation. On the other hand, top management seemed to have understood
well that a realistic and unbiased estimate is critical for the success of a project and
organisation. We found plenty of evidence of this understanding in both projects, although
this understanding did not manifest into any concrete actions. For example, the software
developer in the OCS project told that top management did not try to negotiate the
estimate in any direction, customer agreements and offers are depending on the estimates.
The requirements engineer in the NSP project said that top management was seeking
realistic estimates — nobody wants to betray themselves, and everybody understands
that without realistic estimates things will fail.
Top management’s efforts for participating in SCE were equally low in the studied
runaway project. But where the senior managers refrained themselves from any interfer-
ence in SCE in the two successful projects, top management seemed to have influenced
the estimation results by emphasising the importance of the targeted release date, and
that the scope was small or minimum viable. The project manager reported having made
the estimates smaller under this pressure. Additionally, implicitly interpreting estimates
as commitments influenced the project manager’s willingness to give estimates, and he
reported having given upper bound estimates after noticing this. Although the reasons
for the experienced project overruns may have been many, one of the reasons seem to
have been top management induced pressure to make the estimate conform to the target
delivery date. The Senior Business Manager of Small Global also attributes the overrun
both to SCE and project execution.
5 Discussion
5.1 Implications for practice
Our study clearly shows that a project can conclude successfully with no, or with very
little, direct top management participation in software cost estimation. On the other hand,
this study presents evidence that top management’s incautious interference may lead to
undesired outcomes, and influence the project success negatively. The most important
distinctive factor between a positive and negative top management participation seems
to be to not create bias. Not creating bias manifests through understanding the negative
impact of poor estimates on project and organisation success, and therefore avoiding
influencing the estimation to any direction.
Previous studies have found plenty of evidence about the negative effects emerging
from influencing estimation. Magazinovic and Pernstål [33] have found that management
goals affect the results of estimation. Furthermore, Magazinius et al. [30] found that
personal agenda, management pressure and attempt to avoid re-estimation may affect
an estimate. The previous studies also show that cognitive bias may affect estimators:
e.g. high or low expectations influence even experienced estimators [4], first impression
may dictate a significant part of the estimation result [19], and even the wording may
have a significant impact on the estimate [21]. The estimators may not even notice the
influence of the expectations, or consider it to be very low [23]. The findings from the
studied runaway project show, in accordance with the above mentioned studies, that it
is indeed easy for top management to influence the estimation and project success in a
negative way. Thus, in the light of our findings and previous studies, it seems advisable
for top management to stay outside of estimation to minimise any biasing effect they may
induce.
The most tangible top management participation practice in SCE was ‘TM studies and
approves the estimate’. Although the general recommendation seems to be staying outside
of the estimation, we cannot reject the potential importance of this support practice.
Studying the estimate may be a necessary action to ensure that the estimate is prepared
professionally and with due care. Some other studies support the potential importance
of studying the estimate: e.g. Rahikkala et al. [45] report that the extent of use for ‘Top
management ensures that the estimate relies on documented facts rather than guessing
and intuition‘ correlates positively with project success, and Lederer and Prasad [28]
recommend that computing management should study and approve the estimate.
The remaining three top management support practices that were present during the
estimation, ‘TM ensures the involvement of the project manager during the estimation
stage’, ‘Topmanagement ensures adequate resources for estimation’ and ‘Topmanagement
ensures ongoing estimation skills training programmes’, are indirect of nature, and were
not directly related to any of the studied projects. Additionally, none of these practices
could be tracked back to any specific top management actions, implying that these
practices were among the presumably many results of top management actions to create
an overall framework for software development. Thus, because of the lack of direct top
management participation, these practices cannot be considered as top management
support practices for SCE, and do not seem to justify for top management’s attention
during SCE.
Finally, this study shows that top management invests very little time in SCE. In light
of the previous findings this was expected, and even recommended, because the successful
conclusion of a project did not need significant participation from top management. As
is natural considering the low extent of top management participation, the footprint of
their actions is also low. The results of top management actions tend to have a negative
impact on project success, which was the case in the studied runaway project. The only
exception for this was studying the estimate, which triggered re-estimation of certain
items in the two successful projects, resulting in more accurate estimates.
5.2 Implications for theory
The current SCE literature sparsely contains studies addressing management aspects
of software cost estimation [22], and, to our best knowledge, this is among the first
studies to report on experiences related to top management participation practices in
SCE. This paper contributes to the body of knowledge by showing that no, or very little,
direct actions are required from senior management for a successful project delivery. On
the contrary, the results indicate that top management must understand SCE’s delicate
nature prone to bias, and stay outside of the estimation to avoid any negative effects they
may induce. This study also shows, from the perspective of top management that many
known negative effects from biasing the estimation can also be caused by firms’ top
management.
Furthermore, our results show that the time top management invests in SCE is low,
as well as the footprint that their actions leave on SCE related artefacts and actors.
Considering the previous, the responsibility of improving SCE seems to move back
towards project management and technical experts. However, as the literature has shown,
methodologies are not a silver bullet, and a holistic view considering techniques, people
and procedures is needed for producing more useful estimates.
5.3 Validity, limitations and further research
The qualitative case study methodology involves the researchers themselves as the
instrument of the research, which poses a risk that the results are biased by the researchers’
subjective opinions. As countermeasures to the validity threats, we have employed six
strategies outlined by Robson [46]: prolonged involvement, triangulation, peer debriefing,
member checking, negative case analysis and audit trail. Additionally, we have tried to
maximise the richness of the data set by selecting different case companies and projects,
improving the transferability of the results. However, as this study is explorative of nature
and has not been widely examined prior to this study, generalisation of the results must
be done with caution.
Overall, this study provides evidence that top management participation in SCE is
low and that their participation is not needed for successful estimation. Although we
believe that the results of this study can be transferred to similar settings, the situation
can still vary from context to context. For example, we may have overlooked the role of
some company properties, like size or maturity. Therefore, further studies in different
project and company contexts are needed to see if the same phenomena are repeated, or
new phenomena discovered. Quantitative studies would also provide certainty in how
commonly the reported phenomena are repeated in organisations. The importance of top
management studying and approving the estimate was also left unanswered in this study.
6 Conclusions
This study examined top management support for SCE by using a case study approach
and interviewing 15 experts involved in three software projects in three organisations. Top
management support practices for SCE were studied by employing a list of 16 predefined
practices. The results show that 8 from the 16 studied practices were not present in any
of the projects, and that ‘Top management studies and approves the estimate’ was the
only tangible practice present (RQ1). This study also found evidence that the time and
effort top management invested in SCE was low (RQ2), and the items or persons affected
by their actions were only a few (RQ3). However, the results show further that some of
the top management actions induced undesired bias on estimation, and affected project
success negatively (RQ4).
The main implications from the results for managers, software experts, project
managers and academia are the following:
1. No, or very little, direct top management participation in software cost estimation is
required for the successful conclusion of a project.
2. ‘Top management studies and approves the estimate’ was the only concrete top
management participation practice.
3. Top management actions may induce undesired bias on estimation, and affect project
success negatively.
4. Senior managers must recognize the importance of seeking realism in estimation,
and avoid inducing accidental bias in cost estimation.
Finally, the aforementioned also serve as a good starting point for further research.
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Abstract
Despite of many researchers and practitioners agreeing on that organisational issues are equally
important as technical issues from the software cost estimation (SCE) success point of view, most
of the research focus has been put on the development of methods, whereas organisational factors
have received surprisingly little academic scrutiny. This study aims to identify organisational fac-
tors that either support or hinder meaningful SCE, identifying their impact on estimation success.
Top management’s role is specifically addressed. The study takes a qualitative and explorative case
study based approach. In total, 18 semi-structured interviews aided the study of three projects in
three organisations. Hence, the transferability of the results is limited. The results suggest that
the role of the top management is important in creating prerequisites for meaningful estimation,
but their day-to-day participation is not required for successful estimation. Top management may
also induce undesired distortion in estimation. Estimation maturity and estimation success seem
to have an interrelationship with software process maturity, but there seem to be no significant
individual organisational factors, which alone would make estimation successful. Our results val-
idate several distortions and biases reported in the previous studies, and show the SCE research
focus has remained on methodologies and technical issues.
1. Introduction
Most software projects still suffer from budget and schedule overruns [19, 26, 29, 82]. Regardless
of the high price of software projects that bring hundreds of billions of euros in losses annually
[22, 57, 63], there are still severe deficiencies in the proper application of software cost estimation
methodologies in organisations [2, 38, 49, 52, 55, 72].
Systematic overruns have continued for decades, although researchers and practitioners have
developed hundreds of estimation methodologies [39, 55]. However, the reason for the overruns may
not reside only in the estimation methodologies as they are shown to be able to produce accurate
results when used properly [69, 70]. Thus, the problems that result in estimation errors may occur
because estimation methodologies are used ineffectively by organisations [39, 49, 72]. Consequently,
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organisational inhibitors [52], top management focus [71] and the sources of distortions [2, 49] have
become the focus of recent studies.
While most SCE does not use a proper methodology, the situation is considerably better in the
area of project management (PM) as, according to Fortune and White [85], only 5% of projects do
not use any PM tools. Considering the fact that cost estimation is an inseparable part of all projects
[30], and that the cause of overruns in software projects may reside in software cost estimation
(SCE), project management (PM) or other areas [11, 56, 61], the difference in the extent of the
use of methodologies between software project management and management of other types of
projects is surprising. Especially, because commonly used industrial project management and process
improvement frameworks, such as CMMI [81], PMBOK [30] and IPMA ICB [32], promote the
importance of estimation and the use of methodologies. The use of proper methodologies is proven
to have a positive effect on the outcome of both SCE and PM [15, 85, 91], nevertheless only PM
professionals utilise these valuable tools and methods to any great extent.
As scientific literature or industrial advice does not provide a clear explanation for the gap in
the extent of the use of methodologies between SCE and PM, one assumption is that the difference
arises from organisational priorities and does not seem to be related to the availability of proven cost
estimation methodologies. Project management is widely linked to the execution of the corporate
strategy [17, 48, 79], but SCE seems to have very little visibility among top management. Also, while
project management research has paid close attention to non-technical factors, like top management
support, communication, skills and learning [42, 85], SCE research has mostly focused on developing
and improving estimation techniques [39]. This is an important observation, indicating that the
explanation for the difference in the extent of use of SCE and PM methodologies could reside
within the research areas omitted from the study of SCE.
The goal of this study is to identify organisational factors that either support or hinder meaning-
ful SCE, and to establish their impact on estimation success. The study takes a holistic view with
specific attention to top management participation. A qualitative, exploratory case study approach
is employed, using interviews as the primary data collection method. In total, three projects were
studied and 18 semi-structured interviews conducted.
Some research papers addressing SCE from the organisational rather than technical viewpoint
have been published recently [e.g. 18, 49, 52, 71]. This paper continues on this highly relevant
path but diverges from previous studies by studying the impact of organisational factors related
to software process or project process on the effectiveness of the use of estimation methodologies.
Improving the understanding of the real-world dynamics related to the effective use of estimation
methodologies may provide practitioners with valuable tools for improving SCE in organisations.
Especially, the gap between the advice provided by the industrial project management frameworks
and the low extent of use of methodologies could be narrowed. This study may also provide further
evidence that organisational issues are equally important as technical ones for effective SCE, and
generate new theories about the reasons for why the extent of use of methodologies is low regardless
of the experienced importance of SCE and industrial advise. This would justify further study on
the organisational dimension of SCE.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents related work focusing
on four areas: Software cost estimation, Project management, Top management involvement and
Software cost estimation in industrial frameworks. Section 3 presents the research questions. Section
4 introduces the case companies and projects, and Section 5 elaborates on the research design.
Section 6 presents the results of the case study and is followed by a discussion of the key findings
in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the study.
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2. Related work
In the following subsections, we will review top management’s relationship to SCE and PM and
summarise the focus areas of earlier research on these subjects.
2.1. Software cost estimation
Software cost estimation is an activity that aims to produce a prediction of the effort required to
build a software component. As most costs in software development projects are personnel costs,
‘cost’ and ‘effort’ are often used interchangeably. The literature that studies and develops methods
to estimate costs in software projects began in the 1960s [60, 62]. However, despite five decades of
research and hundreds of studies [10, 39], software projects still exceed their budgets and timetables.
Jørgensen and Shepperd [39] conducted the most recent systematic literature review of SCE. In
total, they selected 304 journal articles for their study and identified eight active research topics in
SCE:
Estimation methods: the key issues include formal estimation models, expert estimation pro-
cesses, decomposition based estimation processes and combinations of those three.
Production function: the key issues are the linear versus nonlinear relationship between effort
and size, and the relationship between effort and schedule compression.
Calibration of models: the key issue is the calibration of estimation models, e.g. studies on local
versus multi-organisational data and the calibration of the COCOMO model for certain types
of projects.
Size measures: the key issues include validity and improvements in the size measures that are
important in estimation models, e.g. the inter-rater validity of function point counting.
Organisational issues: the key issues are estimation processes in a wide organisational context,
e.g. estimation practice, the reasons for cost overruns, the impact of estimates on project work,
and estimation in the general context of project management.
Effort uncertainty assessment: the key issue is the uncertainty of effort or size estimates, e.g.
methods providing minimum-maximum intervals for effort.
Measures of estimation performance: the key issues include the evaluation and selection of
estimation methods, e.g. how to measure estimation accuracy or how to compare estimation
methods.
Data set properties: the key issue is how to analyse data sets for the purpose of estimation
methods, e.g. data sets with missing data.
Other: unclassified topics.
The distribution of the topics is presented in Table 1.
As shown in Table 1, all other categories except ‘Organisational issues’ and ‘Other’ focus on
estimation methodologies or other formal methods for improving the estimation of size, effort or
schedule. Only 16% of the articles discussed issues other than non-technical issues, i.e. organisational
issues. Thus, SCE research strongly focuses on formal and technical issues and has relatively little
focus on non-technical topics. Furthermore, the share of the articles focusing on organisational
issues seems to be decreasing, having been only 14% during the period from 2000 to 2004. The
recent study of SCE research trends shows also that the research focus has remained consistently
on estimation methodologies and techniques between 1996 and 2016, the emerged research areas
being ‘size metrics’, ‘estimation by analogy’, ‘tools for estimation’, ‘soft computing techniques’ and
‘expert judgement’ in five topic solution [77].
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Table 1. Distribution of research topics in software cost estimation. A single study can belong to multiple
categories. Adapted from [39].
1990- 2000-
Perspective -1989 1999 2004 Total
Estimation method 73 % 59 % 58 % 61 %
Size measures 12 % 24 % 16 % 20 %
Organisational issues 22 % 15 % 14 % 16 %
Uncertainty assessment 5 % 6 % 13 % 8 %
Calibration of models 7 % 8 % 4 % 7 %
Production function 20 % 4 % 3 % 6 %
Measures of estimation performance 5 % 5 % 6 % 5 %
Data set properties 0 % 1 % 2 % 1 %
Other 0 % 2 % 1 % 1 %
Estimation methodologies produce good results when applied properly [69, 70]. Regardless of
this, overruns still continue. While an obvious research topic should be the effective application
of estimation methodologies, 84% of the articles still focus on improving methodologies. Hihn and
Habib-agahi noticed already in 1991 that only 17% of the estimators used proper estimation method-
ologies [28]. This, however, seems not to have affected the research focus either. Also according to
our experiences, the basic problem of SCE is that the estimation methodologies are not applied
properly; researchers and practitioners largely agree on this point [39, 55]. Furthermore, Jørgensen
and Shepperd’s [39] review reports that only eight articles out of 304 were in-depth case studies and
only three evaluated the background to the estimation processes. This, together with the technical
focus of the research, confirms that concentrating on real-world issues that prevent the effective use
of SCE methods is justified as a systematic improvement in SCE success that can only be realised
through the successful application of estimation methods in real-world situations.
2.2. Project management
The share of work organised as projects is very high in organisations, and the results of such projects
are critical for the success of an organisation [12, 84]. Due to the significance of PM, the topic has
been broadly studied and the body of knowledge on it is extensive. Several different categorisations
of PM research areas exist and the following six perspectives have been presented by Kolltveit,
Karlsen and Grønhaug [42]:
The task perspective: key issues include the scope of project management for a task, project
targets, project results and planning and control.
The leadership perspective: key issues are leadership, communication, uncertainty and learning
The system perspective: key issues are systems, elements of systems, boundaries and dynamics.
The stakeholder perspective: key issues include stakeholders, communication, negotiation, re-
lationships, influence and dependence.
The transaction cost perspective: key issues are transactions, transaction costs, production
costs, and governance structure.
The business by project perspective: key issues include business, project results, project suc-
cess, strategy, profit and benefits.
In their article, Kolltveit et al. [42] identified 562 articles published in International Journal of
Project Management and classified them into the six above mentioned categories (see Table 2).
Once again, when dividing the areas or aspects into technical and non-technical, the task and
transaction cost perspectives can be seen as technical. The other four can be seen as non-technical,
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Table 2. The distribution of research perspectives in project management. A single study can belong to
multiple categories. Adapted from [42].
1983- 1988- 1993- 1998- 2003-
Perspective 1987 1992 1997 2002 2004 Total
Task 49% 34% 32% 23% 12% 29%
Leadership 8% 16% 25% 28% 33% 23%
System 23% 25% 18% 19% 15% 20%
Stakeholder 1% 3% 1% 5% 6% 3%
Transaction 19% 9% 6% 10% 6% 10%
Business 0% 13% 17% 15% 29% 15%
or at least having most of their key issues beyond the purely technical focus. As Table 2 shows, the
focus of the project management research has been shifting from the task perspective towards the
leadership and business perspectives. This can be seen from the table as with the above classification
into technical and non-technical aspects, the share of technical perspectives decreased from 68%
to 18% between the first and the last period, respectively. This shift of focus seems reasonable
since organisational issues are reported to be even more important factors in project success than
technical ones [21, 47, 64, 91]. Top management support (TMS) has even been suggested as the
most important factor affecting project success [89], which corresponds well with the largest share
of the leadership perspective related papers.
In comparison to SCE research, PM research has undergone a major shift from task oriented
or technical topics towards people oriented or non-technical ones, whereas the SCE research focus
remains on task oriented subjects. Thus, it is also reasonable to assume that the focus of PM
research has placed more focus on how methods are applied by people and therefore increased the
awareness, effectiveness and extent of use of the methods. The mere existence of a method seldom
leads to its success.
2.3. Top management focus
Top management support has been found to be one of the most important critical success factors for
project success in several studies [21, 76, 89] and few would doubt the need for TMS [54]. Also, top
management’s interest in PM is increasing along with the number of PM related articles published
in top management and business journals [43]. However, top managers are generally more interested
in non-technical issues of a strategic nature [16, 83].
The practices through which TMS is demonstrated for a project have been extensively studied.
Garrity [23] recommends top management review plans and monitor results. Beath [6] has found that
top managers are able to make organisational changes, while Morton [59] notes top managers—as
project champions—have the skills to mobilise public opinion, resolve conflicts between stakeholders
and win the hearts and minds of project teams. Zwikael [91] has identified a list of 10 critical
top management support processes that influence a project’s success, including appropriate PM
assignment, project manager involvement during the initiation stage and the use of standard PM
software.
TMS has not been studied widely in the scope of SCE. However, Rahikkala et al. [71] found
that top management pays attention to SCE and recognises that good estimates are critical for
an organisation’s success, as well as for understanding the consequences of an erroneous estimate.
In general, there is very little information about TMS in SCE. This suggests that the actual top
management focus on SCE is low. Regardless of the reported attention, the limited use of SCE
methodologies supports this assumption.
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2.4. Software cost estimation in industrial frameworks
Many of the commonly used project management frameworks, standards and other related guidelines
address cost estimation. Project Management Institute’s PMBOK Guide [30], as well as its Soft-
ware Extension [31], give detailed guidance on preparing software cost estimates. Another popular
framework, International Project Management Association’s Competence Baseline [32], includes cost
estimation as an important step. Furthermore, PRINCE21 and ITIL v3 [1] frameworks emphasize
estimation and cost management, as well as the CMMI process improvement program [13] and the
ISO 21500:2012 standard for project management [33]. Even the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) has published a 12 step guide for cost estimation2. Finally, cost estimation is also
covered by agile methodologies [14].
3. Research questions
The literature review shows that SCE research has been centred on methodology for decades without
a significant change. In contrast, PM research is very broad and covers topics like methodologies,
leadership and business. The focus of research has also shifted from methodologies towards other
areas, currently having a relatively even distribution on a broad range of topics. In particular, TMS
has been studied in the scope of PM but not SCE. Hence, though SCE and PM belong to software
project delivery, the research focus is different. In the industrial context, the importance of SCE
is widely recognized, and practically all major industrial bodies of knowledge provide guidance for
cost estimation.
The above, together with the argument that proper cost estimation is often omitted [28, 52],
suggests that the accountability of the use of meaningful estimation methodologies is unclear in
organisations. There are no reports that SCE would be commonly omitted completely, rather that
it is not conducted in a meaningful way. The previously reviewed project management and process
improvement frameworks define clearly that project management is responsible for that the estima-
tion is done, but not specifically that they would be responsible for how it is done. This seems to
leave a gap in the software process, which may be one reason for malpractices and overruns. This
motivates our first initial objective:
RQ1 What are the real-world factors concerning the organisational context of SCE (organisational
factors) that either support or hinder the creation of a meaningful software cost estimate?
In our study, the organisational context refers widely to properties and mechanisms of an organ-
isation, such as top management commitment, leadership, organisational structure, communication,
monitoring, recognition and education [68]. Effectively, the definition of the organisational context
used in this study does not exclude any properties or mechanisms of an organisation, and we seek to
identify the aspects affecting SCE that human subjects can or are willing to tell us about the topic
[50]. Additionally, although the organisational context is our primary focus, we also consider biases
emerging from human behaviour, as human subjects are centric for the organisational context.
It has been found that technical issues are of little interest to senior managers [16, 83]. One
reason for the existence of the previously described gap may be that SCE is perhaps perceived
as too technical and too specific to software development to interest project managers. On the
other hand, although software developers traditionally focus on technical topics and have little
interest in or power over non-technical issues, they may not perceive SCE as a technical issue, and
1 https://www.axelos.com/qualifications/prince2-qualifications
2 http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/GAO%2012-Step%20Estimating%20Process.pdf
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Table 3. Case study companies and projects.
Company Software Vendor Service Provider Tech Giant
Number of employees Approx. 150 Several thousands Several thousands
Business area Software and services Software and services Software and services
Project Tool Operational Control
System
Network Management
System
Initial / actual size of the
project
12 / 44 person-months 20 / 20 person-months Approx. 200 / 200
person-months
Initial / actual duration
of the project
3 / 11 months 10 / 10 months 3 / 3 months
Project type Internal product
development
External product
development, i.e. tailored
software
Continuous internal
product development
Estimation methodology WBS and expert
estimation
WBS and expert
estimation, historical
data, peer review
WBS and expert
estimation, historical data
Estimation responsible Project Manager Project Manager Program Manager
Development
methodology
Scrumbut: Waterfall
(design) + Scrum
(sprints)
Waterfall-like method Scrum
Result Challenged Successful Successful
consider it to belong under project management’s domain. Technical experts may also be protective
of their domain in order to prevent loss of power to outsiders [78], while the suspicious and negative
attitudes of senior managers towards IT and technical personnel [88] may hinder cooperation further.
Therefore, the second initial objective of this study is to answer the second research question:
RQ2 What is the impact of top management in either supporting or hindering software cost esti-
mation practices?
Finally, this paper draws attention to the difference between the extent of use of SCE and PM
methodologies, as well as to the different focus areas of research on SCE and PM. Additionally,
the gap between the extensive amount of industrial advice on cost estimation and the low extent
of use of SCE methodologies is addressed. An enhanced understanding of the reasons behind these
differences may help organisations improve their SCE success, positively affecting project success.
4. Case contexts
The topics covered in this paper have not been widely addressed prior to this study and our goal
was to collect widely different perspectives related to the organisational phenomena affecting SCE,
and especially top management’s role. Thus, we selected the cases so that they would generate
rich information about the phenomena being studied. We focused on large and small companies,
selecting higher and lower maturity organisations and exemplary and challenged projects. The case
companies and projects are different in their industrial domains, size, as well as in their processes.
The final decision of including a particular project in the study was made based on a discussion
with a company representative, confirming that the project was likely to add new perspectives in
the study. Table 3 depicts the characteristics of the case study companies and the projects. The
companies wished to remain anonymous.
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4.1. Case 1 — Software Vendor’s Tool project
Software Vendor is a software producing company of about one hundred and fifty people. Its main
line of business consists of selling consultancy and support services as well as software products to
businesses. The company is global and has offices in several countries. We studied Software Vendor’s
Tool project, which aimed to produce an application development tool.
While the overall project was strictly planned beforehand, the actual development work was
divided into sprints. The development work started with a prototype version in which technical
challenges were studied. The Product Owner and Project Manager were named to the project
already in the prototype phase. The Product Owner was responsible for creating a design document
for the product, whereas the Project Manager, based on the design document, was responsible for
crafting a timetable and cost estimates. Initially, the project was designed to take three months
with a team of four people. Based on the estimate and design document, top management approved
and started the project.
The Tool project overran its schedule and budget by over 200%. However, the project delivered
the planned scope and the Senior Business Manager reports that the outcome of the project met
his expectations and he attributes the overruns to estimation error and project performance related
issues.
4.2. Case 2 — Service Provider’s Operational Control System project
Service Provider is a large software producing company with thousands of employees, providing
tailor-made and package software and consultancy services for businesses in various sectors. The
company has premises in several countries. We studied an Operational Control System project by
Service Provider that aims to produce custom software for a long-term customer. The Operational
Control System is used for reporting and analysing process control data.
The project followed a Waterfall-like software development process. The first stage of the project
was requirement elicitation and analysis. After the specification was approved, the project was
estimated. The estimation was made by the developers and testers, led by the project manager, who
had the overall responsibility of the cost estimate. The estimate was a result of expert estimates,
placed into a software tool specifically tailored for the application area.
The project was planned according to certain restrictions: the budget and the timetable was
fixed. The development started when the customer and the vendor had agreed upon the scope.
There was a small number of unknown features that needed further elaboration. The development
work continued straightforwardly from design through implementation and testing to delivery. The
duration and effort of the project was 10 months and 600 man-days, respectively. Regardless of
a significant rescoping during the project, it concluded under budget and on schedule with good
customer satisfaction.
4.3. Case 3 — Tech Giant’s Network Management System project
Tech Giant is a large company selling products with software to global business-to-business markets.
The company has tens of thousands of employees around the world. We studied the Network Man-
agement System project of Tech Giant. The project produced a new release of a tool for managing
the network. The Network Management System has been in use for several years.
The project was a part of a continuous development cycle involving just under 100 people.
A new release of the system is developed every three months. The development methodology it
used was based on Scrum with two week sprints. The development teams were distributed over
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several locations. The cost estimation was conducted in two phases: firstly, rough planning for the
whole three month release in the product management function. Secondly, the backlog items were
estimated in the Scrum teams, the main responsible being the program manager. The estimate
for the whole release was based on historical data about certain parts and the estimates for those
parts were prepared by requirement engineers. The backlog items were estimated by using an expert
estimation. The project concluded successfully and delivered over 85% of the planned scope, which
is the goal for all releases.
5. Case study design
The question of how the organisational phenomena (RQ1) and specifically the actions of top man-
agement (RQ2) affect SCE are investigated through three case studies. Since this study deals
with contemporary phenomena in a real-world context—over which the researcher has little or
no control—case studies were chosen as a suitable research approach [87]. This study is exploratory,
discovering what is happening, seeking new ideas and generating hypotheses and research areas
[74]. The research uses a multiple case study design and replication logic [87]. The richness of the
information is maximised by using both exemplary and average organisations as cases [66]. The unit
of analysis is a single software cost estimate. The study focuses on the experiences gained during
the preparation of the cost estimate and the related software process.
To facilitate the identification of organisational phenomena, we have decided to utilise the con-
cept of maturity. Software process maturity is the extent to which a specific process is explicitly
defined, managed, measured, controlled and effective [67]. Paulk et al. [67] argue that maturity
implies the potential for growth in capability and indicates both the richness of an organisation’s
process and the consistency with which it is applied in projects. Furthermore, mature organisations
provide training for processes and the processes are monitored and improved. In general, the concept
of maturity measures organisational capability, culture and consistency in a holistic way, thus it can
be expected to usefully facilitate the discovery of organisational phenomena. Thus the maturity of
SCE and software processes are assessed for this study.
5.1. Instrumentation of SCE maturity
To assess the maturity level of SCE in an organisation, we have developed a definition of an ideal
SCE procedure, covering its most important aspects as identified in [55]:
1. The use of an estimation methodology: A clearly defined, established estimation methodology
is used to produce the estimate, instead of making presumptions.
2. Proper communication of the estimate: The assumptions, accuracy and intended use of an
estimate are communicated as part of the estimate, instead of being presented as a figure
lacking further explanation.
3. Planned re-estimation: An estimate is improved systematically when information about the
assumptions behind an estimate is increased and updated after the initial estimate.
4. The use of a documented estimation procedure: A documented procedure for producing and
communicating an estimate is followed, instead of an ad-hoc procedure.
If the above-mentioned areas of SCE are properly covered, the estimation process should avoid
many of the worst pitfalls and the outcome will have a fair chance of being useful for project control.
As demonstrated by Lederer and Prasad [44], using guessing or intuition as an estimation method-
ology is connected to budget and schedule overruns. Also, the accuracy of an estimate increases
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as a project progresses [8, 46], which encourages the re-estimation and good communication of an
estimate. In addition, one poorly estimated aspect can become an anchor and may contaminate a
whole project’s estimate [4, 40]. Furthermore, a documented estimation procedure protects organi-
sations from poor estimation practices and promotes good practices [55]. Standardised procedures
have also been found to improve the results in PM [30, 58], specifically in software development
[34, 69]. Thus, if an estimate is the result of a rigorous procedure covering the above mentioned
aspects, it is more likely to be useful.
5.2. Instrumentation of process maturity
In order to ensure that the relevant phenomena are discovered, we will also extend the scope of our
investigation outside the actual SCE and assess the maturity of the software processes in the studied
organisations by using the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) [67]. The CMM establishes a set of
publicly available criteria describing the characteristics of mature organisations. CMM presents the
process maturity of an organisation in a scale from 1 (low maturity) to 5 (high maturity). For
the CMM assessment we use the general characterisations of maturity levels presented by Paulk et
al. [67, pp. 9–14] as well as key software process area goals [67, pp. 59–64]. Together, the CMM
characteristics and goals cover a wide range of process areas, so it is probable that reviewing these
items will facilitate the discovery of organisational factors affecting SCE, helping us to answer RQ1
and RQ2. While CMM is rather old, it still describes well the relevant properties and mechanisms of
an organisation, making it a relevant tool for discovering phenomena in the organisational context.
Higher maturity organisations have been found to perform better in software development [24,
25]. The maturity assessment is also related to process areas rather than to techniques, to what
rather than to how, making it agnostic to any specific development methodology. Therefore, the
software development and estimation maturities are relevant to the discussion of organisational
phenomena. The CMM is also specifically intended to be used for software process assessment and
software capability evaluations [67].
The CMM evaluation for the case study companies was made by the researchers during the
interviews and documentation review. We would like to point out that we followed good auditing
practices and the main author had over five years of experience of auditing and holds an ISO
9001:2008 Lead Auditor certificate. Therefore, we believe that the CMM requirements conformance
evaluations conducted as part of the research are valid and we gained a good overall understanding
of an organisation’s CMM level, even though our focus was still primarily on SCE. We focused on
SCE related topics and CMM acted only as a facilitating instrument.
5.3. Subject selection
The subject sampling strategy was to interview the management and representatives of other roles
related to the case projects. In total 15 people were interviewed in 18 interviews (key informants
were interviewed twice), as presented in Table 4. All participants attended interviews voluntarily
and anonymously and the collected data is treated confidentially.
5.4. Data collection procedures
The data for this study was collected within seven weeks. The primary data collection methods were
semi-structured interviews [74] and a review of documentation. In total 15 people were interviewed
and 18 documents reviewed. The documents included typical project documentation, such as cost
estimates, project plans, meeting minutes and status reports, to gain a better understanding of
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Table 4. Interviewees and their role in the projects
Software Vendor Service Provider Tech Giant
Product Owner (key informant) Project Manager (key informant) Program Manager (key informant)
Senior Business Manager Business Manager Line Manager
Senior Technology Manager Testing Manager Senior Manager
Project Manager Requirements Engineer Requirements Engineer
Software Developer Head of Product Management
Head of Programs
the procedures and SCE methods used. The case studies were completed one at a time to allow
the reflection and refinement of the research and interview questions [41]. All the interviews (but
not key informant interviews) related to a single case study were conducted on the same day, with
the exception of one interview for the last case study. Each interview lasted approximately one
hour. Each interview day was preceded by a key informant interview day during which background
information about the case was collected from a person in a central role in the case study area. The
key informant interviews addressed the following topics:
1. Project background, size, status and success
2. Project team members and their roles
3. Estimation methodology and success
4. Software development methodology
5. Software process maturity, capabilities and track record
The semi-structured interviews were based on a predefined list of questions. Any interesting
facts and observations that were mentioned led to additional questions being asked on that subject.
The interview instrument was developed by three researchers and adapted slightly for the individual
case studies. All the interviews were conducted by two researchers, who interviewed one subject at
a time. The interview instrument is provided in Appendix A, and it consists of the following main
areas:
1. Introduction
2. Personal, team and project background
3. Current state of SCE in the organisation
4. Experiences of the organisational phenomena affecting SCE
5. Ending (uncovered topics)
5.5. Data analysis procedures
The primary steps for deriving conclusions from the experiences of the study subjects included
1) semi-structured interviews, which were sound recorded, 2) collection of documentation, 3) tran-
scription of the interviews, 4) the coding of transcripts and documents, 5) grouping the coded pieces
of text, and 6) making conclusions. The NVivo 10 application was used for aiding the process, and
special care was taken to maintain a clear chain of evidence. The overall process of analysis was
conducted as outlined by [75].
During the coding phase, each interview transcript and collected document was reviewed state-
ment by statement, and statements containing information about organisational factors (RQ1) or
top management participation (RQ2) were assigned a code representing the findings category. After
that, readily coded main categories were reviewed statement by statement to identify subcate-
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gories. Subcategories were also identified from the original transcripts. After a couple of iterations,
subcategories emerged from these two approaches. The performed analysis was of the inductive
type, meaning that the patterns and categories of the analysis come from the data, instead of
being pre-defined. Themes that were often raised in the interviews were identified and coded. The
application used for coding (NVivo 10) maintained the evidence trail from the coded pieces of text
back to the documents, transcripts and interviewees automatically. The coding of the texts was
primarily conducted by one of the researchers. Another researcher conducted a shorter coding of
the data, with fewer iterations, independently, to validate the results of the coding. Any differences
were discussed and resolved, and the categorisation was refined. The final categorisation formed a
structure for reporting the findings of the study.
After the coding of the data, the coded statements were grouped together to form initial hy-
pothesis, or candidates, for conclusions. The process progressed iteratively, and was, once again,
conducted primarily by one of the researchers, while another researcher conducted an independent
analysis with fewer iterations to validate and refine the results. After a certain number of iterations,
and until the end of analysis, the analysis of the statements was conducted by two researchers to-
gether. The other two researchers reviewed and validated the results. During the process of forming
a hypothesis, interviewees were asked clarifying or additional questions, where deemed necessary,
to resolve any unclarities and to provide additional confidence for the hypothesis. The traceability
was secured by marking all statements used for forming the hypothesis with identification codes,
enabling back tracing to the coded statements.
In addition to the interview data and documentation, the researchers’ memos written during
the interviews were used as information sources and as part of the data analysis. The collected
project documentation provided mostly background data for the case projects, and to some extent,
information regarding top management’s participation in different phases of the projects. From
the organisational context point of view, the documentation provided some information about the
software process and related decision making. The role of the collected documentation was mostly
to provide background information and to support statements made by the interviewees.
5.6. Validity procedures
The qualitative case study methodology involves the researchers themselves as the instrument of
the research, which poses a risk that the results are biased by the researchers’ subjective opinions.
More generally speaking, Robson [74] has identified three types of threats to validity: reactivity,
researcher bias and respondent bias. Reactivity means that the presence of the researcher may
influence the study, and particularly the behaviour of the study objects. Researcher bias refers to
the preconceptions of the researcher, which may influence how questions are asked and answers are
interpreted. Finally, respondent bias originates from the respondents’ attitudes towards the research,
which may lead, for example, to withholding information or giving answers the respondents think
the researcher is looking for.
Because of the researcher related threat to validity, a discussion of the effects of the involvement
of particular researchers is appropriate [74]. The main author of this article has been involved in
professional software development since 1996, including companies from start-ups to international
giant corporations. Additionally, he has been conducting academic research within the area of SCE
since 2012, holds an ISO 9001:2008 Lead Auditor certificate, and has over seven years of experience
of quality management system audits. The other authors are from academia, having their main
focus in software process, software development methodologies and software economy. Together
they have published hundreds of research papers, and used different methodologies extensively in
their research, including qualitative case studies.
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The reactivity, researcher bias and respondent bias threats to the validity of the study were
addressed through six strategies provided by [74]: prolonged involvement, triangulation, peer de-
briefing, member checking, negative case analysis and audit trail. The summary of the taken coun-
termeasures to negate the validity threats are summarised below:
Prolonged involvement While the study observations were completed during a short period of
time, all the researchers had followed the case study companies for at least two years and
were intimately aware of recent developments in the software development methodologies being
used. All case organisations had participated in a national research programme, Need4Speed
(www.n4s.fi), enabling the confidential sharing of information between the organisations and
the researchers.
Data source triangulation Multiple data sources were used, including interviews with persons
in different roles, project documentation and informal observations.
Observer triangulation Interviews were conducted by two researchers together. This also re-
duced the strain caused by conducting up to six interviews during one day. Additionally, the
interviewees had a short break before each interview, and a longer break in the middle of the
day. Important analysis steps were conducted by two researchers independently, and emerging
issues were discussed and refined.
Methodological triangulation The data analysis included qualitative interviews and the analysis
of project documentation.
Theory triangulation Several perspectives were considered for interpreting the results, including
the perspectives of the subjects, researchers and other peer group members.
Peer debriefing Peers, including practitioners and researchers, reviewed the research in different
research phases. One research paper based on the conducted research has already been published
[71]. The results of this research have been reviewed by the Need4Speed research programme
steering group.
Member checking Interviewees reviewed both transcripts and analysis, providing feedback and
commentary.
Negative case analysis Elements that seemed to contradict the conclusions of the analysis were
identified and alternative explanations discussed.
Audit trail Strict scrutiny was practiced to maintain a clear audit trail from data collection to
the final conclusions. All interviews, transcripts, codings and other analysis are archived.
Considering that our study is based on three projects, exploratory of nature, and that the study
topic has not been widely explored prior to this study, generalizability of results is low. However,
our study consists of three case companies and 15 interviewees with different roles, and it provides
in-depth findings and detailed information of the study itself. Thus, transferability of the study
should be fair, although case studies are always coloured by their specific context.
6. Results
In the following sections we will present the findings related to organisational phenomena (RQ1) and
top management actions (RQ2) affecting SCE. The findings are divided into four main categories
(the role of management, communication, process maturity and attitudes) that were found in the
analysis and classification of the results by the authors. Additionally, the main categories are divided
into subsections as appropriate. The main observations related to the second research question are
located in Section 6.1 whereas the sections 6.2–6.4 contribute the first research question.
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6.1. Management role
Findings related to the management’s role are presented in the following sections. Table 5 sum-
marises the findings.
6.1.1. Estimate visibility and purpose
In Case 1, the Tool project, Senior Business Manager studied the project plan containing the esti-
mate considering the strategic importance of the project to the company. In Case 2, the Operational
Control System project, the business manager responsible for the important customer relationship
reviewed the estimate. Practically, the visibility of the estimate correlated with the ownership of the
project and the daily involvement of the managers with the project domain. There was no visibility
of the estimate beyond the review as the project was no longer part of the manager’s daily responsi-
bilities. In Case 3, the Network Management System project, the most senior manager aware of the
estimate was the manager of the whole product family. There are roughly 1,000 experts involved in
the system development, so the estimate was visible to relatively senior managers.
In Case 2, the estimate was used for preparing an offer for a customer and planning the project,
while in Case 1 and Case 3, the managers reported that they needed the estimate to ensure that
the resources, scope and schedule were in balance with each other. In Case 1, the Senior Business
Manager reported that the estimate was needed to ensure the project scope was the minimum viable
and that the project would deliver the results as soon as possible.
6.1.2. Participation in estimation
None of the managers studied the estimate in detail. In Case 1, the Senior Business Manager reviewed
the estimate only as part of the project plan. In Case 2 and Case 3, the managers reviewed the
estimates on a summary level. None of the managers participated in the estimation work, and the
managers in Case 1 and Case 3 were not aware of the estimation practices. In Case 2, the manager
was aware of the practices because cooperation with the customer was said to be very intense; the
customer wanted to discuss processes related to daily cooperation. While the managers were not
involved in estimation on a practical level, the managers in cases 2 and 3 stated that they challenged
the estimate when necessary. Also, in these two cases, the Project Manager and Product Owner,
respectively, scrutinized the estimate. An awareness of such scrutinizing allowed the managers to
have greater trust in the estimate. That is, there was no need for them to personally study the
estimate in detail.
6.1.3. Resource provisioning
In Case 1 and Case 2, the Tool and Operational Control System projects, the estimators reported
that they had enough time to prepare the estimates. In Case 3, the Network Management System
project, the estimators wished to have more time. However, although the estimation work was
very time consuming and complex, when considering the previous good results, the time reserved
for estimation seems to have been reasonable. The perceived lack of time was connected to the
complexity and size of the estimation domain. Also, an estimator in Case 3 wondered whether
additional time would actually improve the estimates. In Case 1 and Case 3, building prototypes was
also used as a method for acquiring additional information to use for estimation, which supported
the idea that management provided adequate resources for the estimation work.
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Table 5. Summary of management role findings.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Company Software Vendor Service Provider Tech Giant
Project Tool Operational Control
System
Network Management
System
Estimate purpose Ensuring the resources,
scope and schedule
balance, ensuring the
minimum viable scope
and fast delivery
Preparing an offer for a
customer
Ensuring the resources,
scope and schedule
balance
Participation in estimation The project plan
containing the estimate
studied on a summary
level, management not
aware of the estimation
practices
The estimate reviewed on
a summary level,
management aware of the
estimation practices, the
project manager
scrutinized the estimate
The estimate reviewed on
a summary level,
management not aware of
the estimation practices,
the product owner
scrutinized the estimate
Resource provisioning Estimators had enough
time for preparing the
estimate, prototypes used
for supporting estimation
Estimators had enough
time for preparing the
estimate
Estimators wished to
have more time,
prototypes used for
supporting estimation
Demonstrated importance Estimates considered as
important, confirmed by
interviewees
Estimates considered as
important, confirmed by
interviewees, importance
linked to customer
promises
Estimates considered as
important, confirmed by
interviewees, importance
linked to customer
promises
Goal setting Goals perceived as
realistic, realism pursued,
no support for realism
from historical data, clear
expectations of the scope
and schedule, pressure to
fit the estimate to
expectations
Goals perceived as
realistic, realism pursued,
hundreds of annually
delivered projects
supported realism
Goals perceived as
realistic, realism pursued,
four annual releases for
the same product
supported realism
Other No shared project vision
6.1.4. Demonstrated importance
In all cases the projects had strong support from management, and the managers emphasized the
importance of the estimates. In Case 2 and Case 3, the estimate was strongly linked to keeping
the promises given to customers. All the interviewees concurred that management considered the
estimates to be of high importance.
6.1.5. Goal setting
All interviewees reported that the project goals seemed realistic and achievable at the beginning
of the project, and that everybody pursued realistic estimates. In Case 2, Service Provider delivers
hundreds of projects yearly, while in Case 3, Network Management System has four releases per
year, thus its management is likely to have a realistic picture of its organisational performance.
This probably also supports the setting of realistic and achievable goals for releases and projects.
In Case 1, the Tool project was using a new development methodology for the first time, meaning
relevant historical data about the process performance was lacking and goal setting was unsupported.
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In Case 1, Senior Business Manager had expressed the strategic importance of the project,
which he had initiated personally, prior to the estimation. Also a roadmap vision, which presented
a release date, had been communicated for the product. Furthermore, the scope of the project
was considered to be the minimum viable, meaning that the scope could not be reduced. As a
result, the estimator was facing a situation in which both the scope and schedule were effectively
set, which is always a challenging situation from project planning point of view. The estimator
describes having perceived pressure to fit the estimate to these expectations and having started
to doubt the estimates when they did not match initial expectations. Case 1, the Tool project,
thus seems to have experienced the anchoring phenomena [4, 40], i.e. the estimate is affected by an
expressed starting point. However, Senior Business Manager of Case 1 points out that flexibility in
resources and schedule was emphasised prior to estimation.
6.1.6. Provided direction
The interviewees in Case 1 report that there were different expectations for its outcome: Senior
Business Manager expected a strong commercial product, while others were building a pre-version,
which would contain the full scope of features but not on the quality level expected of a commercial
product. The expectation of the rest of the team was that the quality issue would have to be
addressed in the next version of the product. This difference in the expectations was probably a
significant source of estimation error. Actions for error detection and customer feedback collection
add to the amount of work required, as do fixing bugs and improving functionalities based on
customer feedback.
6.2. Communication
The role of the written documents, as required by the processes, was significant in Case 1 and
Case 2, which followed Waterfall-like development methods. The projects had significantly invested
in preparing the documents on which the estimates were heavily reliant. Interviewees from both
projects reported that the documents were detailed and of high quality. Also the Network Man-
agement System team in Case 3 used documentation as part of its estimation but—as is typical
of agile development—it did not have an official role. The documents were prepared on demand
when necessary, including pre-studies, memos, presentations and user stories. In addition to the
documents, Software Vendor in Case 1 had developed a prototype to get more information on the
application area. Prototypes are artefacts, which are likely to support successful estimation because
they contain significant amounts of relevant information on the estimated application area and an-
swer many questions relevant to estimation [5]. Tech Giant in Case 3 also reports that it occasionally
uses prototypes, while the Business Manager from Service Provider adds that prototypes would be
useful but are not utilised at the moment.
While the interviewees recognised the importance of the written documents, all the interviewees
in Case 2 and Case 3 emphasised that the process of preparing an estimate is more important
than the result itself. The Requirements Engineer and the Project Manager in Case 3 describe the
importance of mutual understanding, and all reported that truly understanding each other’s needs is
crucial. The Requirements Engineer pointed out that estimates become ever more reliable through
discussions and said that he is satisfied when all the questions are answered. The Requirements
Engineer also highlighted the fact that working together provides confidence in each other. Group
estimation sessions were used regularly in both Case 2 and Case 3. The Senior Manager at Case 3
concluded that a good estimate is based on good skills in preparing the specifications and having
a broad knowledge about the application area and software development — the majority of the
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Network Management System project team members in Case 3 had worked on the product for
five or more years. Communication seems to be central to estimation in Case 3 because issues like
multiple locations and time zones hindering estimation were mentioned. Agile grooming was also
mentioned as an important forum for estimation and related communication.
In Case 2, the Project Manager and Testing Manager reported that good cooperation and
fact based communication with customers supported estimation. They also emphasised the role of
feedback. The interviewees at Case 2 described team members as competent in their area of expertise,
stating that estimates were prepared together to a large extent. The Testing Manager added that
the atmosphere was open in general. Peer estimation was used on both the programming and PM
level. The Project Manager stated that being able to receive consultation or a peer review from
another project manager is more important than using information systems to support estimation.
The Business Manager added that the project’s estimation succeeded because they understood the
customer’s needs. The Software Developer expanded on that by saying the estimation succeeded
because all the details relevant to the case were found. The Testing Manager described an estimation
as meaningful if the right experts were consulted and involved in discussions.
In Case 1, the communication relied more on the documentation. The project manager who
prepared the estimate described it as being stored on a shared folder, although no feedback was
received. The estimate was based on a design document, which was prepared by the Product Owner.
The Project Manager revealed that there had been some discussions with the Product Owner to
scope down certain features but the Product Owner and the Senior Technical Manager reported
that the estimate had not been challenged at any phase. However, they both stated that they had
been sceptical about the estimate but could not point out exactly where the problems resided, and
therefore did not raise their reservations. In general, the interviewees reported very few occasions
when the estimate would have been discussed. The communication relied mostly on documents
prepared by individuals. However, the Senior Technical Manager and Product Owner reported that
the atmosphere was open and there was no pressure not to discuss a topic.
6.3. Process maturity
6.3.1. Estimation maturity
All of the case study companies had a documented software process describing how estimation
was related to the whole and which documents were required, but only Service Provider in Case 2
had a written procedure for the estimation itself. However, Tech Giant in Case 3 had established
estimation procedures, although not documented. Service Provider (Case 2) and Tech Giant (Case
3) had used the same practices for several years, whereas this was the first time for Software Vendor
(Case 1) using the estimation procedure in question. The interviewees at Tech Giant and Service
Provider reported that they had a history of making successful estimates, while the interviewees at
Software Vendor stated that they tend to underestimate and have a poor track record in estimation.
The progress of the project was monitored from the estimation point of view in all case projects.
In Case 1, the estimate was presented as a single point estimate. In Case 2, the estimate was
presented as a range, consisting of an optimistic, pessimistic and nominal scenario. In Case 3, the
target was to deliver at least 85% of the nominal estimate, which can also be seen as a range. The
actual project team was more or less known in all projects at the time of estimation. The interviewees
in Cases 2 and 3 report that the general estimation capabilities are good, emphasising the importance
of professional competence in estimation. The interviewees in Case 1 reported that their estimation
capabilities and experience are low. There has also been training related to estimation practices in
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Table 6. Summary of SCE capability findings.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Company Software Vendor Service Provider Tech Giant
Project Tool Operational Control
System
Network Management
System
Use of an estimation methodology (–) No defined
standard practice
(+) Work break-down,
historical data,
software tool
(+) Agile grooming,
work break-down,
historical data
Proper communication (+) Assumptions
presented
(–) Single point
(+) Assumptions
presented, range
(+) Assumptions
presented, range
Re-estimation and follow-up (+) Regular follow-up (+) Regular follow-up (+) Regular follow-up
Documented estimation procedure (–) No documented or
established procedure
(+) Documented
procedure adjusted for
the application area,
improved continuously
(+) Established, but
(–) Not documented
Other (–) Short experience,
low competence, poor
track record
(+) Long experience,
high competence, good
track record
(+) Long experience,
high competence, good
track record
Case 2 and Case 3. In Case 2, at Service Provider, there was a named person who was responsible
for developing estimation practices, which was not the case at the other two companies.
Applying the CMM scale from 1 (low maturity) to 5 (high maturity) and related behavioural
characteristics [67, pp. 9–14] to SCE maturity, Service Provider (Case 2) was assessed as being on
the highest level, level 5. Their estimation procedures produce reliable results, which are adjusted
to specific application areas and technologies and there is systematic work to improve estimation
practices. According to our assessment, Tech Giant (Case 3) is on level 4, meaning that while there
is room for improvement, the standard processes are defined and established and produce reliable
results. Finally, Software Vendor (Case 1) is on level 2, meaning that the processes are defined and
may support the production of consistent results. However, in practice, the process discipline was
low and the defined practices cannot be applied in real-world situations consistently and successfully.
Table 6 summarises the findings on the SCE procedures used in our case projects; categorised
according to the SCE capability criteria defined in Section 4.2. The SCE maturity, when set against
the criteria in Table 5, seems to correlate well with the CMM maturity levels and the related
behavioural characteristics: Service Provider and Tech Giant have practices in place for repeating
processes and gaining predictable results. This issue will be discussed more in Section 6.1. There
was no standard practices that support the development of consistency at Software Vendor.
6.3.2. Software process maturity
In Case 1, the process used for Tool was relatively new, implemented in the first half of 2014, and
was followed by an organisational change in the second half of 2014. The company was adopting
Scrum methodology and abandoning the process used in the case project. The Senior Technical
Manager of the company said that the primary focus has always been on programming at the cost
of other things, such as leadership and PM. The interviewees also referred to similar overruns in
projects resembling Tool.
In Case 2, the project manager reported that they deliver hundreds of projects yearly using the
same delivery process as used in the case project. The processes are stable and under constant devel-
opment. According to the Project Manager and Business Manager, the results have been generally
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good, which was also true of the case project. There has also been training related to the different
aspects of the software project delivery model.
Also, Tech Giant in Case 3 has used the current Scrum based process for approximately seven
years. According to the Line Manager, the process was under constant development, which was
supported by comments from other interviewees. However, the two representatives from product
management report that there is still much room for improvement, especially regarding the basing
of estimates on current data instead of historical data and the managing of dependencies. Regardless
of the pointers for improvement, the product management representative, and other interviewees,
described the overall software development performance as good.
To recapitulate, according to our assessment of the overall software process maturity, Software
Vendor (Case 1), Service Provider (Case 2) and Tech Giant (Case 3) are on the CMM levels 2, 5
and 5, respectively. A summary of the assessment findings is presented in Appendix B.
6.3.3. Attitudes
All the interviewees in this study recognised the importance of estimation. The reasons for the
experienced importance varied. In Case 3, the Senior Manager argued that estimation facilitates the
planning process before the actual work, connecting work to reality. In Case 1, the Project Manager
stated that estimation is important from the planning perspective and the Testing Manager in
Case 2 concurred. Nevertheless, estimation was experienced as being of high importance. In all case
projects, the project manager had the overall responsibility for preparing the estimate. All of the
project managers reported that their commitment to the estimate was high.
In Case 1, the general attitudes towards estimation were negative. For example the Senior
Technical Manager, Project Manager and Product Owner argued that estimates were not trusted
because they are likely to fail. The Senior Technical Manager stated that people are indifferent
about the estimates because the usual reaction to overruns is just to continue the project. The
Project Manager reported that he did not like giving an estimate and was afraid that the estimate
would be interpreted as a commitment. During the re-estimation of the functionalities, the Project
Manager described having given upper-bound estimates due to the high level of uncertainty, which
also led to the implementation team’s reluctance to estimate.
In Case 2, the Customer Manager describes the general attitude towards estimation as good and
all the other interviewees agreed, reporting that estimation was a meaningful and motivating task.
However, the Testing Manager and Software Developer report that when they are asked for quick and
rough estimates, the work does not feel meaningful. They felt that some experts in their company,
at Service Provider, take estimation too lightly, not necessarily recognising it as demanding and
important work, although the importance of an estimate is understood by all. The Project Manager
commented that estimates are sometimes given reluctantly because they are then interpreted as
commitments. The Requirements Engineer reported that estimation was not necessarily a pleasant
task due to its difficulty. However, the interviewees agreed that estimation generally works well.
In Case 3, the Requirements Engineer and Project Manager stated that estimation is not a
pleasant task, though the discussions are seen as meaningful and relevant. Like the two interviewees
in the Operational Control System project, the Requirement Engineer in the Network Management
System project said making quick, rough estimates was not motivating. The Line Manager noted
that estimators may be afraid that the estimates may not be as desired or that inaccurate estimates
will lead to re-planning and corrective actions in the later phases of a project. Estimating was seen
as an onerous responsibility. The Senior Manager commented that the development organisation
should improve their estimation practices in order to improve the accuracy.
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7. Discussion
The following Section 7.1 presents the key findings of this study. The remainder of this section
will present the academical (Section 7.2) and practical implications (Section 7.3) of this study,
addressing the study’s limitations and giving pointers for future research (Section 7.4).
7.1. Key findings
In this study, we have focused on gaining insight into top management’s role in SCE and discovering
organisational phenomena that either support or hinder successful SCE. There were two main
research questions: (RQ1) What are the real-world organisational factors that either support or
hinder the creation of a meaningful software cost estimate? (RQ2) What is the impact of top
management in either supporting or hindering software cost estimation practices?
The primary findings of the study are summarised in Table 7. We demonstrate that communi-
cation, attitudes and process maturity seem to support and hinder the creation of meaningful SCE
(RQ1). Furthermore, top management’s support and realism were found to support the results of
SCE, although anchoring and the lack of a shared project vision were found to hinder SCE (RQ2).
Finally, many of the factors affecting SCE, such as communication, providing resources and shared
vision, have been found to affect project execution as well. This overlap is natural, since both SCE
and project execution are inseparable parts of a software project. Our study, however, focuses on
SCE influences, and presents evidence on factors affecting SCE specifically.
7.2. Implications for theory
It has been argued that only a very few papers examine the organisational context of SCE and how
its methodologies are applied in real-world situations [39]. According to Jørgensen and Shepperd [39],
the basic problems experienced by software companies in relation to SCE are not technical. Hence,
this paper has specifically focused on the organisational context related to SCE and in increasing
our understanding of the prerequisites for meaningful SCE. This paper also demonstrates that SCE
research remains focused on technical issues, while the focus of PM research has undergone a major
shift from a technical to a managerial focus.
The primary finding of this study is that there seems to be a connection between the software
process maturity, estimation maturity and estimation success. The maturity as a construct consists
of several factors. Our study did not identify individual significant organisational factors, which alone
would make estimation successful. The connection between the maturity and estimation success
suggests that successful estimation is a sum of several factors, such as communication, competence,
experience and attitudes.
The more specific results from this study show that commonly used estimation techniques,
WBS and expert estimation, can produce good results, if the overall project management and
software practices are established and produce consistent results. This paper also suggests that
communication is an important factor in the scope of SCE. Furthermore, the findings suggest that
SCE should not set any specific requirements for top management, other than that they should
carry out their basic responsibilities effectively and avoid the harmful anchoring of estimates.
The finding of this study also correlate well with the previous studies in the area of organisational
context and human factors. From the organisational context point of view, Magazinovic and Pernstål
[52] researched causes for estimation error, also validating results of Lederer and Prasad’s [45] earlier
study. They found that management goals affect the results of estimation. This seemed to happen
also in Case 1 of our study. Also, in the same study, they found that unclear requirements are
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Table 7. Summary of findings from the case projects by category
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Company Software Vendor Service Provider Tech Giant
Project Tool Operational Control System Network Management
System
Outcome Challenged Success Success
Management role (+) Strong support, realism
pursued, enough resources
(–) Anchoring, no shared
project vision
(+) Strong support, realism
pursued, enough resources
(+) Strong support, realism
pursued, enough resources
Communication (+) Detailed plans and
specifications, prototype
(–) Estimate prepared by
one person, lack of
discussions and cooperation
(+) Detailed plans and
specifications, mutual
understanding and insight
pursued, cooperation
intensive process, expertise
and competence emphasised,
shared project vision
(+) Aide memoir
documentation, mutual
understanding and insight
pursued, cooperation
intensive process, expertise
and competence emphasised,
shared project vision
Process maturity (+) Documented software
process, regular follow-up
(–) No documented
estimation procedure,
non-established processes,
no continuous improvement,
no training arranged, low
estimation experience and
competence, no historical
data used
(+) Documented software
process, documented
estimation procedure,
established processes,
continuous improvement,
training, historical success,
high estimation experience
and competence, estimate as
a range, regular follow-up
(+) Documented software
process, established
processes, continuous
improvement, training,
historical success, high
estimation experience and
competence, estimate as a
range, regular follow-up
(–) No documented
estimation procedure
Attitudes (+) Importance recognised
(+) Project manager
commitment high
(–) Generally not pleasant,
generally negative attitudes,
indifference to failure,
reluctance
(+) Importance recognised,
estimation regarded as
meaningful and motivating,
general opinion that
estimation works well
(+) Project manager
commitment high
(–) Quick, rough estimates
not motivating, sometimes
unpleasant because of
difficulty, some people do
not recognise its seriousness,
estimates interpreted as
commitments
(+) Importance recognised,
discussions regarded as
meaningful and motivating,
general opinion that
estimation works well
(+) Project manager
commitment high
(–) Generally not pleasant,
quick, rough estimates not
motivating, estimates
interpreted as commitments,
fear of failure, some
reluctance
a source for estimation error, and that organisations do not have guidelines for conducting cost
estimation. Our Case 1 suffered from unclear requirements, and Case 1 and Case 3 did not have
guidelines for estimation. Furthermore, Magazinius, Börjesson and Feldt [49] found that personal
agenda, management pressure and attempt to avoid re-estimation may affect the estimate. This
seemed to be the case also in the Tool project of our study. Promotion of the project [51] may also
explain parts of the tight target setting for the Tool project.
Cognitive bias is another non-technical topic related to SCE, which has gained attention recently.
While our primary focus was in the organisational context, we discovered the presence of anchoring
[40] in Case 1. There also seemed to be, at least to some extent, attitudinal tendency in all cases to
find hindrances for estimation outside the respondent’s direct influence, corresponding with [36].
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Based on the results presented above, this paper supports the assumption that the estimation
challenges experienced in companies are not only technical, but are also related to the organisational
context, specifically to the project management and software process maturity. Also, easy to use
estimation techniques may not be used by chance but because of the fact that these methods
require less organisational capabilities for their successful application. These findings, along with
similar findings, should justify SCE researchers shifting their research focus from technical topics
to managerial and processual ones.
7.3. Implications for practice
This study addressed the top management’s role in software cost estimation. In the following, we
will discuss the practical advice found in this research. These are categorized into four groups: top
management’s role, the importance of communication, organization’s process maturity and general
attitudes towards SCE.
7.3.1. Top management role
This study suggests that by supporting SCE through the basic TMS practices found in this study,
demonstrating SCE’s importance, reviewing plans, providing resources and ensuring a shared vision
and commitment, top management can create an environment for successful SCE. Earlier studies
support this conclusion. For example Boonstra [9] has found that the provision of resources, the
establishment of a clear and well defined project framework, communication with the project team,
being knowledgeable about a project and using power to resolve conflicts are important behavioural
categories for top management. Zwikael [91] has reported similar findings, and concludes that, e.g. an
organisational structure that is supportive of a project, communication between the project manager
and the organisation and appropriate project manager assignment have a positive impact on project
success. However, the previously defined behaviour is likely to be enough only in an environment
where management has already created the necessary capabilities and gained the required experience
for successful software work.
On the other hand, the results indicate that if there is a lack of a shared vision or a lack of
commitment, the negative impacts on SCE can be significant. This finding receives support from
earlier studies. White and Fortune [85] report that ‘Clear goals/objectives’ was the most frequently
mentioned success factor for projects. Fortune and White [21] report that ‘Clear realistic goals’ was
the second most cited factor for success. However, clearly expressed expectations may also become
harmful anchors and distort SCE, as found in this and other studies [4, 40].
In summary, successful SCE seems not to require any specific actions from top management, if
the general maturity of a work environment is good. Thus, it is enough if management performs
its role effectively by providing typical TMS behaviour. However, top management should avoid
situations in which their expectations could become anchors that negatively affect SCE.
7.3.2. Communication
The results provide evidence that communication related issues are important factors in successful
SCE, when work breakdown structure (WBS) and expert estimation are in use. In both of the
successful projects, Cases 2 and 3, the interviewees reported that mutual understanding and under-
standing the requirements were sought by management. Furthermore, there were many opportunities
and forums for discussions on the issues. Hence, cooperation was described as good and the expertise
as sufficient for reaching an adequate level of understanding.
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There are plenty of similar findings from other areas related to the importance of communication.
In the scope of project cost management, [18] has found that early interaction with key stakeholders
and the establishment of clear lines of communication for sharing professional and project based
knowledge are crucial during the inception phases of projects. Furthermore, the significant role of
communication in managing the coordination process has been addressed by Malone and Crowston
[53]. Communication has been found to be a common success factor when discussing change in
software projects and teams [80] and the best way to build trust in development teams [27]. Com-
munication has also been found to make software development more efficient in companies [65] and
is one of the cornerstones of agile development [7]. In the scope of SCE, Jørgensen [36] noted, in
a case study, that poor communication skills or team dynamics might have had an impact on the
SCE’s result in one team.
On a practical level, these findings suggest that project managers, software professionals and
other project team members should focus on achieving an understanding of requirements through
discussion, instead of focusing on compliance, techniques and documentation.
7.3.3. Process maturity
All of the case projects used easy to implement [37] estimation methodologies, such as WBS, expert
estimation and group estimation. The methodologies seem to produce useful results in a mature
environment. Established processes and at least moderate maturity seem to be the key to successful
application of estimation methodologies. This conclusion also receives support from earlier research.
The success of expert estimation has been shown by Jørgensen [35] and studies on the impact of
CMM levels on estimation results show that companies who have levels from three to five produce
significantly more accurate results than companies on the lower maturity levels [20, 55, p. 10].
However, although the estimation accuracy and CMM level seem to correlate with each other,
we would like to point out that there seems to be no significant correlation between the project
management maturity (PMM) of an organisation and the project success [86]. The correlation
between the CMM level and estimation accuracy observed in this study occurs within the studied
area of maturity, SCE being part of the software process maturity.
Maturity as a construct consists of several factors, like experience, skills and processes. While we
report several maturity related findings connected to successful estimation, like training, experience
and continuous improvement, we believe that none of the individual factors is likely to lead to
success on its own. However, a lack of one of those factors may have significant negative impacts.
Thus, based on our findings, we decided to focus on maturity as a whole, instead of individual
factors.
Software process maturity (or project management maturity), estimation maturity and attitudes
seem to have a clear interrelationship. If software process maturity is good, estimation maturity
seems to be good, furthermore attitudes become more positive. This is not surprising, because SCE
is part of a software project and managed under the relevant software project or software process
management. The CMMmodel does not include attitudes in its attributes, although, for example, [3]
suggest attitudes are an important factor in project management maturity, in addition to knowledge
and action. However, the true relationship between these three is beyond the scope of our study.
Considering the previous and the findings presented in Table 7, it seems intuitive that the
overall maturity correlates with the estimation success. This is supported by Flowe and Thordahl
[20] and findings from Boeing, presented by McConnell [55, p.10]. Furthermore, each of the elements
of maturity is likely to contribute to estimation success also individually. For example Jørgensen
[35] has provided evidence that training opportunities, good estimator competence and use of an
estimation checklist improve estimation success. In other words, the more there are elements of high
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maturity present, the higher is the probability of estimation success, and vice versa, low presence
of high maturity elements increases uncertainties in estimation.
Our advice for organisations would be to include a simple maturity self assessment in the software
cost estimation process, for example based on a publicly available criteria like CMM or CMMI. If the
maturity is assessed to be low, a thorough uncertainty analysis is appropriate. Even knowledge of a
high level of uncertainty may help managers in their decision making, even though the uncertainties
could not be mitigated. Also, we understand that self assessments are perhaps not typical for low
maturity organisations. However, use of a simple maturity assessment is far easier than accounting
the whole industrial and scientific body of knowledge as individual items. In the beginning, the
awareness of the high level of uncertainty could help to make better decisions, and in the longer
term act as a list of development pointers towards higher maturity.
For the practitioners in higher maturity organisations, we suggest addressing specific estimation
challenges, like estimating change requests or estimating testing. For example, those two areas seem
to be sources of errors [72] and serve to decrease motivation, even in exemplary organisations. Also
the relationship between the estimate, target and commitment is not always clear, which has been
reported as resulting in a reluctance to make estimates; the importance of making a distinction
between these three aspects is addressed by McConnell [55].
7.3.4. Attitudes
In cases 2 and 3, project managers had the overall responsibility of preparing the estimate, while
the actual estimation was done by software developers. In both projects the estimation was seen as
an important and relevant task, and the project managers reported that they were committed to
the estimates.
However, in both projects the developers’ attitudes towards estimation were negative. Estimation
was not considered as a pleasant task and reluctancy and low motivation were reported, especially
originating from lack of trust and quickly emerging needs requiring flexibility. Negative attitudes, low
motivation and reluctance have been found to decrease the quality of work [73]. Although estimates
and outcomes have correlated well in these two projects, it is likely that the risk of estimation error
increases when negative attitudes are present, especially in low maturity organisations. Trust and
flexibility as values have been found to have a positive effect on project outcome [90]. A trivial
advice is to support a positive atmosphere around estimation. However, further research is needed
to provide better and more specific advice on this topic.
7.4. Limitations and future work
Although we have taken a number of countermeasures to validity threats (see Section 5.6), and
improved the transferability of the results by collecting a rich set of data, this research has certain
limitations. This research considered the organisational phenomena on a general level, without
taking the project or organisation specific characteristics, like development methodology or company
size, into account in the study design.
The findings provide evidence that, on a general level, organisational issues, like the role of man-
agement, process maturity and communication, are important factors in SCE. However, although
we believe that the results are transferable to similar project settings, the organisational challenges
may vary between different contexts. For example, we may have overlooked some organisational
properties or mechanisms, like the size of the company, which causes variation between projects. In
addition, there are different reasons for the cost estimates: one company was using them to set the
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price to the customer while the others were seeking balancing content and timing of their products
with the estimates.
Therefore, we encourage further studies in different project and company contexts to see if the
same phenomena are repeated, or if there are other context specific phenomena not discovered in this
study. Quantitative studies would also provide insight in how commonly the reported phenomena
repeat in organisations.
This study also provides evidence that there is an interrelationship between the estimation ma-
turity and project management maturity. This is an important observation, and should be confirmed
with a quantitative study that considers a large number of projects as well as studied qualitatively
to understand the phenomenon. For example, it might just be that companies with a low CMM
level do not recognize that there are situations when it is inappropriate to estimate at all (e.g., new
development and estimation methods, new product with no client). This is a lack of risk management
procedures, not just an estimation problem.
The findings of this paper are based on three projects, and do not provide a generalizable level of
confidence for their relationship. The SCE maturity and software process maturity were also assessed
only to the extent necessary for the purposes of this study. We suggest that further studies establish
a more precise model for assessing SCE maturity and conduct the actual maturity assessment with
maturity as the sole focus of the study.
As an exploratory study, the purpose was also to generate new theories and pointers for further
research. One interesting observation revealed by this study was that the attitudes towards esti-
mation were negative among the developers participating in estimation, whereas the attitudes of
the project managers were positive and the level of commitment to the estimation high. Negative
attitudes may be a source of estimation errors, and increase the probability of overruns. This should
be studied further, since negative attitudes hinder any work.
From the construct point of view, the aim was to discover organisational factors affecting SCE.
We covered many relevant aspects related to the organisational context in which the estimation
took place. Thus, we studied what we planned to study and felt that we developed a clear picture
of each of the studied projects.
Generally speaking this study has found that management and process related topics are equally
important from the SCE point of view as estimation technique related topics. This suggests that
SCE research would benefit from approaching those topics from a PM or software process point
of view, and that elements from these areas should be synthesised into SCE research. Lastly, as
demonstrated in the introduction of this paper, e.g. PM research is more advanced than SCE
research on management and other organisation related issues.
8. Conclusions
Many researchers and practitioners argue that organisational issues are equally important from
the software estimation success point of view as technical issues. Some of the often cited works
related to this important topic have been Lederer and Prasad [45], Jørgensen and Shepperd [39]
and Magazinovic and Pernstål [52]. Regardless of this knowledge of the importance of organisational
issues in SCE, the focus of the SCE research has remained heavily on estimation methodologies and
other technical issues.
The findings of this paper have potential to contribute to the current body of knowledge on
organisational issues related to SCE, and specifically on top management’s role, in several ways,
regardless of the limited transferability of the results. By using exploratory case study approach and
interviewing 15 practitioners involved in software development in three organisations, we have found
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that the role of top management is important in creating prerequisites for meaningful estimation,
but their day-to-day participation is not required for successful estimation. Top management may
also induce undesired distortion in estimation. We have also found that estimation maturity and
estimation success seem to have an interrelationship with software process maturity, but there seem
to be no significant individual organisational factors, which alone would make estimation successful.
Additionally, our study validated many of the distortions and biases reported in the earlier studies,
and showed that the SCE research focus has remained on estimation methodologies.
Low maturity organisations may be able to reduce overruns through a better understanding
of their increased risk level and the existence of good estimation practices. We suggest therefore
that future studies and software process improvement activities should pay more attention to low
maturity organisations and their specific needs.
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A. Interview instrument
1. Introduction (approximately 5 minutes)
– A brief introduction to the study.
– An introduction of the benefits of participation
– Anonymity and confidentiality.
2. Personal, team and project background (approximately 5 minutes)
– Interviewee’s personal history and job position in the company.
– Background of the estimated project and the development methodology that was used.
3. Current state of SCE in the organisation (approximately 25 minutes)
– Describe the procedure for creating the estimate.
– Describe the method for creating the estimate of the effort required.
– Describe the responsibilities related to maintaining and improving the software and estima-
tion practices.
– Describe the outcome of the estimation.
– Describe the approach to re-estimation during the project.
4. Experiences of organisational phenomena affecting the four SCE aspects (approximately 20
minutes)
– Describe the management, project manager and personal expectations of the estimate.
– Describe the overall SCE skills and motivation in your organisation during the estimation.
– Describe the demonstrated importance and attitudes regarding the estimate.
– Describe the ways in which top management and other stakeholders were involved in SCE.
– Did the project have clear goals and realistic expectations?
– Was there pressure to make the estimate smaller or other pressures?
– Was the estimate allowed to change over time?
– Was there enough time allocated for preparing the estimate?
– Did all stakeholders seek realistic and accurate estimates?
– What was the level of commitment of different stakeholders to the estimate?
– What were the primary issues hindering and supporting successful estimation?
5. Ending (approximately 5 minutes)
– Any other relevant observations that we have not covered?
B. Software process CMM level assessment summary
The following tables 8, 9, 10 and 11 presents our CMM assessments for levels 2, 3, 4 and 5, respec-
tively, to the case study companies.
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Table 8. The Key Process Areas for Level 2: Repeatable
Software Service Tech
Process area Goal Vendor Provider Giant
Requirements Management System requirements allocated to software are
controlled to establish a baseline for software en-
gineering and management use.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Requirements Management Software plans, products, and activities are kept
consistent with the system requirements allocated
to software.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Software Project Planning Software estimates are documented for use in
planning and tracking the software project.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Software Project Planning Software project activities and commitments are
planned and documented.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Software Project Planning Affected groups and individuals agree to their
commitments related to the software project.
N/A N/A N/A
Software Project Tracking
and Oversight
Actual results and performances are tracked
against the software plans.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Software Project Tracking
and Oversight
Corrective actions are taken and managed to clo-
sure when actual results and performance deviate
significantly from the software plans.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Software Project Tracking
and Oversight
Changes to software commitments are agreed to
by the affected groups and individuals.
N/A N/A N/A
Software Subcontract Man-
agement
The prime contractor selects qualified software
subcontractors.
N/A N/A N/A
Software Subcontract Man-
agement
The prime contractor and the software subcon-
tractor agree to their commitments to each other.
N/A N/A N/A
Software Subcontract Man-
agement
The prime contractor and the software subcon-
tractor maintain ongoing communications.
N/A N/A N/A
Software Subcontract Man-
agement
The prime contractor tracks the software subcon-
tractor’s actual results and performance against
its commitments.
N/A N/A N/A
Software Quality Assurance Software quality assurance activities are planned. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Software Quality Assurance Adherence of software products and activities to
the applicable standards, procedures, and require-
ments is verified objectively.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Software Quality Assurance Affected groups and individuals are informed of
software quality assurance activities and results.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Software Quality Assurance Noncompliance issues that cannot be resolved
within the software project are addressed by se-
nior management.
N/A N/A N/A
Software Network Manage-
ment Management
Software configuration management activities are
planned.
N/A N/A N/A
Software Network Manage-
ment Management
Selected software work products are identified,
controlled, and available.
N/A N/A N/A
Software Network Manage-
ment Management
Changes to identified software work products are
controlled.
N/A N/A N/A
Software Network Manage-
ment Management
Affected groups and individuals are informed of
the status and content of software baselines.
N/A N/A N/A
Notes: Yes. - assessment provides evidence of fulfilling the goal; No. - assessment provides evidence of not fulfilling the
goal; N/A - fulfillment of the goal was not assessed.
The Role of Organisational Phenomena in Software Cost Estimation 33
Table 9. The Key Process Areas for Level 3: Defined
Software Service Tech
Process area Goal Vendor Provider Giant
Organization Process Focus Software process development and improve-
ment activities are coordinated across the or-
ganization.
No. Yes. Yes.
Organization Process Focus The strengths and weaknesses of the software
processes used are identified relative to a pro-
cess standard.
N/A N/A N/A
Organization Process Focus Organization-level process development and
improvement activities are planned.
No. Yes. Yes.
Organization Process Definition A standard software process for the organiza-
tion is developed and maintained.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Organization Process Definition Information related to the use of the organi-
zation’s standard software process by the soft-
ware projects is collected, reviewed, and made
available.
N/A N/A N/A
Training Program Training activities are planned. No. Yes. Yes.
Training Program Training for developing the skills and knowl-
edge needed to perform software management
and technical roles is provided.
No. Yes. Yes.
Training Program Individuals in the software engineering group
and software-related groups receive the train-
ing necessary to perform their roles.
No. Yes. Yes.
Integrated Software Manage-
ment
The project’s defined software process is a tai-
lored version of the organization’s standard
software process.
N/A N/A N/A
Integrated Software Manage-
ment
The project is planned and managed according
to the project’s defined software process.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Software Product Engineering The software engineering tasks are defined, in-
tegrated, and consistently performed to pro-
duce the software.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Software Product Engineering Software work products are kept consistent
with each other.
N/A N/A N/A
Intergroup Coordination The customer’s requirements are agreed to by
all affected groups.
No. Yes. Yes.
Intergroup Coordination The commitments between the engineering
groups are agreed to by the affected groups.
N/A N/A N/A
Intergroup Coordination The engineering groups identify, track, and re-
solve intergroup issues.
N/A N/A N/A
Peer Reviews Peer review activities are planned. No. Yes. Yes.
Peer Reviews Defects in the software work products are iden-
tified and removed.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Notes: Yes. - assessment provides evidence of fulfilling the goal; No. - assessment provides evidence of not fulfilling the
goal; N/A - fulfillment of the goal was not assessed.
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Table 10. The Key Process Areas for Level 4: Managed
Software Service Tech
Process area Goal Vendor Provider Giant
Quantitative Process Management The quantitative process management ac-
tivities are planned.
No. Yes. Yes.
Quantitative Process Management The process performance of the project’s
defined software process is controlled quan-
titatively.
N/A N/A N/A
Quantitative Process Management The process capability of the organiza-
tion’s standard software process is known
in quantitative terms.
No. Yes. Yes.
Software Quality Management The project’s software quality manage-
ment activities are planned.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Software Quality Management Measurable goals for software product
quality and their priorities are defined.
N/A N/A N/A
Software Quality Management Actual progress toward achieving the qual-
ity goals for the software products is quan-
tified and managed.
N/A N/A N/A
Notes: Yes. - assessment provides evidence of fulfilling the goal; No. - assessment provides evidence of not fulfilling the
goal; N/A - fulfillment of the goal was not assessed.
Table 11. The Key Process Areas for Level 5: Optimizing
Software Service Tech
Process area Goal Vendor Provider Giant
Defect Prevention Defect prevention activities are planned. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Defect Prevention Common causes of defects are sought out
and identified.
N/A N/A Yes.
Defect Prevention Common causes of defects are prioritized
and systematically eliminated.
N/A N/A N/A
Technology Change Management Incorporation of technology changes are
planned.
N/A N/A N/A
Technology Change Management New technologies are evaluated to deter-
mine their effect on quality and productiv-
ity.
N/A N/A N/A
Technology Change Management Appropriate new technologies are trans-
ferred into normal practice across the or-
ganization.
N/A N/A N/A
Process Change Management Continuous process improvement is
planned.
No. Yes. Yes.
Process Change Management Participation in the organization’s soft-
ware process improvement activities is or-
ganization wide.
No. Yes. Yes.
Process Change Management The organization’s standard software pro-
cess and the project’s’ defined software
processes are improved continuously.
No. Yes. Yes.
Notes: Yes. - assessment provides evidence of fulfilling the goal; No. - assessment provides evidence of not fulfilling the
goal; N/A - fulfillment of the goal was not assessed.
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